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Introduction
This dissertation focuses on optimal income taxation theory and analyses how the optimal
income tax schedule changes when non-welfarist objectives expressed in terms of inequality and
polarization reduction are pursued. The structure of the thesis consists of four chapters:
 Chapter 1: Optimal income taxation and non-welfarist objectives. Theoretical vs prac-
tical perspectives.
 Chapter 2: Optimal non-welfarist income taxation for inequality and polarization re-
duction.
 Chapter 3: Optimal redistribution with non-welfarist objectives.
 Chapter 4: Optimal non-welfarist taxation with non-constant labour supply elasticity.
Over the last two decades many countries have experienced a remarkable increase in income
inequality and polarization. On the other hand, policy makers have continuously modied the
tax systems towards more simplied schemes with few income brackets and lower top tax rates.
Recent literature has addressed the question if the increasing trends of income inequality can
be explained by these changes.
In this work we investigate how the optimal tax system should be designed in order to
achieve inequality and polarization reduction objectives. To this end, in line with recent works
by Kanbur et al. (2006) and Saez and Stantcheva (2016) we adopt a non-welfarist approach,
moreover we focus on piecewise linear tax systems. By choosing the non-welfarist approach we
recognize that redistributive objectives are crucial per se to the determination of the optimal tax
schedule, and not necessarily because of the shape of agentsutility functions. In fact, to this
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regard Kanbur et al. (2006) claim that governments should not evaluate social welfare taking
into account only individualsutility. Individuals preferences indeed, can be manipulated or
agentsbehaviors could not be socially optimal.
Conventionally the main di¤erence between welfarism and non-welfarism is that in the latter,
the argument of the governments social welfare function is di¤erent from individualsutility.
To this end, we focus on incomes as the most appropriate variable to investigate when the
government objectives are the reduction of inequality, poverty or polarization.
We formalize the non-welfarist objectives by assuming that the government maximizes a
rank-dependent social evaluation function dened over individualsnet incomes, subject to a
budget constraint. Then, the evaluation of the income distribution can be summarized by the
mean income of the distribution and a linear index of dispersion dependent on the choice of
the weighting function. More specically, we consider two weighting functions which allow to
formalize redistributive objectives expressed in terms of changes in the Gini index of incomes in
case of inequality considerations. Then, by appropriate modications of the positional weights
it is possible, within the same evaluation model, to shift towards evaluation concerned with the
polarization of incomes.
We consider piecewise linear tax systems that represent the most commonly internationally
adopted scheme and the easiest way to identify changes in the tax schedule when the govern-
ments concerns move from inequality to polarization reduction. The results we obtain make
explicit the interlink between the redistributive objective and the theoretical optimal shape of
the tax schemes.
Chapter 1 presents a survey of the main results of the optimal taxation literature, distin-
guishing between the welfarist and the non-welfarist approach.
Chapter 2 represents the core of this dissertation and it aims at investigating the e¤ect of
di¤erent redistributive objectives on the shape of the optimal tax schedule.1 In particular, we
consider a piecewise linear tax system with three income brackets and two di¤erent regime of
the tax rates, i.e. convex (t1  t2  t3) and non-convex (t1  t3  t2). The goal of the chapter is
to identify the socially desirable mechanism collecting a given amount of taxes, given a specic
1A version of Chapter 2 is also available as: Prete, Sommacal and Zoli (2016), "Optimal Non-Welfarist Income
Taxation for Inequality and Polarization Reduction".
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non-welfarist redistributive objective, i.e. inequality and polarization reduction.
The optimal tax system is derived both with xed and with variable labour supply. The
most interesting result we obtain is that the redistributive objectives matter as the optimal
tax schedule substantially changes depending on whether the government is inequality or po-
larization sensitive. In particular, with xed labour supply (which represents the benchmark
case) the optimal tax system reducing income inequality requires a no-tax area until a given
threshold and the maximal admissible taxation above that threshold, which is set in order to
satisfy the revenue requirement. In other words, our results suggest that to reduce income in-
equality the solution is to reduce the income distance between incomes within the tax-area and
between these incomes and those in the no-tax area. As to polarization reduction, the optimal
tax system requires to tax with the maximum admissible tax rate all incomes belonging to a
central interval, which includes also the median income. Marginal tax rates within the two
external brackets are set equal to zero. Therefore, the solution to reduce polarization requires
to reduce the distance between the incomes in the central bracket, in order to create a sort of
less disperse middle class. Note that all incomes in the highest bracket are taxed according to
a lump-sum taxation, keeping their absolute dispersion unchanged.
By introducing labour supply elasticity, which is assumed to be constant throughout the
entire income distribution, the results are qualitatively una¤ected. That is, the optimal tax
system reducing inequality is convex, unless when labour supply elasticity is high. While the
optimal tax system for the reduction of polarization is non-convex with reduced marginal tax
rate for the upper income bracket.
Chapters 3 and 4 integrate the analysis of Chapter 2. In particular, the main novelty of
Chapter 3 is the introduction of the possibility to use lump-sum transfers (taxation and sub-
sidy). In this chapter we consider a set of piecewise tax systems with two and three income
brackets and two regimes of the tax rates, i.e. convex and non-convex. Here, the results we ob-
tain are completely di¤erent with respect to those described in Chapter 2 where redistribution
is not allowed. More specically, when labour supply is xed the solution is independent of the
governments redistributive objective. The optimal tax system is based on a proportional tax-
ation with the highest admissible tax rate. The collected amount is then equally redistributed,
eventually keeping the share of income needed to cover the revenue requirement.
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When we introduce labour supply elasticity the scenario becomes less obvious. In particular,
the non-welfarist objectives become again crucial as the optimal tax system changes when the
governments focus shifts from inequality to polarization considerations. More specically, to
reduce inequality the optimal two brackets tax system requires a no taxation area below a given
threshold, above which taxation is proportional. The threshold and the tax rate are respectively
increasing and decreasing in the level of elasticity. As to polarization reduction, the optimal two
brackets tax system requires a proportional taxation for all incomes below a given threshold
and zero marginal tax rate for all incomes above. Both the threshold and the tax rate are
decreasing in the level of labour supply elasticity, moreover when elasticity is high the optimal
tax system reducing polarization is based only on lump-sum taxation.
With three income brackets, the optimal tax system for inequality reduction is convex
unless when labour supply elasticity is high or the initial level of income inequality is low. For
the reduction of polarization the optimal tax system is always non-convex. In both cases the
marginal tax rates are decreasing in the level of labour supply elasticity.
The interesting aspect of the results of Chapter 3 is that the design of the optimal tax system
is independent of the revenue requirement, and the sign of the lump-sum transfer depends on
the di¤erence between the collected amount and the required revenue. Moreover the lump-sum
transfer is positive (subside) or negative (tax) depending on the combination of the level of
labour supply elasticity and the index of gross incomes dispersion. We also nd that lump-sum
taxation is more likely to be used to reduce polarization.
Last, in Chapter 4 we extend the analysis of Chapter 2 introducing the hypothesis that
labour supply elasticity is non-constant. In line with Aaberge et al. (2013) we assume that
labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the level of individualswage. The results we obtain
here, are qualitatively in line with those presented in Chapter 2. The optimal tax system reduc-
ing inequality and polarization are respectively convex and non-convex. The di¤erences with
respect to Chapter 2 are related to the magnitude of the marginal tax rates, which are lower for
the income percentiles exhibiting higher elasticity. In this last chapter, we also consider a third
weighting function taking into account both inequality and polarization concerns. Specically,
this weighting function is obtained as a linear combination of the two weighting functions used
for inequality and polarization concerns. Then, the shape of the optimal tax system associated
4
with this particular weighting function depends on the level of pre-tax dispersion. In particu-
lar, for high (low) level of pre-tax inequality and polarization the optimal tax system is convex
(non-convex).
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Chapter 1
Optimal Income Taxation and
Non-Welfarist Objectives.
Theoretical vs Practical Perspectives
In this work we investigate if normative recommendations of the optimal tax theory represent
a useful guide to understand reforms in the personal income tax systems. In other words, we
check if theory and practice move along the same directions. This analysis shows that some
theoretical results can be easily identiable in the tax changes of the last twenty-ve years.
This is the case of the attempts to reduce the complexity and to improve the e¢ ciency of the
tax systems. However, other trends of the tax reforms, like the reduction of the top tax rates
and of the progressivity of the tax systems, contrast with theoretical prescriptions suggesting,
instead, more progressive taxation and higher tax rates when the level of income inequality is
high.
1.1 Introduction
Evidence shows that OECD countries collect a remarkable fraction of their GDP in taxes. Over
the last fty years, the tax to GDP ratio has been slowly increasing in most of the advanced
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economies, exhibiting an average value of 34.4% in 2014.1
In addition, the total tax burden is not equally distributed among the di¤erent income
sources. More specically, as noted by Piketty and Saez (2012), the tax structure is such that
three quarters of taxes fall on labour income, with the personal income tax (PIT) collecting
about twenty-ve percent of the total tax revenues.
Tax structure in OECD area
The magnitude of these gures suggests that the tax system has a relevant impact on the
welfare of the society. To this regard, the main lesson from the optimal tax theory is that
a "good" tax system should achieve its economic and redistributive objectives, by minimizing
both e¢ ciency and welfare losses. In other words, when designing their tax system, governments
have to accept a compromise between the need to collect the required revenue to nance public
services and to carry out redistributive policies, and the need to limit as much as possible the
distortions on individualsdecisions.
This normative prescription has its foundation in the seminal work by Mirrlees (1971),
which represents the rst attempt to explicitly introduce e¢ ciency concerns in the design of
1See OECD (2015).
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the optimal income taxation. Since then both academic researchers and policy makers have
devoted a notable e¤ort in the attempt to identify the optimal tax system, namely, the e¢ cient
and equitable distribution of the tax burden across a population of heterogeneous individuals,
who di¤er in terms of their abilities and or incomes. The relevance of this (re)search is not only
conrmed by the presence of several theoretical models but also by the continuous reforms of the
tax systems. To this regard, indeed, Peter et al. (2009) considering a sample of 189 countries,
argue that from 1981 to 2005 on average each year about 50% of the countries modify the
personal income tax schedule, either by readjusting the statutory tax rates or by changing the
number of income brackets. Moreover compared to low and middle income countries, high
income economies tend to engage more in the identication of the optimal tax structure.2
After a more careful analysis, it is possible to identify two well dened traits of these changes,
that is a reduced level of progressivity and a higher simplicity of the PIT schedule. In particular,
the former is the result of the decline of the top tax rates nanced by a shift of the tax burden
over the middle of the income distribution. The latter, instead, is due to the reduction of the
number of tax brackets and the use of less sophisticated allowances and tax formula.3 Hence,
actual personal income tax systems appear less progressive and complex than those in the 80s.
However, are the evolution of tax reforms and theoretical literature following the same pat-
terns?
More generally, the spirit of this question is to investigate how divergent tax policy reforms
are from theoretical prescriptions, that is if policy makers are looking for the optimal tax system
by taking into account normative recommendations. To this regard, since Mirrlees (1971) all
theoretical models have formalized the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ in a tax formula which is
a function of three elements: the level of inequality in the wage or income distribution, the
governments attitude toward inequality and the extent to which individuals react to taxation.
In other words, given the dispersion level of individuals income distribution, a government
might want to reduce this inequality through the tax system and redistributing from high income
agents to low income ones. However, this redistributive policy may discourage individuals
labour supply decisions and then leads to e¢ ciency losses, whose size depends on the individuals
2See Peter et al (2009) Table 1.
3See Peter et al. (2009) Table 5 and Table 6.
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responsiveness to tax changes. Hence, inequality reduction entails a cost in terms of economic
e¢ ciency and welfare losses. From this perspective the choice of a particular tax schedule can be
seen as the result of the combination between governments objectives and initial circumstances.
Then, the previous question can be reformulated as follows:
Can tax changes represent the governments attempt to achieve some redistributive objec-
tives? Are the changes in the level of inequality (and polarization) driving the variations in the
PIT schedule? Does individuals responsiveness to taxation shape changes in the tax rates?
The remainder of this chapter provides an answer to those questions and it is structured as
follows: rst, we review the main theoretical results and their normative prescriptions. Then,
we analyze how changes in PIT schedule can be related to the theoretical literature. Second,
we describe the role of objectives and circumstances in shaping the optimal tax formula and the
redistributive policies. More specically, with regard to the objectives, we compare the standard
welfarist and the non-welfarist approach and we highlight how the optimal tax schedule changes
in both cases. Then, we see toward which approach the tax changes are moving. Finally, with
respect to circumstances, we analyze if changes in PIT can be reconciled with the trend of
inequality and polarization, or if there have been variations in the individuals labour supply
elasticity which can explain the pattern of tax changes.
1.2 The (re)-search of the optimal tax system. Theory vs prac-
tice
As it has been largely acknowledged Mirrlees(1971) paper represents the origin of the modern
analysis of optimal income taxation. By adopting this framework, researchers developed several
models to identify the optimal tax system which achieves equity and minimizes e¢ ciency losses.
A shared element among all these models is the way in which the optimal tax problem is
formalized. More specically, the optimal tax system is the result of an optimization problem
faced by the government, which maximizes a social welfare function, dened over individuals
utility, subject to a budget constraint and taking into account individualsreactions to taxation.
The way in which the utility of di¤erent individuals are weighted represents the governments
concerns for equity. While the individuals reactions to taxation are measured by the level
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of labour supply elasticity. Hence, when inequality is low social welfare increases. However,
reducing inequality is costly in terms of e¢ ciency losses.
The main qualitative conclusions of the theoretical literature can be summarized into three
points: rst, marginal tax rates are non negative and lower than 100 percent. Second, the
marginal tax rate on the individual with the highest income is zero (Sadka (1976) and Seade
(1977)). Third, if the income distribution is bounded from below and there is no bunching of
individuals at the bottom, then the marginal tax rate for the lowest income is also zero (Seade
(1977)). In addition to these qualitative recommendations, some other works also provide
quantitative prescriptions about the marginal tax rates prole. In particular, Mirrlees(1971)
computations suggest that tax schedule is roughly linear, with low and decreasing marginal
tax rates. Atkinson (1973) by adopting a di¤erent specication of the social welfare function,
conrm the regressive trait of the tax schedule, however marginal tax rates are higher than those
obtained by Mirrlees. Thereafter, Stern (1976), Tuomala (1984) and Kanbur and Tuomala
(1994) show that the magnitude of the results obtained by Mirrlees and Atkinson depends
on the assumption about individuals labour supply elasticity, while the regressive pattern is
due to the hypothesis about the level of initial dispersion within individualsincome or ability
distribution. Specically, as regard to the individualsreaction to taxation, by considering lower
value of labour supply elasticity, Stern (1976) and Tuomala (1984) nd higher marginal tax rates
than Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973), even if they are still decreasing in income.4 Kanbur
and Tuomala (1994), instead, prove that a progressive tax system, with increasing marginal
tax rates, is obtained when there is high dispersion within individualsability. Afterward, Saez
(2001) concludes that the optimal tax schedule exhibits marginal tax rates increasing in income,
with the top tax rates ranging between 50 and 80%.
Hence, the theoretical prescriptions tend to be unanimous as regard the fact that tax system
should be progressive when inequality is high. However, there is a substantial disagreement
about the treatment of the top incomes. In particular, from one side Mirrlees et al. (2011)
argue that top tax rates should be reduced or at least not increased, while from the other side
Piketty et al. (2014) claim the opposite, i.e. that top tax rates should be raised.
4Marginal tax rates in Tuomala (1984) range from 60 percent at the bottom to 25 percent at the 95th
percentile.
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In light of the state of art of the theoretical literature, when looking at the salient trends
of the reform in PIT, we observe a general tendency to reduce top tax rates and to nance
this cut by shifting the tax burden towards the middle of income distribution. As reported by
Peter et al (2009) this downward trend is common within non OECD economies as well. Their
investigation reveals that, in the last two decades, the fraction of countries with top tax rates
higher than 40 percent sharply declined from 71% to 17%.5
This scenario seems to be in line with the position of Mirrlees et al. (2011) about the
reduction of top tax rates. However, the fact that these cuts reduce the progressivity of the
tax systems allows us to claim that tax changes are moving in an opposite direction than the
theoretical prescriptions.
Another peculiarity of the tax changes of the last twenty-ve years is the attempt to simplify
the tax schedules. To this regard, policies reforms appear in line with some theoretical pre-
scriptions. In particular, theory recognizes that a good tax system has to be simple in order to
avoid additional costs on the society and to limit evasion and avoidance opportunities. Slemrod
and Sorum (1984) estimate these costs for the U.S. as 5-7% of the total amount of collected
taxes. According to Peter et al. (2009) there are several aspects which contribute to the overall
level of complexity of the PIT. Among those, in order to analyze the trend of the tax reforms,
they choose the use of non-standard allowances, surtaxes, complex tax formula and multiple
brackets schedule as indices of the complexity of the personal income tax system. What they
nd is that all these indicators have declined due to the tax changes occurred over the last two
decades, leading to reduction of the overall level of complexity of the PIT.
The reduction of the number of brackets and the decline in progressivity could suggest
that policy makers are moving toward a at tax system. However, to this regard there are no
convergent opinions in the literature. More specically, from one side the proponents of this
kind of tax schedule emphasize its advantages in terms of high simplicity which implies low
compliance and administration costs, reduced tax evasion and strong labour supply incentives.
On the other side, instead, the opponents claim that the argument of lower compliance costs does
not make sense, at least for developed economies. Moreover, these countries are characterized
by a large middle class which will be disadvantaged by the introduction of a at tax schedule
5See Peter et al. (2009) Table 2.
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which shifts the tax burden from the top to the middle of the income distribution. In addition
there is no convincing evidence that a at tax system increases labour supply incentives and
the tax revenue. In particular the magnitude of this e¤ect strictly depends on the parameters
of the tax system.6
1.3 The role of objectives. Welfarism vs Non-Welfarism
One lesson from the optimal taxation literature is that a crucial element of the optimal tax
formula is the way in which the government evaluates the welfare of di¤erent individuals. This
choice reects the particular objective pursued by the social planner and its attitude toward
redistribution. In this section we start by describing two di¤erent approaches used in the
theoretical literature to identify governments objectives, then we analyze if the changes in the
PIT schedule during the last two decades can be reconciled with one of these two approaches.
The standard approach, known as welfarist, characterized optimal taxation literature since
its foundation. Under this approach, an utilitarian government is aimed at maximizing a
social welfare function dened over individuals utility. Then, in order to redistribute from
individuals with high income (and/or ability) to individuals with low income (and/or ability),
this welfarist government uses a non-linear (Mirrlees (1971)) or linear (Sheshinski (1972)) tax
schedule. Theoretical literature has criticized welfarist approach from di¤erent perspectives.
Sen (1985), for example, argued that utility is only one aspect of individualswelfare, as there
are several other dimensions that should be considered in the design and in the evaluation of tax
policies. In other words, by focusing only on the individuals utility other relevant information
are ignored, i.e. individuals di¤er in term of their functioning and capabilities. Then, even if
resources were equally allocated across individuals, their utility could not be the same, due to
the heterogeneity in terms of functioning and capabilities.
Starting from Sens critique Kanbur et al. (1994) develop an alternative approach known
as non-welfarism. More specically, they propose a framework to analyze how the optimal tax
schedule changes when the government is aimed at achieving an objective di¤erent from the
maximization of the sum of individualsutility.
6See Paulus and Peichl (2009) and the references therein.
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It could be happen, indeed, that individuals preferences are manipulated or that individuals
behaviors are not socially optimal. Hence, in all these situations there is room for a govern-
ments intervention through the tax system. To this regard ODonoghue and Rabin (2003) and
Schroyen (2005) are two examples of this corrective (paternalistic) taxation. In particular, the
formers derive an optimal tax schedule to reduce the consumption of harmful good, while the
latter designs a tax system which aims to promote the consumption of some merit goods.
However, it has to be noted that there is no consensus on the dividing line between the
welfarist and the non-welfarist approach. In both cases the optimal tax problem is formalized
as a constrained maximization of a social welfare function, given the revenue requirement and
taking into account individualsreactions. The di¤erence between the two approaches is the
argument of the social welfare function. More specically, a government is said to be non
welfarist when its social welfare function is not dened over individuals utilities.7
To this regard, the non-welfarist approach to evaluate social welfare by focusing on individu-
alsincome instead of their utility, seems to be supported by the fact that social indicators mea-
suring inequality, poverty and polarization are based on incomes and not on utilities. Kanbur,
Keen and Tuomala (1994) study how the optimal tax formula changes when the governments
objective is the reduction of poverty. In this case, the optimal tax problem is formalized as the
minimization of a poverty index, dened over individuals income. The optimal tax formula
reducing poverty qualitatively di¤ers from the welfarist optimal tax formula. However, in order
to quantify this di¤erence in terms of marginal tax rates, they provide some numerical simula-
tions, which show that non-welfarist tax system envisages higher marginal tax rates than the
welfarist one, even if both approaches show a decreasing marginal tax rates.
Another example of non-welfarism is the use of a social welfare function where individuals
incomes are weighted according to their position in the income distribution. For example, in a
rank dependent social evaluation function consistent with the Gini index, the weights attached
to individuals incomes, ranked in ascending order, are linearly decreasing and bounded above
by two and below by zero. Aaberge and Colombino (2013) adopt a rank dependent social
welfare function in their micro econometric optimal tax model. Their results conrm that
di¤erent social objectives lead to di¤erent tax systems. Specically, the more egalitarian the
7See Kanbur, Pirtilla and Tuomala (2006).
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social welfare function, the more progressive the tax schedule. Recently Saez and Stantcheva
(2016) propose an approach to evaluate tax reforms, where the weights attached to individuals
incomes taking into account concerns of fairness.
To summarize, the welfarist approach tends to focus more on e¢ ciency concerns, while
the non-welfarist one considers the possibility that the social-planner could pursue di¤erent
social objectives. As the examples for poverty reduction have shown, these di¤erences have a
remarkable impact on the design of the optimal tax schedule. Hence, changes in objectives could
lead to di¤erent tax schedules. However, when observing the trend of PIT changes it is not a
easy task to identify a specic redistributive objective pursued by policy makers. In particular,
the reduction of the overall progressivity of the tax systems does not appear consistent with
a non-welfarist objective of inequality reduction. This is conrmed by the upward trend of
inequality measures as well. Hence, one can conclude that governmentobjectives might be the
improvement of the e¢ ciency and the simplicity of tax schedule. In addition, the reduction of
top tax rates seems to move toward one of the most famous welfarist result, i.e. zero marginal
tax rate on the top of distribution.
1.4 The role of circumstances
1.4.1 Elasticity
The size of the tax to GDP ratio suggests that the e¤ect of taxation on individuals welfare is
not negligible. Individuals labour supply decisions are one channel through which this e¤ect
materializes and the labour supply elasticity measures the magnitude of individuals respon-
siveness to taxation. Therefore, it might be interesting to understand if PIT changes reect
in some way variations in the individualsresponsiveness to taxation. To this regard the main
lesson from theoretical models is that the more responsive are the individuals, the lower the
tax rates.8 Researchers have devoted a considerable e¤ort to estimate individualsreaction to
8As noted before, one reason for the low tax rates obtained by Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973) is their
assumption on the elasticity between consumption and labour. In particular, they consider an elasticity level equal
to one and constant throughout the wage distribution. Stern (1976) and Tuomala (1984) consider respectively a
level of elasticity equal to 0.4 and 0.5 and obtain higher tax rates.
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taxation.9 However, it has to be considered that these reactions can materialize along several
dimensions. For example, individuals may change their labour supply or vary the composition
of their income, by preferring income sources which are subject to lower taxation.10
Then, available estimates are quite di¤erent and their heterogeneity is due to the estimation
procedure, the characteristics of the tax system, the country and the period analyzed. To this
regard, Creedy (2009) suggests that elasticity changes both over time and across countries which
are di¤erent in terms of tax systems and regulations. In any case, it is possible to outline an
overview of the main results of the literature and then try to understand if tax changes are
consistent with theoretical prescriptions.
More specically, with regard to taxable income elasticity there is a broad consensus about
a range of values between 0.1 and 0.4. In addition, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009) nd that
the elasticity of taxable income is increasing in income. If we consider, instead, individuals
reactions in term of labor supply decisions (hours of work) the picture is that elasticity is
inversely related to income.11 Moreover, males appear less responsive than females and this
di¤erence is more evident with respect to married females or females with children. Moreover,
among males those with low and middle education levels are more sensitive than those with
high education. In addition Bargain and Peichl (2016) argue that there has been a fall in the
labours supply elasticity since 1980.
However heterogeneity in terms of individualsreaction to taxation, the variety of the avail-
able estimates and the complexity of tax systems make di¢ cult to relate the continuous tax
changes to some pattern of the elasticities.
1.4.2 Inequality (and Polarization)
Since the seminal work by Mirrlees (1971), optimal taxation models recognize that the level of
inequality plays an important role in determining the level of tax rates. More precisely, the
9See Giertz (2004), Meghir and Philips (2008), Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009) and Bargain and Peichl
(2016) for an overview of the literature relating labour supply, taxes and taxable income elasticity.
10Meghir and Phillips (2008) for example suggest that another possible dimension is related to the human
capital accumulation.
11According to Aaberge and Colombino (2013) this is due to the fact that individuals with high income, on
average participate more and work more hours. Then, if their wage decreases they have to change less their labor
supply with respect to individuals with low income.
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higher the level of inequality, the lower the social welfare and the more progressive the tax
system. Then, by looking at the next gure we can observes that there has been an upward
trend in the level of inequality, as shown by the increase in the Gini index in most of the OECD
economies. The fact that economies became more unequal during the last two decades is also
conrmed by the evolution of two other inequality measures: the Palma ratio and the ratio
between the income shares of the richest 10% and the poorest 10%. Both indicators increased
over this period.
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Trend in Gini indexes in OECD countries
17
Trend in Palma ratio and other income share ratio
Another interesting aspect concerning income distribution is the level of polarization, which is
to some extent related to the dimension of the middle class. The next gure shows the trends
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of polarization indices.
Trend in Polarization indexes in OECD countries
Given these trends and the normative prescription of optimal tax theory one should expect
that tax changes move toward more progressive tax systems. However, evidence suggests the
opposite, thus personal income taxation become less progressive and top tax rates decline. Put
in these terms, theory and practice seem to move along two di¤erent patterns.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate if theoretical prescriptions of the optimal taxation theory and
tax reforms occurred in the last twenty-ve years move along the same direction. In addition,
by considering tax policies as the result of objectives and circumstances, we have analyzed if
theoretical implications on the relevance of those two crucial elements, can help to understand
the changes in the PIT schedule. Our analysis shows that some theoretical results can be
recognizable in tax policy changes, for example the tendency to improve simplicity and e¢ ciency
of the PIT system goes through this direction. However, there are also some trends in the tax
reforms which appear not consistent with the theory. More specically, the reduction of the top
tax rates and the decline in the level of progressivity contrast with the theoretical framework
developed since Mirrlees (1971), which claims a positive relationship between progressivity and
inequality. Indeed, evidence shows that while during this period inequality has been rising, the
tax burden has been shifted from the top to the middle of the income distribution. This is also
not consistent with the non-welfarist objective of inequality reduction. Last, it is di¢ cult to
use theoretical prescriptions about the role of elasticity to explain tax changes.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Non-Welfarist Income
Taxation for Inequality and
Polarization Reduction
We adopt a non-welfarist approach to investigate the e¤ect of di¤erent redistributive objectives
on the shape of the optimal tax schedule. We consider inequality and income polarization re-
duction objectives and we identify socially desirable three brackets piecewise linear tax systems
that allow to collect a given amount of per-capita revenue. The optimal tax problem is formal-
ized as the maximization of families of rank-dependent social evaluation functions dened over
individualsnet income. These functions allow to incorporate within the same social evaluation
model concerns for inequality and for polarization reduction.
Both with xed and with variable labour supply the optimal tax schemes substantially di¤er
as the focus moves from the reduction of inequality to the one of polarization. In the case of
inequality concerns the optimal tax system is mainly convex exhibiting increasing marginal tax
rates unless when labour supply elasticities are higher. While in case of polarization concerns
the optimal tax scheme is non-convex with reduced marginal tax rate for the upper income
bracket.
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2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades many countries have experienced a remarkable increase in income in-
equality and income polarization.1 At the same time, policy makers have continuously modied
the tax systems, especially the personal income tax schedule, which on average represents one
quarter of the total amount of revenues for OECD countries. More specically, these changes
have been related to the reduction in the number of income brackets and the decline of the
top marginal tax rates with a shift of the tax burden from the top to the middle of the income
distribution. As a result, tax systems have become more simplied and less progressive over
the last twenty ve years.2
Recent literature has addressed the question of the optimal level of taxation for top incomes
and analyzed if the upward trend in inequality can be related to the reduction of the top tax
rates. However, divergent views about these aspects have been developed.3
In this paper we focus on the entire income distribution and analyze how the optimal tax
system should be designed in order to reduce income inequality or income polarization. For
this purpose we adopt a non-welfarist approach and consider a piecewise linear tax system.
In line with Kanbur et al. (2006) a government is said non-welfarist if its social welfare
function is dened over individualsincome instead of their utility. Individualspreferences do
not play a direct role into the social welfare, but they still play a role in the design of the optimal
tax system in that they shape the individuals reaction to taxation in terms of consumption
and labour supply decisions We believe that the focus on income is the most appropriate choice
when the government objective is to reduce inequality, poverty or polarization whose indicators
are dened in terms of individualsincome.
As to the formalization of the redistributive objective, we assume that the non-welfarist
government maximizes a rank-dependent social evaluation function dened over individuals
1See OECD (2015) and Brzezinski (2013) for a description of the trend of income inequality and polarization
respectively.
2See Peter et al. (2009) for an overview of the changes emerged in the personal income taxation schedule from
1981 to 2005 in 189 countries, where it is shown that on average each year about 50% of the countries modify
the income tax schedule. See also Piketty and Saez (2013) and OECD (2015) for a description of the tax systems
and their evolution.
3Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2014) argue that top tax rates should be raised, while on the other hand,
Mirrlees et al. (2011) suggest that top tax rates should not be increased.
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income, given a revenue requirement constraint. According to this evaluation model incomes
are aggregated linearly and are weighted according to their position in the income ranking.
The specic form of the weighting function captures the governments non-welfarist objective.
This class of social evaluation function allows to formalize redistributive objectives that could
be quantied in the case of the concern for inequality in terms of changes in the Gini index of
incomes. Moreover, by suitable modications of the positional weighting function it is possible
to move within the same social evaluation model from evaluations concerned on inequality to
those focussing on the polarization of the incomes.
In our analysis we focus on piecewise linear tax systems not only because these tax schemes
represent those most commonly adopted, but also because they allow to make explicit the
changes in tax schedule driven by the governments shift from a concern for inequality to a
concern for polarization reduction. In fact, as we will show, for the benchmark case with xed
labour supply a scheme with three brackets is su¢ ciently exible to highlight the distinctive
features of the inequality reducing optimal taxation compared to the one that aims at reducing
income polarization.
Our unied approaches that focus on inequality and polarization reduction objectives extend
existing literature on non-welfarist taxation that has focussed on poverty alleviation (Kanbur,
Keen and Tuomala, 1994). We identify the socially preferred three brackets linear taxation
schemes that collect a given amount of taxes, given a specic redistributive objective both for
the case of xed labour supply and when labour supply elasticity is constant. The interesting
aspect of our work is that both with xed and with variable labour supply the optimal tax
schemes substantially di¤er as the focus moves from the reduction of inequality to the one
of polarization. In the case of inequality concerns the optimal tax system is mainly convex
exhibiting increasing marginal tax rates unless when labour supply elasticities are high. While
in case of polarization concerns the optimal tax scheme is non-convex with reduced marginal
tax rate for the upper income bracket.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next subsection briey reviews the
literature on optimal income taxation, comparing the welfarist and non-welfarist approaches.
Section 2 presents the linear rank-dependent social evaluation function and describes the two
di¤erent weighting functions adopted in the paper to formalize the non-welfarist redistributive
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objective. Section 3 formalizes the optimal tax problem faced by the non-welfarist government.
The solution of this problem is presented in Section 4 under the assumption of exogenous xed
labour supply. Section 5 describes rst the agents optimization problem, then it presents
numerical results about the optimal tax schedule reducing income inequality and polarization
with xed and elastic labor supply. Section 6 concludes.
2.1.1 Optimal Welfarist and Non-Welfarist Income Taxation
Optimal Welfarist Income Taxation
An optimal tax system is the result of a constrained optimization problem, where the govern-
ment maximizes a social welfare function, subject to a set of constraints. These constraints are
related to the amount of required revenues and to individualsreaction to taxation. A celebrated
result of the seminal Mirrlees(1971) model of non-linear income taxation is that marginal tax
rates should be non-negative and lower than 100%. In addition, when income distribution is
bounded the optimal marginal tax rate is zero both on the highest income (Sadka, 1976 and
Seade, 1977) and on the lowest one (Seade, 1977). Mirrlees also provided some numerical com-
putations for the optimal tax system that suggest that the tax schedule is quite linear and
regressive. By adopting a di¤erent specication of the social welfare function, Atkinson (1973)
conrms the regressive pattern of tax rates which are however higher than those obtained in
Mirrlees (1971). Thereafter, Stern (1976), Tuomala (1984), and Kanbur and Tuomala (1994)
show that such results derive from the assumption of low levels of inequality and high labour
supply elasticity. More specically, by considering lower values of labour supply elasticity Stern
(1976) and Tuomala (1984) obtain higher marginal tax rates than Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson
(1973). While Kanbur and Tuomala (1994) derive a progressive tax system by considering an
high level of inequality within the distribution of individuals abilities.
The complexity of the non-linear tax model has led the theoretical literature to formulate
the optimal tax problem in a simpler way, by considering the case of linear taxation. Sheshin-
ski (1972) identies the optimal marginal tax rate and the level of lump-sum subsidy which
maximize an utilitarian social welfare function given the budget constraint. Tuomala (1985)
then provides a simplied formula for the optimal linear income tax, where the equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o¤ is easily identiable. Specically, the higher is the elasticity of labour supply, the
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higher are the e¢ ciency costs of taxation and the lower is the optimal tax rate. Likewise, the
optimal tax rate decreases with higher levels of inequality within the distribution of individuals
wage.
Therefore, both non-linear and linear optimal taxation models highlight the impact of the
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ on the design of the optimal tax schedule. However, actual tax
systems diverge from those considered by the Mirrlees and Sheshinskis models. In particular,
most countries adopt a piecewise linear tax system, with few income brackets and marginal tax
rates varying between brackets but constant within. Given this consideration, the theoretical
literature has developed models of piecewise linear optimal taxation starting from the works
by Sheshinski (1989) and Slemrod et al. (1994). More specically, Sheshinski (1989) shows
that the optimal piecewise linear tax system is convex in the sense that higher tax rates are
associated with higher income brackets. Slemrod et al. (1994) challenge Sheshinskis result
arguing that the optimal tax structure could be non-convex. This is because Sheshinski ignored
the discontinuity in the tax revenue function. Recently, Apps et al. (2014) provide a simple
model of piecewise linear taxation with just two income brackets. They consider two systems,
namely convex and non-convex, and by using numerical simulations they analyze the conditions
under which each system is optimal. They nd essentially convex systems unless when labour
elasticities are high. Also Aaberge et al. (2013) nd that the optimal piecewise tax system
is convex with increasing marginal tax rates. Moreover, by comparing their results with the
current tax system they show that, the optimal tax system requires lower marginal rates on
low incomes and higher marginal tax rates on the top of the distribution.
Optimal Non-Welfarist Income Taxation
All the models described in the previous section adopt the standard welfarist approach, where
the governments redistributive objective is represented by the maximization of an utilitarian
social welfare function that weights all individualsutilities equally and maximizes their sum
independently of distributional aspects. If some conditions are satised, the optimal tax system
envisages a conscatory tax rate and lump-sum redistribution of the tax revenues. The little
signicance given by the welfarism to the role of di¤erences in redistributive objectives has
motivated the development of an alternative approach by Kanbur et al. (1994), which takes into
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account the possibility that governments can pursue objectives di¤erent from the maximization
of the sum of individuals utility such as the reduction of social indicators like inequality,
poverty and polarization. Consequently, the two approaches lead to two di¤erent proles of the
optimal tax formula, which is, under the non-welfarist approach, strictly related to the specic
governments objective. For example, Kanbur et al. (1994) derive the optimal income tax
schedule reducing poverty measured in terms of a family of additively separable poverty index.
Moreover, they use numerical simulations in order to show that the optimal non-welfarist tax
rules envisage lower marginal tax rates than the welfarist approach.
Another criticism of the use of individualsutility as in the welfarist approach is that in
some situations individualspreferences can be manipulated and individualsbehaviors are not
socially optimal. Therefore, in these situations there is room for a governments corrective
intervention, who uses taxes and transfers to correct individuals behaviors. To this regard
some papers develop models of paternalistic taxation, for example ODonoghue and Rabin
(2003) consider the case of taxation for the reduction of the consumption of harmful goods,
while Schroyen (2005) provides a non-welfarist characterization of the merit goods provision.
Recently Saez and Stantcheva (2016) propose an alternative approach to evaluate tax reforms
according to a social evaluation model where the weights attached to individualsnet income
allow to take into account di¤erent concepts of justice.
The main indication arising from theoretical literature is that a government is "non-welfarist"
when evaluates social welfare by using a criterion di¤erent from individualspreferences. To
some extent, as pointed by Kanbur et al. (2006), one could argue that redistribution itself rep-
resents an example of non-welfarism, since government evaluates individualswelfare di¤erently
than individuals do. Conventionally, following Kanbur et al. (1994) a non-welfarist government
is one that goes beyond utility and maximizes a social welfare function which is not dened
over individualsutility. In our case the objective function will be dened over the net income
distribution and will take a rank-dependent formalization.
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2.2 Rank-dependent social evaluation functions
In order to assess alternative taxation policies we consider the family of linear rank-dependent
evaluation functions that aggregate the net incomes of the individuals weighting them according
to the position in the income ranking.
Let F (y) denote the cumulative distribution function of income y of a population with
bounded support (0; ymax) and nite mean  (F ) =
R ymax
0 y dF (y). The left inverse continuous
distribution function or quantile function, showing the income level of an individual that covers
position p 2 (0; 1) in the distribution of incomes ranked in increasing order, is dened as
F 1 (p) := inf fy : F (y)  pg. For expositional purposes, in the remainder of the paper we will
also equivalently denote with y (p) the quantile function. The average income could then be
calculated as  (F ) =
R 1
0 F
 1 (p) dp.
Consider a set of positional weights v (p)  0 for p 2 [0; 1] such that V (p) = R p0 v (t) dt, with
V (1) = 1: A rank-dependent Social Evaluation Function [SEF] where incomes are weighted
according to individualsposition in the income ranking is formalized as
W(F ) =
Z 1
0
v (p)F 1 (p) dp (2.1)
where v (p)  0 is the weight attached to the income of individual ranked p. The normative
basis for this evaluation function has been introduced in Yaari (1987) for risk analysis and
in Weymark (1982) and Yaari (1988) for income distribution analysis and recently have been
discussed as measures of the desirability of redistribution in society by Bennett and Zitikis
(2015).4 This representation model is dual to the utilitarian additively decomposable model.
According to W the evaluation of income distributions is based on the weighted average of
incomes ranked in ascending order and weighted according to their positions. Incomes are
therefore linearly aggregated across individuals and weighted through transformations of the
cumulated frequencies (the individualsposition).
The specic non-welfarist objective of the government can be formalized by the particular
form of the weighting function  (p). We consider two di¤erent non-welfarist objectives that
combine the average income evaluation with di¤erent distributional objectives, namely the
4See also Aaberge (2000), Aaberge et al. (2013) and Maccheroni et al. (2005).
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reduction of inequality and the reduction of polarization.
When taking into account inequality considerations the social evaluation can be summarized
by the mean income of the distribution  (F ) and a linear index of inequality Iv (F ) dependent
on the choice of the weighting function v. This "abbreviated form" of social evaluation5 is
dened as
Wv(F ) =  (F ) [1  Iv (F )] :
For instance, by dening v (p) =  (1  p) 1 we can rewrite (2:1) as
W(F ) =
Z 1
0
 (1  p) 1 F 1 (p) dp
which is the class of Generalized Gini SEF parameterized by   1 introduced by Donaldson and
Weymark (1983) and Yitzhaki (1983). The parameter  is a measure of the degree of inequality
aversion, for  = 1 we obtain the mean income  (F ) and therefore inequality neutrality, while
for  = 2 the SEF is associated with the Gini index G (F ) and becomes as6
W2(F ) =  (F ) [1 G (F )] :
The SEF could also be interpreted as W2(F ) =  (F )   (F )G (F ) where  (F )G (F ) denotes
the absolute version of the Gini index that is invariant with respect to addition of the same
amount to all individual incomes.
2.2.1 Weighting functions
Inequality sensitive SEFs
A non-welfarist government aimed at reducing inequality, once individual incomes are ranked
in ascending order, when expresses evaluations consistent with the Gini index attaches to each
quantile F 1 (p) of the income distribution a weight according to the following function vG (p) =
2(1   p): These weights are linearly decreasing in the position of the individuals moving from
5For general details see Lambert (2001).
6The single parameter family of relative Gini index of inequality parameterized by  is expressed as G (F ) =
1
(F )
R 1
0
h
1   (1  p) 1
i
F 1(p)dp, which becomes the standard Gini coe¢ cient for  = 2.
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poorer to richer individuals. Alternatively we can write these weights as
vG (p) =

1  [ 2  12   p] if p  12
1  2  p  12 if p  12 : (2.2)
That is, to the weight 1 associated with the average income is subtracted the weight associated
to the absolute Gini index that captures the inequality concerns, this weight is
wG (p) =
 2  12   p if p  12
2
 
p  12

if p  12
: (2.3)
With a "non-traditional" interpretation of the absolute Gini index, inequality could be mea-
sured by considering the di¤erence between incomes covering equal positional distance from the
median weighted with linear weights that increase moving from the median position = 1/2 to
the extreme positions 0 and 1. For instance, take the incomes that are either t positions above
the median and t positions below the median, the index considers the di¤erence between these
incomes F 1
 
1
2 + t
  F 1  12   t and weights it with the weight 2t. That is
 (F )G (F ) =
Z 1
1=2
2
12   p
F 1 (p) dp  Z 1=2
0
2
12   p
F 1 (p) dp:
The weights attached to the income di¤erences increase as the position of the individuals moves
away from the median position. In this case any rank-preserving transfer of income from
individuals above the median to poorer individuals below the median reduces inequality in that
it reduces the income distances between individuals covering symmetric positions with respect
to the median. Rank-preserving transfers from richer to poorer individuals positioned on the
same side with respect to the median, also reduce inequality because it increases the income
di¤erence between the incomes that are closer to the median and decreases of the same amount
the income di¤erence of the incomes that are in the tails of the distribution. However, the
inequality index gives lower weight to the income di¤erences between individuals closer to the
median and therefore the e¤ect for the individuals that are more distant from the median is
dominant and inequality is reduced.
The next gure shows the weighting function vG, and as we can see the weights attached to
the lowest and to the highest income are respectively equal to two and zero, while the median
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income receives a weight equal to one. This equivalent representation of the SEF makes clear
the positive social e¤ect of a progressive transfer from richer to poorer individuals given that
the incomes are transferred from individuals with lower social weight to individuals with higher
weight.
The weighting function for the Gini based SEF
Polarization sensitive SEFs
When the non-welfarist objective is the reduction of polarization, the distributive concern is
for reducing inequality between richer individuals and poorer ones but not necessarily reducing
the inequality within the rich and within the poor individuals. In line with the seminal works
of Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004) the polarization measurement combines
an isolation component that decreases if the distance between richer and poorer individuals is
reduced. The second relevant component in the measurement of polarization is the identication
between the individuals belonging to an economic/social class. In the case of the measurement
of income bipolarization the two social groups are delimited by the median income. The higher
is the degree of identication within each group the higher is the e¤ect of their isolation on
polarization. In this case the identication decreases as more disperse is the distribution within
one group. Thus, reducing inequality between individuals that are on the same side of the
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median increases their identication and then increases the overall polarization.
We adopt here the bipolarization measurement model introduced in Aaberge and Atkinson
(2013).7 The associated SEF is rank-dependent with a weighting function that can be formalized
as:
vP(;) (p) =

1 +  (2p) 1 if p  12
1   (2  2p) 1 if p  12
: (2.4)
Where   0 quanties the relative relevance of polarization with respect to the average income
in the overall social evaluation. Moreover   1 is a measure of the relative sensitivity of
polarization to changes in incomes that occurs at di¤erent positions p around the median. For
 = 1 and  = 2 the weights vP (p) are linear and increasing,
vP (p) =

2p+ 1 if p  12
2p  1 if p  12
: (2.5)
We focus primarily on this weighting function as it constitutes the counterpart of the Gini
weighting function for the (bi-)polarization measures. The shape of the weighting function in
(2:5) is illustrated in the following gure.
The weighting function for the Polarization based SEF.
7An alternative approach to the construction of polarization sensitive SEFs is presented in Rodriguez (2015).
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The weights are linearly increasing both below and above the median and exhibit a jump at
the median, with higher weights below the median and lower above the median.
It is also possible to derive an associated abbreviated SEF where polarization reduces welfare
for a given average income level
WP (F ) =  (F ) [1  P (F )]
with P (F ) denoting a polarization index. In the case of the linear polarization measure we
have that the polarization index can be derived from the condition
 (F )P (F ) =  
Z 1=2
0
2pF 1 (p) dp+
Z 1
1=2
2(1  p)F 1 (p) dp: (2.6)
In line with the formalization presented for inequality measurement, the SEF weighting function
can be formalized as
vP (p) =

1  f [1  2(12   p)]g if p  12
1  [1  2(p  12)] if p  12
: (2.7)
where the polarization component is subtracted from the weight 1 associated with the average
income. The polarization weight is therefore
wP (p) =
 [1  2(12   p)] if p  12
[1  2(p  12)] if p  12
: (2.8)
The polarization index can then be formalized similarly to the inequality index, by considering
the di¤erence between the incomes with equal positional distance from the median weighted
with linear weights that decrease moving from the median position where p = 1=2 to the extreme
positions 0 and 1. For instance, for the incomes that are either t positions above the median
and t positions below the median, the index considers the di¤erence between these incomes
F 1
 
1
2 + t
  F 1  12   t and weights it with the weight 1  2t. That is
 (F )P (F ) =
Z 1
1=2

1  2
12   p
F 1 (p) dp  Z 1=2
0

1  2
12   p
F 1 (p) dp:
The weights attached to the income di¤erences decrease linearly as the position of the
individuals moves away from the median position. This representation guarantees that income
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transfers from richer to poorer individuals on the same side of the median income increase
polarization.8
An elementary normative implication of the polarization based welfare weighting function
is that in order to maximize the welfare, redistribution should be from the individuals above
the median to those below. However, when tax schedules are set over few brackets that are
dened in terms of incomes and not positions, then the implications arising from moving from
an inequality reducing objective to a polarization reducing one are more subtle.
From the two gures above it appears evident that the two weighting functions give more
weight to individuals below the median with respect to those above the median. However, for
inequality concerns the weight decreases for the individuals on the same side of the median as
their income increases, while it increases for polarization concerns.
The associated non-welfarist objectives will lead to di¤erent proles of the income taxation.
Our aim is to see how the optimal tax formula changes according to the choice of the weighting
function.
2.3 Non-welfarist optimal piecewise linear taxation
In this section we formalize the optimal tax problem faced by a non-welfarist government.
The social evaluation function considered is a general rank-dependent function W with generic
non-negative positional weights v (p) with
Wv =
Z 1
0
v (p) [y (p)  T (y (p))] dp; (2.9)
where y (p) denotes the quantile function or the inverse of the income distribution. Let p1 :=
supfp : y(p) = y1g and p2 := supfp : y(p) = y2g with y (p1) = y1 and y (p2) = y2 denoting the
two income thresholds of the considered tax system, where F (y1) = p1 and F (y2) = p2. The
tax function is denoted by T (y), where taxation is non-negative. The per capita government
8The construction of this family of polarization indices is also consistent with the rank-dependent generaliza-
tion of the FosterWolfson polarization measure (see Wolfson, 1994) presented in Wang and Tsui (2000). The
main di¤erence between the two approaches is that the Wang and Tsui paper normalizes the index by dividing
it by the median instead of the mean income.
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budget constraint is Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp = G
where G represents the per capita revenue requirement. We consider a three brackets linear
tax function, with T (y) dened as follows
T (y) :=
8>>><>>>:
t1y
t1y1 + t2 (y   y1)
t1y1 + t2 (y2   y1) + t3 (y   y2)
if y  y1
if y1 < y  y2
if y > y2
(2.10)
or in equivalent terms
T (y) := t1y + (t2   t1) max fy   y1; 0g+ (t3   t2) max fy   y2; 0g :
In our analysis we consider situations where the gross incomes are unequally distributed across
individuals. Moreover, we will derive results that hold under the assumption of bounded max-
imal marginal tax rate whose admissible upper level is  2 (0; 1]:
The social optimization problem requires to maximize Wv with respect to the three tax
rates ti with i = 1; 2; 3, and the two income thresholds y1 and y2 where y1 < y2. As a result the
nal net incomes distribution could lead to congurations where groups of individuals exhibit
the same net income. These distributions could substantially di¤er depending on whether the
social objective is concerned about reducing inequality or with reducing polarization.
2.4 The solution with xed labour supply
The taxation design that is socially optimal is rst illustrated under the assumption of exogenous
xed labour supply. This rst approach is in line with the literature on the redistributive e¤ect
of taxation pioneered by the works of Fellman (1976) Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977).9
We derive the results for the three brackets piecewise linear taxation in order to compare
the e¤ects on taxation of an inequality reducing sensitive SEF with the one of a polarization
reducing sensitive SEF. Our aim will be to maximize the social evaluation under the revenue
9See also the review in Lambert (2001).
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constraint that collects the per-capita value G:
The constrained optimization Lagrangian function for this problem is as follows
max
t1;t2;t3;y1;y2
L =Wv + 

G 
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp

; (2.11)
with ti 2 [0; 1] for i = 1; 2; 3; and y1 < y2:
The SEF Wv is presented in (2.9). As argued in the previous section the shape of the posi-
tional social weights v (p) could make the SEF consistent with di¤erent distributional objectives,
and in particular it could be made sensitive to either inequality or polarization reduction con-
cerns.
The derivation of the solutions for the constrained optimization problem are illustrated in
details in Appendix A both for inequality sensitive and for polarization sensitive SEFs. Here
we summarize and comment the main ndings.
2.4.1 Inequality concerns
We present here the qualitative features of the optimal taxation problem that hold for any
distribution of pre-tax gross income and for a large class of inequality sensitive SEFs. Our
results hold for piecewise linear three brackets tax functions whose upper marginal tax rate
is 100% and are generalized in order to consider maximal marginal tax rates that could not
exceed  2 (0; 1].
The family of SEFs considered is denoted by WI that represents the set of all linear rank-
dependent SEFs with decreasing non-negative weights v(p): These SEFs are sensitive to inequal-
ity reducing transformations of the distributions through rank-preserving progressive transfers
from richer to poorer individuals. For instance, the Gini based social weighting function in
(2.2) satises this condition.
Let T denote the set of all piecewise linear taxation schemes with three brackets with
maximal marginal tax rate  2 (0; 1].
We assume that the maximal marginal tax rate  is s.t. G     (F ) we can derive the
statement highlighted in the next proposition.
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Proposition 1 A solution of the optimal taxation problem with xed labour supply for tax
schedules in T maximizing linear SEFs in WI is
t1 = 0;
t3 = t2 =  ;
with y1 s.t. the revenue constraint is satised:
A more detailed specication of the above proposition is illustrated and proved in Appendix
A as Proposition 5.
All the SEF in WI are maximized under the revenue constraint by the taxation schemes
presented in Proposition 1. Thus only two income brackets are required to derive the result.
Many equivalent taxation schemes could solve the optimization problem. In fact the scheme
presented is not a¤ected by the choice of y2 > y1; moreover an equivalent scheme could be
derived where t3 =  ; t1 = t2 = 0 and the relevant income threshold is y2:
To summarize, the optimal taxation problem involves the maximal admissible proportional
tax burden in the higher bracket and no taxation for bottom incomes. When  = 100% then
the solution involves reducing to y1 all incomes that are above this value.
This result holds not only for the SEFs in WI but could be shown to hold for any strictly
inequality averse social evaluation function not necessarily belonging to the family of those that
are linearly rank-dependent.
In fact it is well known that all such social evaluation functions for comparisons of distribu-
tions with the same average income are consistent with the partial order induced by the Lorenz
curve or equivalently by the criterion of second order stochastic dominance (see Atkinson 1970,
and Lambert 2001). The result in Proposition 1 could then be generalized to all social eval-
uation functions that are consistent with the Principle of Transfers, that is are such that any
income transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one does not decrease the social evaluation
of the distribution. In mathematical terms these functions are Schur-concave [see Dasgupta,
Sen and Starrett 1973 and Marshall et al. 2011]. We provide here the generalization of the
result in Proposition 1. Its proof is obtained following a di¤erent strategy than the one adopted
for the proof of Proposition 1. We present both proofs because the one of Proposition 1 allows
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more direct comparisons with the results that will be presented for SEFs that are polariza-
tion sensitive. To derive the desired result we also consider a larger set of tax functions that
include T : We denote by T the set of all non-negative and non-decreasing taxation schemes
with maximal marginal tax rate  2 (0; 1]; that is all tax functions such that T (y)  0 and
  T (y) T (y0)y y0  0 for all y; y0 such that y > y0:
Proposition 2 The solution of the optimal taxation problem with xed labour supply involv-
ing tax schedules in T maximizing all the Schur-Concave evaluation functions of the post-tax
income distribution obtained under a given revenue constraint involves a two brackets linear
taxation scheme where
t1 = 0; and t2 =  ;
with y1 s.t. the revenue constraint is satised:
Proof. Dominance of the tax scheme presented in the proposition over all alternative
schemes in T that satisfy the revenue constraint for all social evaluation functions that are
Schur-Concave requires to check that the obtained post-tax net income distribution dominates
in terms of Lorenz any of the alterative post-tax distributions [see Marshall et al. 2011]. That is,
let T 0 denote the optimal tax function then the Lorenz curve of the post tax income distribution
is obtained as LT 0(p) =
1
T0
R p
0

y (q)  T 0 (y (q)) dq where T 0 = R 10 y (q)  T 0 (y (q)) dq
denotes the average post-tax net income under taxation T 0.
It then follows that Lorenz dominance of this tax scheme over all alternative schemes T in T
requires that LT 0(p) =
1
T0
R p
0

y (q)  T 0 (y (q)) dq  LT (p) = 1T R p0 [y (q)  T (y (q))] dq for
all T 2 T and all p 2 [0; 1]: Recalling that all the alternative tax schemes should guarantee the
same revenue, the condition could be simplied as
R p
0

y (q)  T 0 (y (q)) dq  R p0 [y (q)  T (y (q))] dq;
that is after simplifying for y (q) we obtain
Z p
0
T 0 (y (q)) dq 
Z p
0
T (y (q)) dq (2.12)
for all T 2 T and all p 2 [0; 1]; where by construction the revenue constraint requires thatR 1
0 T
0 (y (q)) dq =
R 1
0 T (y (q)) dq = G:
Recall that by construction (i) T 0 (y (p)) = 0 for all p  p1; and that (ii)  = T
0(y) T 0(y0))
y y0 
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T (y) T (y0))
y y0 for all y > y
0 and all T 2 T : By combining the conditions (i) and (ii) and the revenue
constraint condition it follows that T 0 (y (p))  T (y (p)) for all p  p1 (with strict inequality
for some p); T 0 (y (1)) > T (y (1)) and the tax schedule T 0 (y) crosses once each schedule T (y)
from below:
As a result the condition in (2.12) holds for all T 2 T and all p 2 [0; 1]:
The above results could also be interpreted in term of progressivity comparisons of the
alternative tax schemes considered. It claries that the tax scheme in the proposition is the
more progressive among all tax schemes that guarantee the same revenue (see, Keen et al, 2000
and references therein, and Lambert 2001 Ch. 8). The result shows that the Lorenz curve of tax
burden under the taxation scheme considered is more unequal (and then more disproportional)
in terms of Lorenz dominance than the one of any alternative tax scheme in T giving the same
revenue as originally suggested in Suits (1977) as a criterion to assess the progressivity of a tax
schedule.
2.4.2 Polarization concerns
We now move to consider polarization sensitive linear rank-dependent SEFs where v(p) is
increasing below the median and above the median and weights are larger in the rst interval
than in the second with v(0) = v(1) = 1 and limp!1=2  v(p) = 2 6= limp!1=2+ v(p) = 0 as for
the polarization P index illustrated in the previous section. We denote with WP the set of all
these SEFs.
In order to specify the solution we need to consider two hypothetical two brackets tax
schemes with marginal tax rates t1 and t2 and whose threshold between the two brackets is set
at the median income level y (1=2) = yM . Under the rst tax scheme the rst bracket is not
taxed, that is t1 = 0; and the second bracket is taxed at the maximal tax rate t2 =  :We denote
with G+ the revenue arising from such taxation. Under the second tax scheme the rst bracket
is taxed at the maximal tax rate t1 =  ; while the second bracket exhibits zero marginal tax
rate (t2 = 0) and so all the income recipients above the median are taxed with a lump-sum tax
equal to yM : We denote with G  the revenue arising from this latter taxation scheme. We
can now formalize the results in next proposition.
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Proposition 3 The solution of the optimal taxation problem with xed labour supply for tax
schedules in T maximizing linear SEFs in WP is:
(i) p1 < 1=2 < p2 where
1 VP (p1)
1 p1 =
1 VP (p2)
1 p2 and such that the revenue constraint is satised
with
t1 = t3 = 0;
t2 =  ;
if G  minfG+; G g.
(iia) If G > G+ solution (i) should be compared with p1 < 1=2; and
t1 = 0;
t2 = t3 = 
where p1 [and so also y1] is such that the revenue constraint is satised
(iib) If G > G  solution (i) should be compared with p1 > 1=2; and
t1 =  ;
t2 = t3 = 0;
where p1 [and so also y1] is such that the revenue constraint is satised:
(iii) If G > maxfG+; G g all three solutions (i), (iia) and (iib) should be compared.
A more detailed specication of the above proposition is illustrated and proved in Appendix
A as Proposition 7.
The proposition highlights the fact that under standard revenue requirementsG  minfG+; G g
the marginal tax rate is maximal within the central bracket that includes the median income,
while for very large revenue requirements maximal marginal tax rates are applied in the tail
brackets. However, note that solution (iib) involves also a lump-sum taxation for the individu-
als in the higher bracket. While solution (iia) coincides with the optimal solution for inequality
sensitive SEFs. In all cases the median income is subject to the maximal marginal tax rate.
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It should be pointed out that solution (i) is under associated to a local maximum of the opti-
mization problem under any condition on the level of revenue. While solution (i) always exists,
as also highlighted in the proof of the proposition, solutions (iia) and (iib) may lead to local
maxima and the conditions G > G+ and G > G  are only necessary for this result and in any
case they need to be compared with solution (i).
The comparison between the results in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 highlights the strik-
ing role of the distributive objective in determining the qualitative shape of the optimal taxation
scheme. While for inequality sensitive SEFs the optimal scheme considers increasing marginal
tax rates, for the polarization sensitive SEFs it requires to tax heavily the "middle class". These
two results act as benchmarks for the analysis of optimal taxation with variable labour supply
developed in the next section.
2.5 The solution with variable labour supply
In this section we rst describe the agents optimization problem, then we provide numerical
results about the optimal tax schedule reducing income inequality and income polarization,
with xed and elastic labor supply. Here we assume that redistribution is not allowed and the
focus is on the socially desirable mechanism that ensures to collect a given level of per-capita
revenue.
2.5.1 The agents optimization problem
Agents make labour supply decisions based on the constrained optimization of the quasi-linear
utility function
U(x; l) = x  (l)
where x 2 R denotes net disposable income/consumption and l 2 [0; L] denotes labour supply.
The function  : [0; L] ! R is continuous, convex and increasing in l with 0(0) = 0 where 0
denotes the marginal disutility of labour. The utility function could also be expressed in terms
of disposable income and leisure `; where ` = L   l: In this case given the above assumptions
the function is strictly quasi-concave in x and `.
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We will consider an utility specication where  is isoelastic, taking the form
(l) = k  l (2.13)
with  > 1; k > 0:
Each agent is endowed with a productivity level formalized by the exogenous wage w > 0:
The agents in the economy earn a gross income y  0 obtained only through labour supply,
that is y = wl: Agents are subject to taxation T (y)  0 formalized by (2.10); that leads to the
net disposable income, considered in their utility function, obtained as x = y   T (y):
Quasi linearity of the utility function rules out income e¤ects in agents decisions and allows
to focus only on substitution e¤ects on labour supply.
We can equivalently re-express the problem in the space (x; y) for each agent. In this case
the utility function becomes
u(x; y) = U(x; y=w) = x  (y=w)
and the relation between x and y is
x := y   T (y) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  t1)y if y 2 Y1  [0; y1)
(t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)y if y 2 Y2  [y1; y2)
(t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)y if y 2 Y3  [y2;1)
: (2.14)
Where Yi denotes the income set associated to the ith income bracket. The set Y nyi 1 will
instead denote the set Yi net of its lower element yi 1; where y0 = 0:
The marginal rate of substitution between y and x is MRSyx = 0(y=w)=w: For levels of
gross income that do not coincide with the thresholds y1 < y2 it should hold that MRSyx =
(1  ti) when y 2 Yi: That is
y = w  0 1 [(1  ti)w]
when y 2 Yinyi 1; where the function 0 1(:) by construction is positive and strictly increasing.
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Given the denition of y = wl; one obtains also the associated optimal labour supply
l = [(1  ti)w]
when wl 2 Yinyi 1:
Given the assumptions, y and l are continuous and strictly increasing w.r.t. w within the
sets Yinyi 1:
We consider now in details the issues when (l) = k  l with  > 1:Thereby leading to
y = w 

(1  ti)w
k
 1
 1
= w

 1

(1  ti)
k
 1
 1
(2.15)
l =

(1  ti)w
k
 1
 1
when y 2 Yinyi 1: Note that within the sets Yinyi 1 the elasticity " of labour supply w.r.t. the
wage is constant and equals 1( 1) :
10In this paper we will consider as a reference distribution
the gross income distribution in absence of taxation. Then, by setting ti = 0 from (2.15) we
obtain y = w

 1

1
k
 1
 1 and l =

w
k
 1
 1 : Let w (p) denote the gross wage of the individual
in position p 2 [0; 1] in the distribution of gross wages ranked in non-decreasing order. Then,
the following monotonically increasing transformation of the wage
y (p) := w (p)

 1

1
k
 1
 1
= w (p)1+"

"
k ("+ 1)
"
(2.16)
represents the gross income of the individual covering position p under the assumption of no-
taxation, with the associated labor supply l (p) =
h
w(p)
k
i 1
 1
=
h
w(p)"
k("+1)
i"
: The gross income
distribution in absence of taxation, formalized by the quantile (or inverse distribution) function
y (p) ; is the reference distribution in our analysis.
In order to simplify the exposition, and in line with the results obtained with xed labour
supply we focus only on tax schedules where t1  t2; and assume two possible regimes, i.e.
convex (case A) and non-convex (case B) of tax rates depending on the ranking of t2 and t3.
10 In the case with xed labor supply elasticity is set equal to zero, hence labor supply reduces to one and gross
incomes and wages coincide.
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Case A, is such that t1  t2  t3; while case B considers the conguration where t1  t3 < t2:
Depending on what case is considered we could either have as in case A that some agents
experience the same gross income coinciding with one of the thresholds y1 and y2; or as under
case B that this could happen for y1 while around y2 the map of y w.r.t. w is discontinuous,
but still increasing.
To simplify the exposition in the next two subsections we express the gross income distribu-
tion in terms of intervals of quantiles y (p), while in the Appendix B we show the gross income
distribution also in terms of wages intervals.
Case A: t1  t2  t3
Under case A the above optimality conditions hold if yi 1 < y < yi that is, if
yi 1
(1  ti 1)" < y (p) <
yi
(1  ti)"
for i 2 f1; 2; 3g where y3 = +1: The three sets of values can then be expressed in terms of
intervals of gross incomes such that
0 < y (p) <
y1
(1  t1)" ;
y1
(1  t2)" < y (p) <
y2
(1  t2)" ;
y2
(1  t3)" < y (p) :
Note that by construction it follows that
h
yi
(1 ti)"
i
<
h
yi
(1 ti+1)"
i
, and therefore we obtain:
yt (p) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
y (p) (1  t1)" if y (p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y (p) 
y1
(1 t2)"
y (p) (1  t2)" if y1(1 t2)" < y (p) 
y2
(1 t2)"
y2 if
y2
(1 t2)"  y (p) 
y2
(1 t3)"
y (p) (1  t3)" if y (p) > y2(1 t3)"
(2.17)
where yt (p) denotes the post tax gross income of an individual that covers position p in the
distribution of y (p) :
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Case B: t1  t3  t2
Under case B (non-convex regime) we assume that the optimal labour supply and gross income
are the same for all incomes that are in the rst bracket and at the rst threshold, the result
changes for the income levels in the second and third brackets. In particular, if t2 > t3 then
there exists a threshold level by in the gross income distribution such that all incomes above by
are such that y 2 Y3ny2; while all incomes below are such that y 2 Y2ny1: Appendix B illustrates
the derivation of by that is
by := (1 + ") (t2   t3) y2
(1  t3)(1+")   (1  t2)(1+")
with t2 > t3, while if t2 ! t3 then by = y2(1 t2)" . It follows that
yt (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
y (p) (1  t1)" if y (p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y (p) <
y1
(1 t2)"
y (p) (1  t2)" if y1(1 t2)"  y (p)  by
y (p) (1  t3)" if y (p) > by
(2.18)
where the after tax gross income yt (p) is discontinuous at y (p) = by:
The presentation of the further case where the optimal labour supply choice is such that
after tax no gross incomes belong to the second income bracket is discussed in Appendix B.
2.5.2 Numerical results
The optimal taxation problem described in the previous section is solved numerically.11 To this
end, we need to assign a value to the parameters  and k of the utility function (2.13) and to
specify the distribution w of individual wages and the exogenous revenue requirement G.
The parameter  determines the wage elasticity " of labor supply, which is constant through-
out the entire wage distribution and equal to 1( 1) . The parameter k is a scale parameter which
is set equal to 1=. We simulate the model for three di¤erent values of ", i.e. 0.1, 0.2, 0.5,
11We use a grid search method. More specically, we dene the grids for t1; t2; y1 and y2, with t1  t2 and
y1  y2: For each combination of these policy parameters we compute the value of t3 which keeps the government
budget constraint balanced and then we compute the value of the social evaluation function. Last, we identify
the combination of policy parameters that delivers the highest value of the social evaluation function.
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and accordingly we set  respectively equal to 11, 6 and 3.12 For a given distribution of wages,
di¤erent values of " have two e¤ects: rst they impact on the distribution of gross income in the
absence of taxation; second they determine how this distribution reacts to the tax system. We
want to get rid of the rst e¤ect in order to focus on how the optimal tax structure is a¤ected
by the strength of the agents reaction to the tax system. Accordingly, when " changes, we
keep the distribution of gross income in the absence of taxation constant, by an appropriate
rescaling of the wage distribution. This constant distribution of gross income in the absence
of taxation is chosen to be equal to the distribution implied by a wage elasticity " that tends
to zero.13 In turn, given that " tends to zero, it is possible to show that such a distribution
is equal to the distribution of wages. With regard to this wage distribution we assume that it
is a Pareto distribution, as in Apps et al. (2014), Andrienko et al. (2016), and Slack (2015).
More specically, we follow Apps et al. (2014) and consider a truncated Pareto distribution,
with mean  and median m respectively equal to 48.07 and 32.3, and wages ranging from 20 to
327.14
Finally we consider di¤erent values of the exogenous revenue requirement G, namely we
alternatively set G equal to 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% of the average gross income computed in the
absence of taxation.
As to the tax system, we assume two di¤erent regimes (convex and non-convex) depending
on the ranking between t2 and t3. The convex tax regime is such that t1  t2  t3, while the
non-convex tax regime considers the conguration where t1  t3  t2. We always assume that
there is an upper limit  to the value of the marginal tax rates and we set  = 50%.
Before we present the results of the simulations for the values of " > 0 mentioned above,
we report in Table 1 the optimal values of the policy parameters in the case in which " tends
to zero and accordingly labor supply is xed. The Table provides a quantitative illustration of
12The values of the labor supply elasticity we consider are broadly consistent with the empirical estimates
provided by the literature (see Giertz 2004, Meghir and Philips 2008, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2009 and Creedy
2009).
13Given a reference distribution ^w of wages, an " that tends to zero and the implied gross income distribution
^y, it is possible to show that the distribution of income is equal to ^y even when the " is positive if all wages
are raised to the power of (1 + ") (see equation (2.15) and set t = 0 and k = 1=).
14The cdf of a Pareto distributed variable x is F (x) = 1    L
x

, where L is a scale parameter, denoting the
lowest value of the distribution, while the coe¢ cient  > 1 represents the Pareto index, which is a measure of
the degree of inequality within the distribution. As in Apps et al. (2014) (case (1:a)), we assume L=20,  = 1:4
and we truncate the distribution at the 98th percentile which corresponds to a value of 327.
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the theoretical analysis that has been performed in Section 4.
Table 1. Optimal tax systems with xed labor supply
Panel A: Gini Social Evaluation Function.
Initial social welfare: 30.21, Inequality before taxes: 0.37.
G t1 t2 t3 y2 y2 WG
0:1  0 0 50% 66:07
0:83
66:07
0:83
29:83
0:15  0 0 50% 45:02
0:69
45:02
0:69
29:27
0:2  0 0 50% 32:66
0:51
32:66
0:51
28:31
0:25  0 0 50% 24:68
0:26
24:68
0:26
26:85
Panel B: Polarization Social Evaluation Function.
Initial social welfare: 42.83, Polarization before taxes: 0.11.
G t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 WP
0:1  0 50% 0 27:5
0:37
52:00
0:75
39:75
0:15  0 50% 0 26:0
0:31
71:50
0:85
37:81
0:2  0 50% 0 24:25
0:25
106:50
0:92
35:62
0:25  0 50% 0 22:5
0:15
171:50
0:97
33:40
Note. The two values reported in the columns y1 and y2
express the thresholds in terms of the level of income and
the associated percentile in the income distribution.
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More specically panel A illustrates the rst two propositions, and shows that the optimal
tax system reducing income inequality, is such that there is a no-taxation area (t1 = t2 = 0)
until a given threshold (y1 = y2). Above this cuto¤, the tax rate is set to its upper bound, i.e.
(t3 = 50%) : The higher the amount of collected taxes
 
G

is, the lower is the income threshold
and the no-taxation area. For example, when the required revenue doubles from 10% to 20%
of the average income, the fraction of incomes falling in the taxation area increases from 17%
to 50%, (compare rows 1 and 3 of panel A).
Simulation results panel B of Table 1 illustrate Proposition 3. The optimal tax system aimed
at reducing polarization, envisages a central bracket with the maximum admissible tax rate and
no taxation in the two external brackets. The median income falls within this central bracket
which widens as the amount of required tax revenue increases. For example, comparing the
rst and the fourth row of panel B, we see that, when the amount of collected taxes increases,
the fraction of people belonging to the central bracket changes from about 40% to about 80%.
We now present the results of the simulations for positive values of the labor supply elasticity.
Tables 2A and 2B show the optimal policy aimed at reducing inequality both under the convex
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and the non-convex tax regime.
Table 2A. Optimal convex tax-system: Gini based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 W
0:1  0:1 0 18% 49:9% 55:00
0:78
60:00
0:82
29:57
0:15  0:1 0 9% 49:85% 35:00
0:56
40:00
0:67
28:65
0:2  0:1 0 18% 49:79% 25:00
0:29
30:00
0:49
27:06
0:25  0:1 6% 7% 49:97% 20:00
0:01
25:00
0:34
24:79
0:1  0:2 0 39% 49:8% 50:00
0:77
55:00
0:82
29:23
0:15  0:2 0 10% 49:89% 30:00
0:46
35:00
0:64
27:80
0:2  0:2 2% 42% 49:91% 25:00
0:38
30:00
0:54
25:47
0:25  0:2 12% 42% 49:87% 25:00
0:38
30:00
0:54
22:91
0:1  0:5 1% 36% 43:30% 35:00
0:68
40:00
0:76
27:39
0:15  0:5 9% 11% 42:43% 30:00
0:49
35:00
0:70
24:38
0:2  0:5 18% 34% 43:10% 35:00
0:67
40:00
0:76
21:32
0:25  0:5 27% 41% 44:29% 35:00
0:70
40:00
0:76
18:14
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Table 2B. Optimal non-convex tax-system: Gini based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 W
0:1  0:1 0 47% 46:34% 55:00
0:79
60:00
0:82
29:54
0:15  0:1 1% 49% 48:59% 40:00
0:67
45:00
0:72
28:47
0:2  0:1 2% 50% 49:83% 30:00
0:49
35:00
0:60
26:97
0:25  0:1 7% 49% 48:80% 25:00
0:34
30:00
0:49
24:66
0:1  0:2 0 49% 48:36% 50:00
0:79
55:00
0:82
29:21
0:15  0:2 1% 50% 49:12% 35:00
0:64
40:00
0:70
27:70
0:2  0:2 6% 50% 49:75% 30:00
0:54
35:00
0:64
25:43
0:25  0:2 15% 50% 49:50% 30:00
0:54
35:00
0:64
22:86
0:1  0:5 1% 41% 20:53% 35:00
0:70
165:00
0:98
27:41
0:15  0:5 9% 42% 21:86% 35:00
0:70
200:00
0:99
24:45
0:2  0:5 17% 50% 25:46% 35:00
0:73
165:00
0:99
21:36
0:25  0:5 27% 48% 29:61% 40:00
0:78
155:00
0:98
18:21
The comparison between Table 1A and Table 2B shows that, when the wage elasticity of labor
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supply is positive, the optimal convex tax system aimed at reducing income inequality always
requires a central bracket with positive marginal tax rate (t2). The tax rate on the third income
bracket (t3) is approximately equal to its upper bound and it declines as the elasticity increases.
As to the tax rate (t1) on the rst income bracket, it is zero when the wage elasticity of labor
supply and the exogenous revenue requirement are low. However, when the amount of collected
taxes or the wage elasticity of labor supply rise, this no-taxation area may disappear.
Table 2B shows the optimal tax system for inequality reducing social objectives under the
non-convex regime, that is when t3  t2. It always happens that the optimal value of t3 is
strictly below t2. In particular the di¤erence between the two tax rates is sizeable when the
wage elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0:5.
Table 3 compares the values of the social evaluation function associated to the two di¤erent
tax regimes for each combination of G and ". The comparison shows that, to reduce income
inequality, the convex system is socially preferred to the non-convex one for low level of the
wage elasticity of labor supply. When the elasticity is equal to 0.5 the optimal tax system
becomes the non-convex one and top incomes face lower marginal tax rates than incomes in the
central part of the distribution. The reason for choosing to reduce the tax rate on top incomes,
whose weight in the social evaluation function is low15, is related to a La¤er curve type e¤ect
and is reminiscent of the classical result for optimal non linear income taxation by Mirrlees
(1971) of zero marginal tax rate for the top income. Setting t3 below t2, it is possible to collect
more revenues from top incomes and thus to reduce the scal burden for people in the lower tail
of the income distribution. The argument can be understood looking at the last row of Tables
2A and 2B. Under the convex tax regime (Table 2A), the rst income threshold is around the
70th percentile and the marginal tax rate in this income bracket is equal to 27%. Then, there
is a narrow central bracket with a marginal tax rate equal to 41% and including about the 7%
of population. The marginal tax rate on the remaining 23% of the population is equal to 44%.
The non-convex tax regime (table 2B) entails a remarkable reduction of the marginal tax rate
in the last bracket which however includes only the 2% of the population. The marginal tax rate
in the central bracket increases to 48%. Finally the marginal tax rate within the rst bracket
is the same as in the convex case but the rst bracket is however larger (it includes the 78% of
15See the Gini weighting function in gure 1.
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the population) than the corresponding bracket in the convex tax system. In summary, when
the wage elasticity is equal to 0.5, the welfare gains due to the fact that more people belong
to the rst income bracket (and to the fact that top incomes face a lower marginal tax rate),
o¤set the welfare loss determined by the higher marginal tax rate on the incomes belonging to
the central bracket.
Table 3. Convex vs. Non-convex regime: Gini SEF.
G " WC WNC
Socially preferred
tax regime
0:1  0:1 29:57 29:54 Convex
0:15  0:1 28:65 28:47 Convex
0:2  0:1 27:06 26:97 Convex
0:25  0:1 24:79 24:66 Convex
0:1  0:2 29:23 29:21 Convex
0:15  0:2 27:80 27:70 Convex
0:2  0:2 25:47 25:43 Convex
0:25  0:2 22:91 22:86 Convex
0:1  0:5 27:39 27:41 Non Convex
0:15  0:5 24:38 24:45 Non Convex
0:2  0:5 21:32 21:36 Non Convex
0:25  0:5 18:14 18:21 Non Convex
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Table 4A. Optimal convex tax-system for polarization based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 W
0:1  0:1 0 0 24:53% 30:00
0:46
30:00
0:46
38:30
0:15  0:1 1% 1% 36:53% 20:00
0
30:00
0:48
35:89
0:2  0:1 9% 9% 37:81% 20:00
0:01
30:00
0:48
33:42
0:25  0:1 18% 18% 37:59% 30:00
0:48
30:00
0:48
30:94
0:1  0:2 10:52% 10:52% 10:52% 37:63
0:15  0:2 15:51% 15:51% 15:51% 34:99
0:2  0:2 20:96% 20:96% 20:96% 32:30
0:25  0:2 26:59% 26:59% 26:59% 29:56
0:1  0:5 10:57% 10:57% 10:57% 36:22
0:15  0:5 16:40% 16:40% 16:40% 32:74
0:2  0:5 22:75% 22:75% 22:75% 29:08
0:25  0:5 29:85% 29:85% 29:85% 25:17
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Table 4B. Optimal non-convex tax system: polarization based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 W
0:1  0:1 0 49% 0 30:00
0:49
65:00
0:84
39:04
0:15  0:1 3% 50% 3% 30:00
0:49
85:00
0:90
36:52
0:2  0:1 16% 48% 16:32% 25:00
0:34
75:00
0:87
33:99
0:25  0:1 23% 50% 23:41% 25:00
0:34
70:00
0:86
31:41
0:1  0:2 2% 50% 2% 30:00
0:54
60:00
0:84
38:33
0:15  0:2 9% 46% 9:40% 30:00
0:53
60:00
0:84
35:55
0:2  0:2 16% 48% 16:32% 30:00
0:54
55:00
0:81
32:76
0:25  0:2 23% 50% 23:41% 30:00
0:54
50:00
0:79
29:90
0:1  0:5 8% 28% 8:13% 30:00
0:56
50:00
0:80
36:58
0:15  0:5 14% 34% 14:18% 30:00
0:59
50:00
0:81
32:97
0:2  0:5 22% 32% 22:15% 30:00
0:58
40:00
0:71
29:18
0:25  0:5 29% 39% 29:11% 25:00
0:49
35:00
0:69
25:21
Tables 4A and 4B show the optimal tax schedule when the government objective is the
reduction of polarization. Table 4a illustrates the case of a convex tax regime. When the wage
elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0:1, the optimal tax system envisages two income brackets,
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identied by an income threshold which is close to the median income. The marginal tax rate in
the income bracket above that threshold is higher than that in the rst income bracket. When
the exogenous revenue requirement increases, the income threshold remains constant while the
marginal tax rates, both above and below the threshold, rise. When the wage elasticity of labor
supply is higher than 0:1, the optimal tax system aimed at reducing polarization requires a
proportional taxation, which is increasing in the amount of revenues required.
Simulations under the non-convex tax regime are reported in table 4B. In this case, the
optimal tax system requires a central bracket with a high marginal tax rate (t2). For low values
of the wage elasticity of labor supply, i.e. " equal to 0:1 or to 0:2, t2 is almost equal to its upper
bound, while it sharply reduces when " raises to 0:5. As to the marginal tax rates on the two
external brackets, they increase with the exogenous revenue requirement.
Finally Table 5 compares, for di¤erent combinations of G and ", the values of the social
evaluation function associated to the the convex and the non-convex tax regimes when the aim
of the government is to reduce polarization. The comparison shows that the non-convex tax
system is always socially preferred to the convex one and therefore the optimal tax schedule is
such that t2 > t3 > t1. Thus Proposition 3, which has been proved under the assumption of
xed labor supply, also holds qualitatively when labor supply is endogenous, with the important
qualication that marginal tax rates in the rst and the third bracket are no longer always equal
to zero and the marginal tax rate in the second bracket is no longer always equal to its upper
54
bound.
Table 5. Convex vs. Non Convex regime:Polarization SEF.
G " WC WNC
Socially preferred
tax regime
0:1  0:1 38:30 39:04 Non Convex
0:15  0:1 35:89 36:52 Non Convex
0:2  0:1 33:42 33:99 Non Convex
0:25  0:1 30:94 31:41 Non Convex
0:1  0:2 37:63 38:33 Non Convex
0:15  0:2 34:99 35:55 Non Convex
0:2  0:2 32:30 32:76 Non Convex
0:25  0:2 29:56 29:90 Non Convex
0:1  0:5 36:22 36:58 Non Convex
0:15  0:5 32:74 32:97 Non Convex
0:2  0:5 29:08 29:18 Non Convex
0:25  0:5 25:17 25:21 Non Convex
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we adopt a non-welfarist approach to analyze how the optimal income tax schedule
changes according to the governments redistributive objective expressed in terms of either
inequality or polarization reduction. More specically, the focus is on the socially desirable
mechanism collecting a given level of per-capita revenue, when redistribution is not allowed. We
consider a piecewise linear income tax schedule with three income brackets. As in the optimal
taxation literature, the tax problem is formalized as a constrained optimization exercise. The
interesting aspect of our work is the formalization of the governments redistributive objective,
which is expressed by a rank-dependent social evaluation function. In particular, in line with the
literature on income inequality measurement we have considered two families of rank-dependent
evaluation functions that incorporate either concerns for inequality reduction or concerns for
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polarization reduction.
Our results reveal that redistributive objectives matter. The optimal tax schedule substan-
tially changes depending on whether the government is inequality or polarization sensitive. In
particular, with xed labor supply, the optimal tax schedule maximizing an inequality sensitive
SEF requires an income threshold above which the tax burden is the maximal admissible, and
below which there is no taxation. In other words, to reduce income inequality the optimal
tax system suggests to reduce the income distance between incomes within the second bracket
and between these incomes and those in the rst bracket that are not taxed. As to polariza-
tion reduction, the optimal tax schedule envisages a central interval where the tax rate is the
maximum admissible and it is set equal to zero outside this interval. That is, the way to face
polarization is to reduce the distance between the incomes in the central bracket so to create a
sort of less disperse middle class. At the same time the income in the higher bracket are taxed
according to a lump-sum taxation that is keeping their absolute dispersion una¤ected.
In order to make explicit the optimal tax system and to highlight di¤erences in the redistrib-
utive objective numerical simulations are performed. In addition, simulations are implemented
for di¤erent levels of wage labor supply elasticity and by considering two di¤erent tax regimes,
depending on the ranking of t2 and t3, i.e. convex scheme where t2  t3 and non-convex where
t3  t2:
Simulations shows that in order to reduce inequality the convex regime is socially preferred
to the non-convex one for low levels of wage labor supply elasticity. In addition, the optimal
tax schedule always requires a central bracket exhibiting a positive tax rate. When elasticity
is high the optimal tax schedule is non-convex and the reason is related to a La¤er curve type
argument. With regard to the polarization reduction, the socially desirable tax conguration
is always non-convex. In this case the result derived with xed labour supply that requires for
a lower marginal taxation for the upper income bracket is also combined with the La¤er type
e¤ect that is exhibited also when considering inequality sensitive SEFs.
56
Appendix A
Solutions of the constrained optimization problems for inequality and polar-
ization sensitive SEFs.
Recall the SEF constrained optimization problem where
max
t1;t2;t3;y1;y2
L =Wv + 

G 
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp

;
with ti 2 [0; 1]; y1 < y2: The associated partial derivatives are @L@ti for i = 1; 2; 3; @L@yi for i = 1; 2;
and @L@ :
More specically
@L
@ti
=  
Z 1
0
v (p)
@T (y(p))
@ti
dp  
Z 1
0
@T (y(p))
@ti
dp for i = 1; 2; 3.
Given the tax function T (y) ; the term @T (y)@ti is
@T (x)
@t1
= min fy, y1g ;
@T (y)
@t2
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if y  y1
y   y1 if y1 < y  y2
y2   y1 if y > y2
and
@T (y)
@t3
= max fy   y2, 0g :
Hence the partial derivatives with respect the three tax rates ti are respectively
@L
@t1
=  
Z p1
0
v (p) y (p) dp 
Z 1
p1
v (p) y1dp  
Z p1
0
y (p) dp+
Z 1
p1
y1dp

; (2.19)
@L
@t2
=  
Z p2
p1
v (p) [y (p)  y1] dp 
Z 1
p2
v (p) [y2   y1] dp (2.20)
 
Z p2
p1
[y (p)  y1] dp+
Z 1
p2
(y2   y1) dp

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or equivalently ; after rearranging, @L@t2 could be written as
@L
@t2
=  
Z 1
p1
v (p)min fy (p) , y2g dp+
Z 1
p1
v (p) y1dp  
Z 1
p1
min fy (p) , y2g dp 
Z 1
p1
y1dp

;
and
@L
@t3
=  
Z 1
p2
v (p) [y (p)  y2] dp  
Z 1
p2
[y (p)  y2] dp: (2.21)
The two F:O:Cs with respect the income thresholds y1 and y2 are:
@L
@y1
=  
Z 1
0
v (p)
@T (y)
@y1
dp  
Z 1
0
@T (y)
@y1
dp

= 0
and
@L
@y2
=  
Z 1
0
v (p)
@T (y)
@y2
dp  
Z 1
0
@T (y)
@y2
dp

= 0
where the derivatives of the tax function with respect to the income threshold are respectively
@T (y)
@y1
=
8<: 0 if y  y1t1   t2 if y > y1
and
@T (y)
@y2
=
8<: 0 if y  y2t2   t3 if y > y2 :
These two associated F:O:Cs can then be rewritten as
@L
@y1
=  
Z 1
p1
v (p) [t1   t2] dp  
Z 1
p1
(t1   t2) dp = 0 (2.22)
and
@L
@y2
=  
Z 1
p2
v (p) [t2   t3] dp  
Z 1
p2
(t2   t3) dp

= 0: (2.23)
The F:O:C: with respect to the Lagrangian multiplier is
@L
@
= G 
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp = 0: (2.24)
58
Derivation and simplication of F.O.Cs.
The associated Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions (F:O:Cs) are for the marginal tax rates,
either
@L
@ti

ti=0
 0; or @L
@ti

ti2(0;1)
= 0; or
@L
@ti

ti=1
 0
for i = 1; 2; 3: While the F:O:Cs for the income bracket thresholds are
@L
@y1
= 0;
@L
@y2
= 0
with y2 > y1 > 0; and for the multiplier  the F:O:C: requires that
@L
@
= 0:
We provide here rst a proof of the optimization result for inequality sensitive SEFs, then
we will prove the result for the polarization sensitive SEFs.
The rst simplications of the F:O:Cs. are expanded here below.
As shown above, the derivatives of the Lagrangian function in (2.11) are:
@L
@ti
=  
Z 1
0
v (p)hi (p) dp  
Z 1
0
hi (p) dp

(2.25)
for i = 1; 2; 3; where
h1 (p) : =
8<: y (p) if p < p1y1 if p  p1 ;
h2 (p) : =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p < p1
y (p)  y1 if p 2 [p1; p2)
y2   y1 if p  p2
;
h3 (p) : =
8<: 0 if p < p2y (p)  y2 if p  p2 :
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The associated cdfs of these three inverse functions are denoted with Hi.
The partial derivatives w.r.t. the thresholds of the income brackets are also
@L
@y1
= [t2   t1] [1  V (p1) + (1  p1)] (2.26)
@L
@y2
= [t3   t2] [1  V (p2) + (1  p2)] (2.27)
and the derivative w.r.t. Lagrange multiplier is
@L
@
= G 
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp = G 
3X
i=1
ti
Z 1
0
hi (p) dp: (2.28)
Recall that each SEF can be decomposed into an abbreviated social evaluation where the
average of a distribution is multiplied by 1 minus a measure Dv (:) of the degree of dispersion
quantied by a linear index. That is Wv(F ) =  (F ) [1 Dv(F )] ; in our case Dv(F ) could be
for instance the Gini index or a polarization index as those illustrated in Section 2. It follows
that
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [1 Dv(Hi)]     (Hi) =   (Hi)  [1 Dv(Hi) + ] :
Moreover, denote with i(p) the quantile function at position p of distribution of i where
incomes are equal to 0 for all individuals whose position is lower than pi and are constant with
value z > 0 for all individuals in positions p  pi; that is
i(p) :=
8<: 0 if p < p1z if p  p1 :
Note that  (i) = z  (1  p1): It follows that:
@L
@y1
= [t2   t1] [1  V (p1) + (1  p1)]
= [t2   t1] [ (1)  [1 Dv(1)] +  (1)] ; (2.29)
@L
@y2
= [t3   t2] [1  V (p2) + (1  p2)]
= [t3   t2] [ (2)  [1 Dv(2)] +  (2)] ; (2.30)
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and
@L
@
= G 
3X
i=1
ti   (Hi) : (2.31)
The partial derivatives for the social optimization problem are summarized in the next remark.
Remark 4 The partial derivatives of the Lagrangian optimization problem in (2.11) are:
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [1 Dv(Hi) + ] for i 2 f1; 2; 3g;
@L
@y1
= [t2   t1]   (1)  [1 Dv(1) + ] ;
@L
@y2
= [t3   t2]   (2)  [1 Dv(2) + ] ;
@L
@
= G 
3X
i=1
ti   (Hi) :
Note that if we let @L@yi = 0; then either ti+1 = ti holds or  =   [1 Dv(i)] :
Inequality concerns.
We derive here the qualitative features of the optimal taxation problem that hold for any
distribution of pre-tax gross incomes, for the class of inequality sensitive SEFs WI given by
the set of all linear rank-dependent SEFs with decreasing weights v(p); and for the set T
of piecewise linear three brackets tax functions whose marginal tax rates could not exceed
 2 (0; 1].
Derivation of optimal tax scheme for SEFs in WI : Consider the results in Remark 4. If
we consider SEFs where v(p) is decreasing as is the case for the Gini based SEF and in general
for all SEFs that are sensitive to inequality reductions through rank preserving progressive
transfers from richer to poorer individuals, then Dv(1) < Dv(2) [with Dv(1) = Dv(2)
only if p1 = p2]: This is the case because once the distributions 1 and 2 are normalized by
their respective means; then it is possible to move from the latter to the former through a series
of progressive transfers from the richer individuals with those poorest with normalized income
0.
It then follows that either (i) [t3 = t2 = t1 = t] or (ii)  =   [1 Dv(1)] and [t3 = t2 =  ] :
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The case (i) is not consistent with the solution because according to the revenue constraint
we should obtain t =
P3
i=1  (Hi) =G 2 (0; 1): In this case it should be
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [1 Dv(Hi) + ] = 0
for all i = 1; 2; 3: Given that Dv(Hi) could be di¤erent for all i, then  = 1 Dv(Hi) could not
hold for all i:
The solution associated to case (ii) then should hold. It then follows that, given that
 = Dv(1)  1; we obtain
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [1 Dv(Hi) + ] =   (Hi)  [Dv(1) Dv(Hi)] :
It can be proved that Dv(H3) > Dv(H2) > Dv(1) > Dv(H1) for any SEF where v(p) is
decreasing and there is positive density both below y1, in between y1 and y2; and above y2 [that
is if 0 < p1 < p2 < 1]. In order to make these comparisons one has to normalize all incomes by
the total income of the respective distribution and therefore make the comparisons by looking
at the distribution of the shares of total income. Once the income shares are compared the
distribution with the smaller dispersion evaluated by any rank-dependent SEF with decreasing
positional weights is the one where the cumulated income shares are larger for any p: In fact in
H1 income shares are larger than those in 1 at the bottom of the distribution for all p  p1
and are constant and smaller than those in 1 for p > p1: As a result the cumulated income
shares are larger in H1 than in 1 for any p 2 (0; 1): Following an analogous logic it could be
proved also that Dv(H3) > Dv(H2) > Dv(1):
From the condition Dv(H3) > Dv(H2) > Dv(1) > Dv(H1) then follows that: @L@t1 < 0;
@L
@t2
> 0; and @L@t3 > 0: As a result we obtain then that t1 = 0; t3 = t2 =  = 1; where y1 and y2
are set such that G =
P3
i=2  (Hi) :
Given the above result, the only threshold that matters for the solution is y1: Moreover,
given the sign of the partial derivatives @L@t1 < 0;
@L
@t2
> 0; and @L@t3 > 0 then for any given value
of y1 we have that the choice of t1 = 0; t3 = t2 = 1 identies a maximum point of the objective
function. However, for t1 = 0; t3 = t2 = 1 the value of the threshold y1 is identied by the
revenue constraint, in this case we have that y1 should be such that G =  (H2) +  (H3) : As
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a result the solution is a global maximum for the constrained optimization problem.
The above result could be generalized in order to take into account tax functions whose
upper marginal tax rate is not necessarily 100%. To summarize, if we assume that the maximal
marginal tax rate is  2 (0; 1] s.t. G     (F ) we can derive the statement highlighted in the
next proposition.
Proposition 5 (1A) A solution of the optimal taxation problem with xed labour supply for
tax schedules in T maximizing linear SEFs in WI is
t1 = 0;
t3 = t2 =  ;
with y1 s.t. G =  [ (H2) +  (H3)] :
Polarization concerns.
In order to derive the optimal three brackets linear tax scheme for polarization sensitive evalu-
ation measures we will take as starting point the results in Remark 4.
We consider polarization sensitive linear rank-dependent SEFs where v(p) is increasing below
the median and above the median and weights are larger in the rst interval than in the second
with v(0) = v(1) = 1 and limp!1=2  v(p) = 2 6= limp!1=2+ v(p) = 0 as for the polarization P
index illustrated in the previous section. We denote with WP the set of all these SEFs.
For these SEFs it is possible to derive p1 and p2 such that Dv(1) = Dv(2): This is the
case for instance for the SEF whose weights are represented in (2:5) : For these measures it is
possible to derive the associated V (p) and compute 1 V (p)1 p : They are respectively:
VP (p) =
8<: p2 + p if p  1=2p2 + 1  p if p > 1=2 ;
with
1  VP (p)
1  p =
8<: 1 
p2
1 p if p  1=2
p if p > 1=2
:
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Which can be represented as in the following gure
1 VP (p)
1 p
Note that for this specic SEF we have that @L@y1 =
@L
@y2
= 0 if   = 1 VP (p1)1 p1 =
1 VP (p2)
1 p2 : The
above function 1 VP (p)1 p is continuous and is decreasing for p  1=2; and increasing for p > 1=2;
with the minimum in p = 1=2 where it takes the value of 1/2, and the maxima in p = 0 and
p = 1 where it takes the value of 1. It then follows that there exist p1 < 1=2 and p2 > 1=2 such
that   = 1 VP (p1)1 p1 =
1 VP (p2)
1 p2 for   > 1=2:
In this case
  = 1 Dv(1) = 1  p
2
1
1  p1
= 1 Dv(2) = p2
thus p
2
1
1 p1 = Dv(1) = Dv(2) = 1  p2:
More generally for all SEFs inWP the associated function 1 V (p) is continuous and strictly
decreasing [from 1 to 0] for all p; and is concave for p  1=2 and for p 2 (1=2; 1]; with slope
-1 for p = 0 and p = 1: By computing the derivative of 1 V (p)1 p ; its sign depends on the sign of
 v(p)(1 p)+1 V (p); by construction of the weighting function it turns out that in line with
what shown for the bi-polarization weighting VP (p); we have that for all SEFs in WP the value
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of 1 V (p)1 p is decreasing for p  1=2; and increasing for p > 1=2; with the minimum in p = 1=2.
Following the same logic presented for the inequality sensitive SEFs the optimal solution
for SEFs in WP excludes the case where [t3 = t2 = t1 = t] :
We can then consider three cases: (i) t3 6= t2; t1 6= t2; (ii) t3 = t2; t1 6= t2; and (iii) t3 6= t2;
t1 = t2: Where cases (ii) and (iii) can be analyzed symmetrically.
Consider rst case (i) where
@L
@y1
=
@L
@y2
= 0!  =  1 +Dv(1) =  1 +Dv(2): (2.32)
By substituting  into the formula for @L@ti one obtains
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [Dv(1) Dv(Hi)]
=   (Hi)  [Dv(2) Dv(Hi)]
for all i = 1; 2; 3; with p1 < 1=2 < p2:
Note that for any polarization measure Dv(2) > Dv(H3); that is @L@t3 < 0; implying that
t3 = 0: This result is obtained because the di¤erence between 2 and H3 is that the latter
distribution is more disperse for realizations that take place in positions above p2 > 1=2; while
in 2 all incomes covering these positions are equal. As we have argued, moving from H3 to 2
increases polarization because this transformation increases the identication e¤ect reducing
the inequality between the individuals on the same side of the median.
It is possible also to show that for dispersion measures that are sensitive to polarization we
have that Dv(1) > Dv(H1) that is @L@t1 < 0; implying that t1 = 0:
This result could be obtained by properly dening distributions 1 and H1 so that  (1) =
 (H1) : By construction it follows that these distributions cross once for p = p1 and for all
p > p1 with p1 < 1=2; incomes are larger in 1 with a constant di¤erence compared to those in
H1; while for p < p1 incomes are larger in H1: It then follows that H1 can be obtained from 1
by transferring all the income di¤erences for p > p1 in order to compensate the di¤erences of
opposite sign for p < p1: Note that the average weight in the SEF for income in position p > p1
is lower than the minimal weight [that corresponds to 1] for all the incomes in position p < p1:
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As a result the SEF value increases when moving from 1 to H1 and given that  (1) =  (H1)
then Dv(1) > Dv(H1).
In order to verify the condition related to the sign of @L@t2 ; it is possible to combine distrib-
utions 1 and 2 whose linear measures of polarization are the same in order to obtain a new
distribution 12 with the same value for the measure of polarization but such that its quantile
function intersects from above the one of H2 for p = 1=2:
In this case it can be shown that for polarization sensitive dispersion measures we have that
Dv(1) = Dv(2) < Dv(H2); thus we obtain @L@t2 > 0 and therefore t2 = 1:
This is the case because by construction 12 can be obtained from H2 by transferring
incomes from above the median to below the median and transferring incomes from positions
that are above the median and close to it to individuals in the upper tail. Both operations
reduce the polarization and thus Dv(H2) > Dv(12):
We then obtain t2 = 1 and t1 = t3 = 0; with p1 < 1=2 < p2 where Dv(1) = Dv(2) and
such that G =  (H2) :
In order to verify that such conditions are associated to a constrained maximum, note rst
that given the sign of the partial derivatives @L@t3 < 0;
@L
@t1
< 0; and @L@t2 > 0; then for given
values of p1 and p2 (and so also for given values of y1 and y2) satisfying the revenue constraint
G =  (H2) we have that the combination t2 = 1 and t1 = t3 = 0 is associated to a maximum.
Consider now the population shares p1 < 1=2 < p2 associated to the solution that satisfy the
condition (2.32) and the revenue constraint that is such that  =  1+Dv(1) =  1+Dv(2)
and G =  (H2) : Our aim is to show that under the condition t2 = 1 and t1 = t3 = 0 these
population shares (and the associated values of y1 and y2) correspond to a maximum of the
constrained optimization problem.
Associated to these shares we have the value  and the dispersion indices Dv(1) = Dv(2)
such that 1 Dv(1) +  = 0 and 1 Dv(2) +  = 0.
Consider a generic pair of shares p1 < 1=2 < p2 (with associated values of y1 and y2) in the
neighborhood of p1 and p2 that satises the revenue constraint. By construction, given that
the revenue constraint has to satised it should be either that (I) p1 < p1 < 1=2 < p2 < p2 or
that (II) p1 < p1 < 1=2 < p2 < p2: That is, a reduction (increase) in y1 should be paired with a
reduction (increase) in y2 in order to continue to satisfy the revenue constraint. Substituting the
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condition t2 = 1 and t1 = t3 = 0 in the SEF and making use of the calculations leading to (2.22)
and (2.23) we have that @Wv@y1 =
R 1
p1
v (p) dp = 1  V (p1) and @Wv@y2 =  
R 1
p2
v (p) dp = 1  V (p2):
Moreover, denoting with G the revenue
R 1
0 T (y (p)) dp we obtain also that
@G
@y1
=   R 1p1 dp =
 (1  p1) and @G@y2 =
R 1
p2
dp = (1  p2): It follows that by taking the di¤erential of the revenue
we have dG =  (1  p1)dy1+ (1  p2)dy2; so under the assumption that the revenue constraint
is satised G = G; we have that dG = 0 and so
(1  p1)dy1 = (1  p2)dy2: (2.33)
Analogously the di¤erential of the SEF is
dWv = [1  V (p1)] dy1   [1  V (p2)] dy2: (2.34)
Substituting for dy2 from (2.33) we obtain
dWv = (1  p1) 

1  V (p1)
1  p1  
1  V (p2)
1  p2

dy1: (2.35)
Recall that the value of 1 V (p)1 p is decreasing for p  1=2; and increasing for p > 1=2; with the
minimum in p = 1=2. As a result under case (I) we have that dy1 < 0 and that p1 and p2
decrease w.r.t. p1 and p2: As a result
1 V (p1)
1 p1 >
1 V (p2)
1 p2 and so dWv < 0: Similarly we have
that if dy1 > 0 then p1 and p2 increase w.r.t. p1 and p2; and so
1 V (p1)
1 p1 <
1 V (p2)
1 p2 leading to
dWv < 0 according to (2.35): As a result the combination of p1 and p2 where
@L
@y1
= @L@y2 = 0
identies a maximum for the constrained optimization.
Consider now case (ii) where t3 = t2; t1 6= t2 implying that in order to obtain @L@y1 = 0
necessarily it is required that  =  1 +Dv(1):
Note that t3 = t2 guarantees that @L@y2 = 0 irrespective of the value of p2; that in any case
has to satisfy p2 > p1:
Substituting for  into @L@ti we obtain
@L
@ti
=   (Hi)  [Dv(1) Dv(Hi)] :
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Recall that t3 = t2 implies that the sign of Dv(1)   Dv(H2) according to the polarization
sensitive dispersion measures Dv() should be the same as the sign of Dv(1)   Dv(H3); and
this result should hold for any p2 > p1:
We leave aside for the moment the case where Dv(1) Dv(H2) = Dv(1) Dv(H3) = 0.
We can then have two cases, either t3 = t2 = 1 and t1 = 0; or t3 = t2 = 0 and t1 = 1:
Note that in the rst case the revenue constraints require that G =  (H1) +  (H2) ; while
in the second case it is required that G =  (H1) :
As G increases   should increase, therefore in consideration that   = 1   Dv(1) we
have that:
(iia) either p1 < 1=2; t3 = t2 = 1 and t1 = 0;
(iib) or p1 > 1=2; t3 = t2 = 0 and t1 = 1:
In fact for (iia) we have that as G increases then p1 should be reduced to increase the tax
base in order to collect the required tax revenue, at the same time as 1 changes we have that
also   increases. Given the denition of 1 this will not be the case if p1 > 1=2:
For (iib) we have the symmetric argument where the value of p1 > 1=2 should increase in
order to guarantee to collect the required revenue and this will lead to an increase of   because
p1 > 1=2:
As for the previous case (i), given the shape of 1, we can either have p1 < 1=2; or p1 > 1=2;
and therefore both (iia) and (iib) are admissible cases.
Suppose we take p1 < 1=2:
Substituting for  =  1 + Dv(1) into @L@ti we obtain @L@ti =   (Hi)  [Dv(1) Dv(Hi)] :
As for the analysis in case (i) we can show that Dv(1) > Dv(H1) giving t1 = 0: Note that we
obtain t3 = t2 = 1 if the signs of Dv(1)   Dv(H2) and of Dv(1)   Dv(H3) are negative, it
should also be that Dv(1) < Dv(H2) when p2 is set equal to 1. However, it is not possible
here to derive a clear-cut conclusion on the sign of Dv(1) Dv(H2); and in general for a given
weighting function and a given distribution the possibility of obtaining Dv(1) > Dv(H2) when
p2 = 1 cannot be ruled out.
Consider now case (iib) where p1 > 1=2: Again, referring to the analysis developed for case
(i) we can show that Dv(1) > Dv(H2) and Dv(1) > Dv(H3) giving t3 = t2 = 0: Similarly to
what argued for the previous case (iia) it is not possible now to derive a clear-cut conclusion
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on the sign of Dv(1)   Dv(H1); and in general for a given weighting function and a given
distribution the possibility of having Dv(1) > Dv(H1) and therefore that it should not hold
t1 = 1 cannot be ruled out.
Going back now to the case where Dv(1)   Dv(H2) = Dv(1)   Dv(H3) = 0. If this is
the case, then t3 = t2 may not reach the maximal value. However, as the revenue requirement
increases then   should also increase, then p1 changes and accordingly also 1 changes, it
follows that Dv(1) is modied and given that H2 and H3 are not a¤ected then the signs of
Dv(1)  Dv(H2) and Dv(1)  Dv(H3) change leading either to t3 = t2 = 1 or t3 = t2 = 0:
Thus, the solutions where tax rates take the extreme values as in (iia) or (iib) are admissible
only for cases related to specic revenue values, and in general are not guaranteed as the solution
at point (i). If these latter solutions are identied they are associated to local maxima of the
constrained optimization problem (see the arguments discussed for the solution related to the
inequality sensitive SEF case) and should be compared to the solution at point(i).
If we consider case (iii) we can note that it is analogous to case (ii) because both cases will
require to consider essentially two brackets with maximal marginal tax rate within one bracket
and minimal marginal tax rate in the other.
A remark for cases (iia) and (iib). Before summarizing the results we make the following
remark that is motivated by the fact that cases (iia) and (iib) hold only if the revenue require-
ment is "su¢ ciently high". In fact for case (iia) we have p1 < 1=2; and the maximal tax rates
are t3 = t2 = 1 with t1 = 0; and for case (iib) we have p1 > 1=2; with t3 = t2 = 0 and maximal
tax rate set at t1 = 1: Analogous results hold also if we assume that the maximal marginal
tax rate is  2 (0; 1]: Let y (1=2) = yM denote the median income. Then, let H  denote the
distribution whose quantile function is
h  (p) =
8<: y (p) if p < 1=2yM if p  1=2 ;
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and let H+ denote the distribution whose quantile function is
h+ (p) =
8<: 0 if p < 1=2y (p)  yM if p  1=2
The associated averages of these two distributions are respectively  (H ) and  (H+) such that
by construction their sum coincides with the overall per-capita gross income, that is  (H ) +
 (H+) =  (F ). The next remark holds
Remark 6 Case (iia) may hold only if G >  [ (H+)] : Case (iib) may hold only if G >
 [ (H )] :
Recall that the condition in the remark are only necessary for (iia) or (iib) to hold, while if
they do not hold this is su¢ cient to guarantee that case (i) holds.
We can now summarize the results in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 (3A) The solution of the optimal taxation problem with xed labour supply for
tax schedules in T maximizing linear SEFs in WP is:
(i) p1 < 1=2 < p2 where I(1) = I(2) and such that G =  (H2) with
t1 = t3 = 0;
t2 =  ;
if G  minf (H+) ;  (H )g.
(iia) If G >  (H+) solution (i) should be compared with p1 < 1=2; and
t1 = 0;
t2 = t3 = 
where G =  [ (H2) +  (H3)]
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(iib) If G >  (H ) solution (i) should be compared with p1 > 1=2;
t1 =  ;
t2 = t3 = 0;
where G =  (H1) :
(iii) If G > maxf (H+) ;  (H )g all three solutions should be compared.
Appendix B
The derivation of the optimal gross income distribution for the non-convex
tax schedule.
In this appendix we present all computations underlying the derivation of the gross income
distribution for the non-convex tax schedule case. We rst derive the gross income distribution
in the space of wages w, then we express such distribution in terms of quantiles y (p) : More
specically, we start the analysis by rst assuming that under the non-convex regime the optimal
labour supply and gross income are the same for all incomes that are in the rst bracket and at
the rst threshold, the result changes for the income levels in the second and third brackets. In
particular, if t2 > t3 then there exists a threshold level bw in the wage distribution such that all
wages above bw are such that the associated y 2 Y3ny2; while for all wages in hy 11 k(1 t2)i 1 ; bw

the associated gross income is such that y 2 Y2ny1:
For all w > y 11

k
(1 t2)
 1

the optimal gross income is y > y1: If t2 > t3; the conditions
in (2.15) could identify two potential levels of incomes one in Y2ny1 and one in Y3ny2 where the
MRSxy and the slope of the net income function y  T (y) coincide. The optimal choice should
then correspond to the one that exhibits larger utility.
Let yi = w

 1
h
(1 ti)
k
i 1
 1
with li =
h
(1 ti)w
k
i 1
 1
for i = 2; 3: Recall from (2.14) that the
associated net incomes xi are x

2 = (t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)y2 and x3 = (t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 +
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(1  t3)y3; then the utility levels associated to the pairs (xi ; li ) for i = 2; 3 are respectively
U2 = U(x

2; l

2) = x

2   k  l2 = (t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)wl2   kl2 ;
U3 = U(x

3; l

3) = x

3   k  l3 = (t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)wl3   kl3 :
It then follows that l = l2 when w > y
 1
1

k
(1 t2)
 1

if and only if U2  U3; otherwise we have
l = l3:
That is, l = l2 holds whenever
(t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)wl2   kl2  (t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)wl3   kl3 ;
which can be simplied as
(1  t2)wl2   kl2  (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)wl3   kl3 :
After substituting for li one obtains
(1  t2)w

(1  t2)w
k
 1
 1
  k

(1  t2)w
k
 
 1
 (1  t3)w

(1  t3)w
k
 1
 1
+ k

(1  t3)w
k
 
 1
 (t3   t2)y2;
that is 
(1  t2)w
k
 
 1
k (  1) 

(1  t3)w
k
 
 1
k (  1)  (t3   t2)y2;
leading to
w

 1k (  1)
 
(1  t3)
k
 
 1
 

(1  t2)
k
 
 1
!
 (t2   t3)y2;
w

 1
(  1)
k
1
 1

 1

(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1

 (t2   t3)y2:
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It follows that
w

 1  k
1
 1

 1
(  1)
(t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1
 ;
or expressing the condition in terms of w one obtains that the wage should be lower than a
threshold bw; that is
w  bw := k 1 (  1) 1 
(  1)
24 (t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1

35 1 :
Recall that in order to obtain that y is in Y2ny1 it should hold that
w 2
 
y 11
k
(1  t2)
 1

;

y 12
k
(1  t2)
 1

!
;
we can then show that bw < hy 12 k(1 t2)i 1 :
To prove this condition consider the equivalent constraint bw  1 < y2 h (1 t2)k i  1 1 ; that is
k
1
 1

 1
(  1)
(t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1
 < y2  k
(1  t2)
 1
 1
:
After a series of simplications and rearrangements one obtains

(  1)
(t2   t3)
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1
 < 1
(1  t2)
1
 1
;

(  1)(t2   t3) <

1  t3
1  t2
 1
 1
(1  t3)  (1  t2);

(  1)
(t2   t3)
(1  t2) <

1  t3
1  t2
 1
 1 (1  t3)
(1  t2)   1;
1 +

(  1)
(t2   t3)
(1  t2) <

1  t3
1  t2
 
 1
:
Let  = t2 t31 t2 > 0;
1 t3
1 t2 = 1 +  and

( 1) =  > 1, the condition can then be rewritten as
1 +  < (1 + ) :
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This condition holds for all  > 0 and  > 1: Making use of the Hopital rule one can also prove
that as (t2   t3) tends to 0 for positive values, the level of bw converges to hy 12 k(1 t2)i 1 from
below.
We summarize these nding with the following remark, where the condition (ii) could be
derived by taking the derivative of bw w.r.t. t3.
Remark 8 If t2 > t3; (i) bw < hy 12 k(1 t2)i 1 ; (ii) bw is increasing in t3; and (iii) limt3!t 2bw = hy 12 k(1 t2)i 1 :
It could however be possible that bw < hy 11 k(1 t2)i 1 ; that is the threshold bw is below the
inmum of the interval of wages leading to optimal choices of post tax gross incomes in Y2ny1: If
this is the case no post tax gross income is in the interval Y2ny1: All gross incomes are therefore
in the non adjacent intervals Y1ny0 and Y3ny2: Given that t1  t3 then in accordance with case
A for all w <
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

we have l = l1 =
h
(1 t1)w
k
i 1
 1
and y = y1 = w

 1
h
(1 t1)
k
i 1
 1
with y1 2 Y1ny0:
If bw < hy 11 k(1 t2)i 1 then for all wages where w  bw we have that l = l3 = h (1 t3)wk i 1 1
and y = y3 = w

 1
h
(1 t3)
k
i 1
 1
: This is the case because the indi¤erence curve that for these
wages is tangent to the net income function in Y3ny2; lies above the one that is passing through
the kink of the function associated to y = y1.
However, there could be also other wage levels lower than bw that lead to l3 and y3 as optimal
solutions.
In order to identify them we need to investigate the case where bw < hy 11 k(1 t2)i 1 and
w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

; bw :
In this case agents should choose between setting either y = y1 or y = y3 = w

 1
h
(1 t3)
k
i 1
 1
:
The utility comparison then becomes
U1 = U((1  t1) y1; y1=w) = (1  t1) y1   k  (y1=w) ;
U3 = U(x

3; l

3) = (t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)wl3   kl3 :
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with y = y1 if and only if U1  U3; that is
(1  t1) y1 k(y1=w)  (t2 t1)y1+(t3 t2)y2+(1 t3)w

 1

(1  t3)
k
 1
 1
 k

(1  t3)w
k
 
 1
:
The condition can be simplied into
y1   k  (y1=w)  t2y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)

 1w

 1

1
k
 1
 1

  1


;
that is
(1  t2)y1 + (t2   t3)y2  k  y1  w  + (1  t3)

 1  w  1

1
k
 1
 1

  1


:
A wage level ~w could then be derived such that the above condition is solved with equality,
that is such that
(1  t2)y1 + (t2   t3)y2 = k  y1  ~w  + (1  t3)

 1  ~w  1

1
k
 1
 1

  1


:
Case B.1. Let bw := k 1 (  1) 1 ( 1)
"
(t2 t3)y2
(1 t3)

 1 (1 t2)

 1

# 1

; and assume that bw h
y 11
k
(1 t2)
i 1

: It follows that
y =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
w

 1
h
(1 t1)
k
i 1
 1
if w <
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

y1 if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

;
h
y 11
k
(1 t2)
i 1


w

 1
h
(1 t2)
k
i 1
 1
if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t2)
i 1

; bw
w

 1
h
(1 t3)
k
i 1
 1
if w > bw
(2.36)
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where the post tax gross income y is discontinuous at w = bw: With the associated optimal
labour supply levels
l =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
h
w (1 t1)k
i 1
 1
if w <
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

y1=w if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

;
h
y 11
k
(1 t2)
i 1


h
w (1 t2)k
i 1
 1
if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t2)
i 1

; bwh
w (1 t3)k
i 1
 1
if w > bw
:
By applying the following monotonically increasing transformation of the wage threshold bw we
obtain the gross income threshold by derived in the paper. In fact taking the denition of bw one
obtains that
bw  1
k
1
 1
= (  1) 1 1


(  1)
 
 1
24 (t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1

35
= (  1)( 1 1   1) ( 1 1+1)
24 (t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1

35 :
By using the denition of the gross income in (2.16) where y (p) := w (p)

 1

1
k
 1
 1 we obtain
that the gross income threshold satisfy by 1 1 = bw  1
k
1
 1
that is after substituting
by = 
  1
24 (t2   t3)y2
(1  t3)

 1   (1  t2)

 1

35
= (1 + ")
"
(t2   t3)y2 
(1  t3)(1+")   (1  t2)(1+")
# :
It then follows that the post tax gross income distribution is
yt(p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
y(p)(1  t1)" if y(p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y(p) <
y1
(1 t2)"
y(p)(1  t2)" if y1(1 t2)"  y(p)  by
y(p)(1  t3)" if y(p) > by
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Note that as explained before with this conguration of the tax system (t2  t3) there is no
bunching of incomes at the second income threshold.
Case B.2. Suppose that bw < hy 11 k(1 t2)i 1 : Let ~w denote the solution of
(1  t2)y1 + (t2   t3)y2 = k  y1  ~w  + (1  t3)

 1  ~w  1

1
k
 1
 1

  1


(2.37)
such that ~w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

; bw : The optimal levels are:
y =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w

 1
h
(1 t1)
k
i 1
 1
if w <
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

y1 if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

; ~w

w

 1
h
(1 t3)
k
i 1
 1
if w > ~w
;
where the gross income is discontinuous at w = ~w with no gross income in the second income
bracket Y2; and
l =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
h
w (1 t1)k
i 1
 1
if w <
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

y1=w if w 2
h
y 11
k
(1 t1)
i 1

; ~w

h
w (1 t3)k
i 1
 1
if w > ~w
:
At the same time, by using (2.16) and substituting in the implicit denition of ~w we have thatey is the solution of:
(1  t2)y1 + (t2   t3)y2 = y1 
ey1 

+ (1  t3)

 1  ey  1


(1  t2)y1 + (t2   t3)y2 = y(
"+1
" )
1

"
"+ 1
 ey(  1") + (1  t3)"+1  ey 1
"+ 1

:
Then the post tax gross income distribution is
yt (p) =
8>>><>>>:
y (p) (1  t1)" if y (p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y (p)  ey
y (p) (1  t3)" if y (p) > ey
:
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Chapter 3
Optimal Redistribution with
Non-Welfarist Objectives
We consider optimal income taxation redistributive schemes under non-welfarist objectives.
We derive theoretical and simulation results that highlight the di¤erent impact of redistrib-
utive income policies under income inequality reducing objectives compared to polarization
reducing ones. The analyzed mechanism considers piecewise linear income taxation schemes
supplemented with lump sum transfers (taxation or subsidy). The sign of these transfers is
determined by the combination of the level of gross income dispersion and the value of labour
supply elasticity.
With two income brackets the optimal tax system reducing inequality exhibits a proportional
taxation with a no-tax area. While in case of polarization concerns the optimal tax system is
proportional with zero top marginal tax rate.
With three income brackets the optimal tax system for inequality concerns is convex unless
when the level of initial dispersion is low or the labour supply elasticity is high. As to polar-
ization reduction the optimal tax system is non-convex with the maximal admissible tax rate
within the central bracket and zero in the two external ones.
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3.1 Introduction
Since its foundation (Mirrlees 1971), the optimal taxation theory has investigated the shape of
the optimal tax schedule under di¤erent possible tax congurations. The optimal tax system is
obtained through the maximization of a social welfare function subject to a set of constraints,
dealing with the amount of required revenue and the agents reactions to taxation. These
exercises consider a social welfare function based over individualsutility and the focus is on
the e¢ ciency costs of taxation.
Typically, little importance is given to the e¤ect of di¤erences in the redistributive objectives
on the shape of the optimal tax formula. Moreover, the focus on individualsutility seems to
be not the most appropriate, since utility is only one aspect of individualswelfare and policy
makers, instead of maximizing the sum of individualsutility, could aim to reduce the level of
social indicators like inequality, poverty or polarization, which are dened in terms of income
and not utility.
Hence, the traditional welfarist approach is not the proper way to investigate the e¤ect of
di¤erent redistributive objectives on the shape of the optimal tax system. Therefore, in order
to provide a justication for income redistribution, we adopt an alternative approach, proposed
by Kanbur et al. (1994) and known as non-welfarist.
In particular, in this paper we consider a set of piecewise linear taxation schemes supple-
mented with lump-sum transfers (taxation or subsidies) and we analyze the impact of these
schemes in terms of a rank-dependent social evaluation function with di¤erent distributive ob-
jectives. More specically, in line with the literature on income inequality measurement we will
consider two families of rank-dependent evaluation functions dened over net incomes, that
could incorporate either concerns for inequality reduction or concerns for income polarization
reduction.
Our results supplement those presented in Chapter 2 whose aim was to highlight the shape
of optimal taxation schemes when redistribution is not allowed. The focus there was only on
the socially desirable mechanism that guarantees to collect a given level of per-capita revenue.
Here, the mechanisms are integrated with lump-sum taxation and subsidies that provide the
basic tools for redistribution within the piecewise linear taxation schemes.
The results we obtain are completely di¤erent from those derived when redistribution is not
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allowed. A rst intuition could be obtained when considering xed labour supply. In particular,
in this case the optimal tax system requires to tax all incomes with the highest admissible tax
rate and then redistribute them equally, eventually keeping the share of income necessary
to cover the revenue requirement. This conceivable result holds irrespective of whether the
social evaluation function is inequality or polarization sensitive and represents a remarkable
di¤erence with respect to the case without redistribution, where there exist two clear and well-
dened patterns of the tax rates as the focus shifts from inequality to polarization concerns.
More specically, with xed labour supply and no redistribution, in case of inequality concerns
the socially desirable mechanism collecting a given revenue requirement exhibits an income
threshold with no taxation below and the maximal admissible tax rate above. While the
optimal tax system associated with a polarization sensitive social evaluation function is such
that the marginal tax rate is the maximal admissible within a central interval including also
the median income, and zero outside.
When we introduce labour supply elasticity the scenario becomes less obvious. In this case,
indeed, the di¤erent redistributive objectives play a relevant role in determining the shape of
the optimal tax system, and we analyze this role comparing di¤erent tax regimes.
In particular, in the case of a two brackets piecewise linear tax system we have that for
the inequality based social evaluation functions the optimal tax system requires a no-taxation
area below a given threshold, and proportional taxation above. The tax rate is decreasing in
the level of labour supply elasticity, while the exemption area is increasing. As to polarization
reduction, the optimal tax system is based on a proportional taxation for all incomes below a
given threshold, above which the marginal tax rate is set equal to zero. Both the tax rate and
the income threshold are decreasing in the level of elasticity.
With three income brackets, the optimal tax system reducing inequality is convex with
increasing marginal tax rates, unless when the level of initial gross income dispersion is not
very high or when labour supply elasticity is high. For polarization concerns the optimal tax
system is mainly non-convex. In both cases, proportional taxation is supplemented with a
lump-sum transfer, whose sign is determined by the combination of the level of labour supply
elasticity and the index of initial gross income dispersion.
Generally the lump-sum taxation is more likely to dominate proportional taxation for po-
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larization sensitive social evaluation functions than for the inequality ones.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the agents
optimization problem and introduces the linear rank-dependent social evaluation function. In
Section 3 we formalize the optimal redistributive tax problem and derive the socially desirable
tax schedule considering alternative congurations with di¤erent tax rates regimes. Section 4
concludes.
3.2 Setting
In this section, rst we formalize the agentsoptimization problem under the assumption of a
piecewise linear three brackets tax system. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, this tax schedule
represents the easiest way to highlight the di¤erences in terms of marginal tax rates driven by
the governments shift from inequality to polarization concerns. Then, we present the linear
rank-dependent social evaluation function and show how the policy maker weights individuals
net incomes according to its specic non-welfarist objective.
3.2.1 The agentsoptimization problem
For most derivations we consider agents endowed with quasi-linear preferences between con-
sumption and leisure exhibiting constant labour supply wage elasticity. In particular, agents
make labour supply decisions based on the constrained optimization of the following function
U(x; l) = x  (l); (3.1)
where x 2 R denotes the net disposable income/consumption and l 2 [0; L] is the labour supply.
The function  : [0; L] ! R is continuous, convex and increasing in l with 0(0) = 0 where 0
denotes the marginal disutility of labour. The utility function could also be expressed in terms
of disposable income and leisure `; where ` = L   l: In this case given the above assumptions
the function is strictly quasi-concave in x and `.
We will consider an utility specication where  is isoelastic, taking the form
(l) = k  l (3.2)
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with  > 1; k > 0:
Each agent is endowed with a productivity level formalized by the exogenous wage w > 0:
The agents in the economy earn a gross income y  0 obtained only through labour supply, that
is y = wl: Agents are subject to taxation formalized by the tax schedule T (y)  0; that leads
to the net disposable income, considered in their utility function, obtained as x = y   T (y):
The tax schedule is piecewise linear, with three income brackets identied by two gross
income thresholds y1 < y2 and three marginal tax rates t1;t2; t3 2 [0; 1]: Formally
T (y) :=
8>>><>>>:
t1y if y 2 [0; y1)
t1y1 + t2(y   y1) if y 2 [y1; y2)
t1y1 + t2(y2   y1) + t3(y   y2) if y  y2
:
Quasi linearity of the utility function rules out income e¤ects in agentsdecisions and allows to
focus only on substitution e¤ects on labour supply. We can equivalently re-express the problem
in the space (x; y) for each agent. In this case the utility function becomes
u(x; y) = U(x; y=w) = x  (y=w)
and the relation between x and y is
x := y   T (y) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  t1)y if y 2 Y1  [0; y1)
(t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)y if y 2 Y2  [y1; y2)
(t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)y if y 2 Y3  [y2;1)
: (3.3)
Where Yi denotes the income set associated to the ith income bracket. The set Y nyi 1 will
instead denote the set Yi net of its lower element yi 1; where y0 = 0:
The marginal rate of substitution between y and x isMRSyx = 0(y=w)=w: For gross income
levels that do not coincide with the thresholds y1 < y2 it should hold that MRSyx = (1   ti)
when y 2 Yi: That is
y = w  0 1 [(1  ti)w]
when y 2 Yinyi 1; where the function 0 1(:) by construction is positive and strictly increasing:
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Given the denition of y = wl; one obtains also the associated optimal labour supply
l = [(1  ti)w]
when wl 2 Yinyi 1:
Given the assumptions, y and l are continuous and strictly increasing w.r.t. w within the
sets Yinyi 1:
In order to simplify the exposition, and in line with the results obtained in Chapter 2,
we consider a piecewise tax system with three income brackets and three marginal tax rates.
Depending on what case is considered with respect to the value of t3 compared to t1  t2; we
could either have (if t1  t2  t3) that some agents experience the same gross income coinciding
with one of the thresholds y1 and y2; or (as under the case where t1  t3 < t2) that this could
happen for y1 while around y2 the map of y w.r.t. w is discontinuous, but still increasing.
When necessary we will consider in details these issues when (l) = k  l with  > 1:
Recall that in this case the condition MRSyx = (1  ti) requires that
y = w 

(1  ti)w
k
 1
 1
= w

 1

(1  ti)
k
 1
 1
(3.4)
l =

(1  ti)w
k
 1
 1
when y 2 Yinyi 1: Note that within the sets Yinyi 1 the elasticity " of labour supply w.r.t. w
is constant and equals 1 1 :
In this paper we will consider a simplied exposition of the problem taking as reference
distribution the gross income distribution in absence of taxation. That is we consider ti = 0
and derive y = w

 1

1
k
 1
 1 and l =

w
k
 1
 1 : Let w(p) denote the gross wage of the
individual in position p 2 [0; 1] in the distribution of the gross wages ranked in non-decreasing
order. It then follows that the following monotonically increasing transformation of the wage
y(p) := w(p)

 1

1
k
 1
 1
denotes the gross income of this individual under the assumption of no-taxation, with the
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associated labour supply l(p) =
h
w(p)
k
i 1
 1
:
We will analyze the redistributive schemes taking as reference the gross income distribution
formalized by the quantile (or inverse distribution) function y(p):
According to (3.4) when considering a linear taxation scheme with a unique marginal tax
rate t the associate gross income distribution will generate the following quantile distribution
yt(p) = w

 1

1
k
 1
 1
[(1  t)] 1 1 = y(p)(1  t) 1 1 (3.5)
= y(p)(1  t)"
for p 2 [0; 1]:
As special cases we will get that when labour supply is not elastic (" = 0) yt(p) = y(p) = w(p)
with l(p) = 1: While, if  = 2 then " = 1 and yt(p) = y(p)(1   t) with y(p) := w(p)2 12k and
l(p) = w(p) 12k :
3.2.2 Social evaluations
The redistributive schemes are evaluated according to rank-dependent social evaluation func-
tions dened over the distribution of the net incomes, in line with the exposition presented in
Chapter 2.
Let F (y) denote the cumulative income distribution function with quantile function y (p) =
inf fy : F (y)  pg. The rank-dependent social evaluation function [SEF] (see Yaari, 1987, 1988
and Weymark, 1982) aggregates incomes weighted according to weights v (p)  0 for p 2 [0; 1]
that depend on the individualsposition p 2 [0; 1] in the income ranking, it is expressed as
Wv(F ) =
Z 1
0
v (p) y (p) dp; (3.6)
where
R 1
0 v (p) dp = 1:
The positional welfare weights could formalize di¤erent distributional concerns for the social
evaluation. In fact, as argued in Chapter 2, we could consider two families of weights that
represent inequality concerns or polarization concerns.
As special cases of these two families of weights we can consider those where v (p) := vG (p)
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with
vG (p) =

1  [ 2  12   p] if p  12
1  2  p  12 if p  12 ; (3.7)
that formalize inequality reducing concerns. These weights could be compared to those formal-
izing polarization concerns that are represented by the function1
vP (p) =

2p+ 1 if p  12
2p  1 if p  12
: (3.8)
For both weighting functions we can derive the cumulative weights obtained as
V (p) :=
Z p
0
v (t) dt:
The weight V (p) =p denotes the average weight for the income of the individuals covering the
poorer p quantiles of the population, while the weight [1  V (p)] = [1  p] considers the average
social weight for the income of those in the upper 1  p proportion of the population. Both for
vG (p) and vP (p) we have that V (p) is increasing with V (p) > p and [1  V (p)] < [1  p] for
p 2 (0; 1): However VG (p) is concave, while VP (p) is convex in the interval p 2 (0; 1=2) and in
the interval p 2 (1=2; 1): In fact VG (p) := 1  (1  p)2 and therefore
VG (p)
p
:=
1  (1  p)2
p
= 2  p; and 1  VG (p)
1  p = 1  p;
it follows that VG (p) =p is decreasing and linear w.r.t. p and
1 VG(p)
1 p is increasing and linear
w.r.t. (1  p) for all p 2 (0; 1):
While for VP (p) we have that
VP (p) :=

p2 + p if p  12
(1  p)2 + p if p  12
;
therefore
VP (p) =p :=

p+ 1 if p  12
p+ 1=p  1 if p  12
; and
1  VP (p)
1  p :=

2 + p  11 p if p  12
p if p  12
:
1For graphical representations of the weighting functions and further illustrations and discussions the reader
is referred to Chapter 2.
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Thus we have that VP (p) =p is increasing w.r.t. p for p 2 (0; 1=2) and then decreases in the
interval p 2 (1=2; 1): On the other hand 1 VP (p)1 p is decreasing and linear w.r.t. (1   p) for all
p 2 (1=2; 1); and increasing and concave w.r.t. (1  p) for all p 2 (0; 1=2):
Under both approaches the social evaluation can be summarized by the mean income of
the distribution  (F ) and a linear index of dispersion Dv (F ) dependent on the choice of the
weighting function v. The SEF could then be decomposed as
Wv(F ) =  (F ) [1 Dv (F )] :
3.3 Solutions for optimal piecewise redistributive linear taxa-
tion
In this section we formalize the optimal redistributive tax problem faced by a non-welfarist
government. The SEF is a general rank-dependent function W dened over net incomes, with
generic non-negative positional weights v (p) with
W =
Z 1
0
v (p) [yT (p)  T (yT (p))] dp;
where yT (p) denotes the quantile function or the inverse of the post-tax gross income distri-
bution and T (yT (p)) is the tax return associated with the post-tax gross income yT (p). The
taxation scheme could also involve positive income transfers to individuals such as a generalized
subsidy.
We will rst provide the theoretical results for the case of pure redistributive linear taxation
with lump-sum taxation and subsidies and then we move to consider redistributive taxation
schemes that guarantee a required level of per-capita revenue.
3.3.1 Optimal linear taxation
In this subsection we consider the purely redistributive taxation in which the amount of tax
revenue collected through a proportional taxation with marginal tax rate t is redistributed
through a lump-sum subsidy S.
86
Hence, the taxation scheme is
T (y) =  S + ty:
Under this scheme the post-tax gross income satises yT (p) = (1  t)" y (p) : While the net
post-tax income is yT (p)  T (yT (p)) = (1  t)"+1 y (p) + S:
Let FT denote the post-tax net-income distribution. If the total amount of collected revenue
is redistributed as lump-sum subsidy the social welfare Wv(FT ) becomes
Wv(FT ) =
Z 1
0
h
(1  t)"+1 y (p) + S
i
v (p) dp =
Z 1
0
(1  t)"+1 y (p) v (p) dp+ S;
where the per-capita subsidy is S =
R 1
0 t (1  t)" y (p) dp:
If we replace the denition of the lump-sum subsidy in the previous expression and given
that Wv(F ) =
R 1
0 y (p) v (p) dp =  (1 Dv(F )) where F denotes the income distribution un-
der no-taxation with average  =
R 1
0 y (p) dp, we have that the social welfare with lump-sum
redistribution is
Wv(F ) =  (1 Dv(F )) (1  t)"+1 + t (1  t)" :
By rearranging the terms we have that
Wv(F ) =  (1  t)"   Dv(F ) (1  t)"+1 :
The F:O:C: w.r.t. t is
@Wv
@t
=  " (1  t)" 1 +Dv(F ) (1 + ") (1  t)" = 0:
Then, the optimal tax rate does not depend on the level of average income that is
t = 1 

"
1 + "

1
Dv(F )
:
In line with our intuition the proportional level of redistribution t is decreasing with the labour
supply elasticity " and is increasing in the level of dispersion Dv(F ):
Moreover, it is important to note the implications of the constraints on t on the level of
labour supply elasticity " and on the index of initial gross income dispersion Dv. In particular,
87
when " increases, in order to obtain an optimal tax rate bounded between 0 and 0:5 the level
of initial dispersion has to be very high. For example, for very high level of labour supply
elasticity " = 1, the optimal tax rate falls within the admissible range if Dv 2

1
2 ; 1

. When
" = 0:5, Dv 2

1
3 ,
2
3

, while for " = 0:2 then Dv 2

1
6 ,
1
3

. Zero labour supply elasticity leads to
a completely conscatory tax rate of t = 1:
Moreover, by considering the weights vG and vP we can derive the optimal tax rate when the
dispersion is formalized making use of respectively an inequality index I or a polarization index
P . For a given gross income distribution under no-taxation F the two indices reach di¤erent
values and therefore also the associated optimal level of taxation/redistribution t could di¤er.
The following remark holds
Remark 9 For any F; I(F )  P (F ); that is
tI = 1 

"
1 + "

1
I(F )
 tP = 1 

"
1 + "

1
P (F )
:
The claim that I(F )  P (F ) could be proved directly by considering that the positional
weights associated with the inequality index are decreasing for all p 2 [0; 1]; while the weights
associated with the polarization index are increasing for all p 2 [0; 1=2) and for all p 2 (1=2; 1]
with the same average weight for both indices in the two intervals [0; 1=2) and (1=2; 1]: Given
that incomes are non-decreasing in p; then the social welfare will be higher for the polarization
sensitive SEF. It follows that, for a given average income level the polarization index is (strictly)
smaller than the inequality index. The two indices coincide in value only if all the incomes below
the median are equal as well as those that are above the median.
Note that in the above remark we use the generic index of dispersion I(F ) because that result
holds for any weighting function whose weights are decreasing in the individualspositions, not
necessarily in a linear way as for the weighting function considered for the Gini SEF.
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Redistributive taxation and revenue constraints
Here we consider the case where the tax function denoted by T (y) should generate a non-
negative per-capita amount of revenue G that is
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp = G:
Under this assumption we rst investigate whether such a budget constraint could be satised
with a lump-sum taxation instead of relying on proportional taxation.
Is there any room for lump-sum taxation? In this subsection we compare proportional
tax scheme with lump-sum taxation and we derive the value of labour supply elasticity such
that a lump-sum tax leads to a higher level of social welfare than a proportional taxation. We
focus only on the proportional tax case and then, on a SEF sensitive to the dispersion reduction
formalized through the index Dv, that could lead to a formalization of the inequality index I
or of the polarization index P .
Let WL the social welfare associated to a lump-sum tax regime, which is equal to
WLv =Wv  G; (3.9)
where Wv is the level of social welfare with no taxation and G is the amount of collected
revenue, which is equal to t (1  t)" in the proportional tax case. The formula in (3.9) is
derived considering that individualspreferences do not exhibit income e¤ects, therefore any
lump-sum tax does not a¤ect the labour supply, and the fact that the SEF is linear in incomes
with average positional weight equal to 1.
Then, given the denition of G and by using the abbreviated form of the SEF we can rewrite
(3.9) as
WLv =  (1 Dv)  t (1  t)" ;
where Dv denotes the dispersion index calculated on the before tax income distribution. The
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social welfare associated to a proportional tax system is
WPv =Wv (1  t)"+1 ;
which we can rewrite as
WPv =  (1 Dv) (1  t)"+1 :
Then, a lump-sum taxation is preferred to a proportional tax system when
(1 Dv)  t (1  t)" > (1 Dv) (1  t)"+1 :
Thus, when
(1 Dv)
h
1  (1  t)"+1
i
> t (1  t)" ;
which implies that
(1 Dv) > t (1  t)
"
1  (1  t)"+1 ;
where the term on the right hand side is equal to 11+" when t tends to zero. Hence, the next
remark follows
Remark 10 The lump-sum taxation leads to a higher level of social welfare than a proportional
tax system when
" >
Dv
1 Dv :
As argued in the earlier section I(F )  P (F ); it then follows that I(F )1 I(F )  P (F )1 P (F ) ; thus
lump-sum taxation is more likely to dominate proportional taxation for polarization sensitive
evaluations than for inequality sensitive ones. In particular, the grey area illustrated in Figure
1 shows all the combinations of labour supply elasticity " and dispersion level Dv such that the
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lump-sum taxation is socially preferred to a proportional scheme.
Fig.1. Combinations of " and Dv leading to a lump-sum taxation.
Redistributive taxation with demo-grant
We consider here a more general taxation scheme with lump-sum transfers, linear taxation and
a revenue constraint. Let
Wv =
Z
v (p) y (p) (1  t)"+1 dp  a (3.10)
denote the SEF expressed in terms of net incomes, where a is a demo-grant, which can be
negative (positive) in case of lump-sum subsidy (lump-sum taxation). The government budget
constraint is
G = a+ t
Z
y (p) (1  t)" dp:
A non-welfarist government who wants to collect a given revenue amount G maximizes (3.10)
w.r.t. t given the constraint that the revenue equals G.
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When G = 0 we obtain the optimal solution for the linear income tax case where t =
1 

"
1+"

1
Dv(F )
: However, in general if G > 0 the optimization problem requires to maximize
the same objective function. That is the social decision requires that
max
t
W (t; G) =
Z
v (p) y (p) (1  t)"+1 dp+ t
Z
y (p) (1  t)" dp G:
That can be rewritten as
max
t
W (t; G) =  (1 Dv) (1  t)"+1 + t (1  t)"  G:
Taking the F:O:C: w.r.t. t
@W (t; G)
@t
=   (1 Dv) (1  t)" ("+ 1) +  (1  t)"   t (1  t)" 1 " = 0:
Dividing by  (1  t)" 1 one obtains (1  t) = t"+ (1 Dv) (1  t) ("+ 1) implying that
(1  t) = "
("+ 1)
1
Dv
;
for t 2 (0; 1). So that we have
t = 0 if Dv  "
("+ 1)
! a = G;
leading to a lump-sum taxation, otherwise
t 2 (0; 1) if Dv > "
("+ 1)
:
By using the optimal solution for the proportional tax case we can rewrite the budget constraint
as G = a+ t (1  t)" R y (p) dp that is
G =

1  "
"+ 1
1
Dv

"
"+ 1
" 1
(Dv)
"+ a
a = G    ""

1
("+ 1)Dv
"+1
(Dv   " (1 Dv)) :
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Then, we obtain a  0; that is we have a lump-sum subsidy if
G

 ""

1
("+ 1)Dy
"+1
(Dv   " (1 Dv))
=

"
("+ 1)Dv
"+1("+ 1)Dv
"
  1

=

"
("+ 1)Dv
"
 

"
("+ 1)Dv
"+1
:
Note that the term G denotes the tax revenue expressed as a proportion of the average income
computed in the case of no-taxation. Figure 2 illustrates the combinations of dispersion Dv
and elasticity " levels that identify the threshold where a = 0 for the three cases of percentage
revenue G equal respectively to 0%, 20% and 50%. These values are associated respectively
with the bottom, the central and the top dashed curves in the graph. The values associated
with a positive subsidy are those above the reference revenue curve. For the combinations
below the curve the optimal taxation scheme involves the use of a lump-sum taxation. Note
moreover that for all the combinations of " and Dv that are below the bottom threshold line the
optimal tax system envisages only a lump-sum taxation, while for all the combinations above
the bottom threshold line we have a positive value of t: That is the tax scheme is such that the
proportional taxation supplements the lump-sum transfer. For instance, in case of a revenue
requirement G = 0:2 we have that all the combinations of values of " and Dv that are below
the bottom threshold line are associated with a lump-sum taxation. For the combinations that
are comprised in between the two bottom threshold lines we have that a lump-sum taxation is
combined with a proportional taxation, while for those coinciding with the central threshold
line the revenue is obtained solely with proportional taxation. Finally, for the values above the
central threshold the revenue requirement is covered combining proportional taxation with a
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lump-sum subsidy.
Fig.2. Combinations of " and Dv a¤ecting the sign of the lump-sum transfer.
3.3.2 Optimal two brackets redistributive taxation
In this section we move to a two brackets piecewise linear income tax scheme. We consider two
di¤erent regimes which depend on the ranking of the two marginal tax rates. In particular we
start with the case of increasing marginal tax rates with a no tax area for all incomes lower
than a given threshold. Then, we focus on a tax schedule exhibiting decreasing marginal tax
rates, where all incomes lower than a given threshold are subject to a proportional taxation,
while for those above the marginal tax rate is set equal to zero. Hence, these incomes pay a
lump-sum tax. For both regimes, we formalize the governments optimization problem, then
we provide a quantitative illustration of the optimal solution by using numerical simulations.
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Two brackets taxation with no tax area
In this subsection we consider a piecewise linear tax schedule T (y) with a tax exemption area
for gross incomes y lower than y1 and a proportional taxation at rate t for incomes above y1
that is:
T (y) :=
8<: 0 if y 2 [0; y1)t(y   y1) if y  y1 :
Let y(p) denote the gross income quantile function with no taxation. Under the assumptions on
the shape of T (y) and on agentspreferences in (3.1) the associated post taxation gross income
quantile function yt(p) is:
yt(p) :=
8>>><>>>:
y(p) if y(p) < y1
y1 if y1  y(p) < y1(1 t)"
y(p)(1  t)" if y1(1 t)"  y(p)
; (3.11)
or alternatively
yt(p) :=
8<: y(p) if y(p) < y1maxfy(p)(1  t)"; y1g if y1  y(p) : (3.12)
Dene pL1 := inffp : y(p) = y1g and pH1 := supfp : y(p)(1   t)" = y1g: Note that pH1 depends
on t for a given ": We have that for all individuals in the positions included in the interval [pL1 ;
pH1 ] the gross income is y1:
Then the associated SEF based on net incomes is
Wv =
Z pL1
0
v (p) y(p)dp+ y1
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp+
Z 1
pH1
v (p) [y1 + (1  t) (y (p) (1  t)"   y1)] dp  a;
with the revenue constraint
G = a+ t
Z 1
pH1
[y (p) (1  t)"   y1] dp:
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It then follows that the tax schedule optimization problem requires to derive
max
t;y1
~Wv =
Z pL1
0
v (p) y(p)dp+ y1
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp (3.13)
+
Z 1
pH1
v (p)
h
y (p) (1  t)"+1 + ty1
i
dp
+t
Z 1
pH1
[y (p) (1  t)"   y1] dp G:
The F:O:Cs: for the optimal level of t requires to compute @
~Wv
@t and
@ ~Wv
@y1
:To simplify the
exposition we assume that the cumulative distribution function is increasing with at most a
nite number of discontinuities such that the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of @p
H
1
@t ;
@pL1
@t and of
@pL1
@y1
;
@pH1
@y1
exist. Let 1 :=
R 1
pH1
y (p) dp and 1(1 Dv1) :=
R 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) dp; that is we compute the average
income and the abbreviated SEF for the distribution where for all p < pH1 all incomes are set
equal to zero and coincide with y (p) for p  pH1 : We can then derive (the detailed calculations
are illustrated in Appendix A1):
@ ~Wv
@t
= (1  t)" ("+ 1)1Dv1  

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1   1 (1  t)" 1 ";
@ ~Wv
@y1
= V
 
pH1
  V  pL1 + t(1  V  pH1 )  t(1  pH1 ):
It then follows that the F:O:C: w.r.t. the tax rate t 2 (0; 1) requires that
@ ~Wv
@t
= 0! (1  t)" ("+ 1)Dv1   (1  t)" 1 " =

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1
1
;
implying that
(1  t)" 1 [(1  t) ("+ 1)Dv1   "] =

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1
1
: (F:O:C: t)
While the F:O:C: for an internal solution w.r.t. y1 requires to set @
~Wv
@y1
= 0; it then follows that
@ ~Wv
@y1
= 0! V  pH1   V  pL1  = t V  pH1   pH1  :
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Recall that by construction V (p) > p for all p 2 (0; 1); it follows that
t =
V
 
pH1
  V  pL1 
V
 
pH1
  pH1 : (F:O:C: y1)
Combining the two F:O:Cs we have
(1  t)" 1 [(1  t) ("+ 1)Dv1   "] =

V (pH1 )  pH1
 y1
1
;
1  t = V
 
pL1
  pH1
V
 
pH1
  pH1 :
A special cases. Before moving to the general solution it is useful to highlight the solution
for the special case where labour supply is xed, that is when " = 0:
In this case pH1 = p
L
1 = p1 and the partial derivatives w.r.t. t and y1 of the objective function
are
@ ~Wv
@t
=
Z 1
p1
v (p) [y1   y (p)]dp+
Z 1
p1
[y (p)  y1] dp
=  
Z 1
p1
[v (p)  1][y (p)  y1]dp > 0
= 1Dv1   [V (p1)  p1] y1 > 0;
for all p1 2 [0; 1); and
@ ~Wv
@y1
= t
Z 1
p1
[v (p)  1]dp =  t [V (p1)  p1] < 0;
for all p1 2 (0; 1) and for all t > 0: As a result t equals the maximal admissible value of the
marginal tax rate and y1 = 0: So irrespective of whether the weighting function is inequality
or polarization sensitive the optimal redistributive policy is to tax at 100% all incomes and
redistribute them equally eventually keeping the share of income necessary to cover the revenue
requirement G:
The general solution. Recall that by construction 1Dv1 > [V (p1)  p1] y1 and V (p1) p1 >
0 for all p1 2 (0; 1). Note also that for any p1 by construction Dv1 > Dv both in terms of
inequality and polarization evaluations, with Pv1  Iv1:
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Moreover recall that the partial derivatives of the objective function are
@ ~Wv
@t
=   "1
(1  t)1 " + (1  t)
" ("+ 1)1Dv1  

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1
@ ~Wv
@y1
= V
 
pH1
  V  pL1   t V  pH1   pH1  :
Note that @
~Wv
@t is decreasing in t for "  1; also verify that for t = 0 we have that
@ ~Wv
@t

t=0
= 1Dv1   "1(1 Dv1) 

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1;
while for high values of t we obtain that @
~Wv
@t < 0. These conditions guarantee that for suf-
ciently small values of " there exists a value of t 2 (0; 1) s.t. @ ~Wv@t = 0: Moreover, for small
values of Dv1 and su¢ ciently large values of " we could have that @
~Wv
@t

t=0
< 0: If this is the
case then t = 0: Recalling that Pv1  Iv1; it follows that for polarization evaluations with
su¢ ciently high levels of " the optimal marginal tax rate t equals 0.
Taking into account the partial derivative @
~Wv
@y1
; then when t 2 (0; 1) we have that the
optimal threshold should satisfy the F:O:C: where @
~Wv
@y1
= 0: The case where y1 = 0 is ruled out
as " increases because in this case both t decreases and V
 
pH1
  V  pL1  increases for a given
y1:
Illustrative simulation results. A quantitative illustration of the optimal two brackets
linear piecewise tax system with a tax exemption area at the bottom of the income distribution
is presented in Tables 1 and 2 for Gini and Polarization SEFs respectively.2
Recall that the simulations are based on a Pareto distribution of gross incomes under no
taxation which is bounded between 20 and 327, whose mean is equal to 48.04, while the level
2The simulations are generated according to the model presented in Chapter 2 which is summarized in
Appendix B at the end of this chapter.
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of Inequality and Polarization are equal to 0.37 and 0.11 respectively3.
Table 1. Optimal tax system: Gini based SEF.
G " t y1 a G " t y1 a
0:1  0:01 97%
21
11:3%
4:5%
19:92 0:2  0:01 97%
21
11:3%
4:5%
15:12
0:1  0:1 80%
25
42:4%
14:9%
9:47 0:2  0:1 80%
25
42:4%
14:9%
4:67
0:1  0:2 66%
29
57:2%
15:7%
4:60 0:2  0:2 66%
29
57:2%
15:7%
 0:20
0:1  0:4 47%
36
70:6%
13:3%
0:30 0:2  0:4 47%
36
70:6%
13:3%
 4:51
Note. The rst two values reported in the column y1 express the threshold in terms
of the income level and the associated percentile in the income distribution.
The third value represents the fraction of population with a gross income equal to y1:
3 In order to illustrate the impact of the combinations of the initial gross income dispersion and the level
of labour supply elasticity we consider alternative gross income distributions, with di¤erent levels of dispersion
(inequality and polarization) which are obtained by changing the bounds of the Pareto distribution. The results
of the simulations with these alternative distributions are reported in Appendix B at the end of this chapter.
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Table 2. Optimal tax system: Polarization based SEF.
G " t y1 a G " t y1 a
0:1  0:01 92%
23
21:1%
2:9%
17:50 0:2  0:01 92%
23
21:1%
2:9%
12:69
0:1  0:1 31%
29
44:5%
4%
1:34 0:2  0:1 31%
29
44:5%
4%
 3:47
0:1  0:15 6%
31
47:5%
0:6%
 3:62 0:2  0:15 6%
31
47:5%
0:6%
 8:42
0:1  0:2 0 0  4:80 0:2  0:2 0 0  9:61
In both Tables, the left (right) panel reports the simulations when the revenue requirement
is equal to 10% (20%) of the average income. As anticipated in our analysis the design of the
tax scheme, that is the optimal choice of y1 and t; is independent of the revenue requirement
G: This aspect is clear from the optimization problem in (3.13) where G does not a¤ect the
rst order conditions for optimization. The the use of lump-sum taxation or subsidies depends
on the di¤erence between the revenue generated by the optimal taxation scheme compared to
the revenue requirement. When this di¤erence is positive (negative) the proportional taxation
is supplemented with a lump-sum subsidy (tax).
More specically, for the Gini based SEFs Table 1 shows that the threshold y1 is increasing
in the level of labour supply elasticity while the marginal tax rate t decreases.
In case of polarization sensitive SEFs (Table 2) the simulations generate higher values for
y1 and lower values for t for a given level of elasticity, (compare rows 1 and 2 of Tables 1 and
2). However, as elasticity increases the marginal tax rate sharply decreases (compare rst three
rows of Table 2) and for elasticity level "  0:2 the optimal marginal tax rate is 0 and the
optimal taxation scheme reducing polarization is only based on lump-sum taxation.
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Two brackets taxation with zero marginal tax rate at the top.
This subsection focuses on a two brackets income tax scheme with decreasing marginal tax
rates. More specically, gross incomes lower than y1 are subject to a proportional taxation
with marginal tax rate  , while the marginal tax rate above this threshold is set equal to zero.
That is, gross incomes greater than y1 are subject to a lump-sum taxation. The tax function
T (y) is:
T (y) :=
8<: y if y 2 (0; y1]y1 if y > y1 :
Let y (p) denote the gross income quantile function with no taxation. Under the assumption of
the tax schedule T (y) the associated post taxation gross income quantile function y (p) is
y (p) :=
8<: y(p)(1  )" if y(p) < byy(p) if y(p)  by ;
which is discontinuous at the income threshold by dened as4
by = (1 + ")  y1
1  (1  )1+"

:
For  > 0 and " > 0 the income threshold by is always greater than y1; while if  ! 0 or "! 0
then by ! y1: Moreover, if y(p) < by then y (p) < y1: With this tax system if  > 0 there are
no gross incomes at the income threshold y1. Let bp := supfp : y(p) = byg denote the position
associated with the income threshold that separates the income recipients with gross incomes
lower than y1 from those with gross incomes above y1 and therefore subject to 0 marginal tax
rate. The associated SEF based on net incomes is
Wv =
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)(1  )"+1dp+
Z 1
bp v (p) [y (p)  y1] dp  a
4This condition and all related to the agents optimization problem are special cases of those discussed in
details in Appendix B of the previous chapter for the three brackets tax function case.
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with the revenue constraint
G = a+ 
Z bp
0
y (p) (1  )" dp+ 
Z 1
bp y1dp:
Then, substituting for a from the revenue constraint to the SEF, the social optimization problem
becomes
max
;y1
W^v =
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)(1  )"+1dp+
Z 1
bp v (p) [y (p)  y1] dp
+
Z bp
0
y (p) (1  )" dp+ 
Z 1
bp y1dp G: (3.14)
The F:O:Cs: for the optimal level of  requires to compute @W^v@ and
@W^v
@y1
:
To simplify the exposition we assume that the cumulative distribution function is increasing
with at most a nite number of discontinuities such that the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of @bp@ exist.
We can then derive (the detailed calculations are illustrated in Appendix A2):
@W^v
@
=  @bp
@by @by@ y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

(3.15)
+ [1  (1 + ") (1  )"]
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] y(p)dp (3.16)
 "(1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp (3.17)
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp; (3.18)
and
@W^v
@y1
=  @bp
@by @by@y1 y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

(3.19)
+ (V (bp)  bp) : (3.20)
Both partial derivatives are presented in order to decompose the e¤ect related to the exis-
tence of a positive elasticity of labour supply and the e¤ect holding with xed labour supply.
This latter e¤ect is formalized in the last term of both partial derivatives.
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A special cases. As also done for the previous taxation scheme we start by highlight the
solution for the special case where labour supply is xed, that is when " = 0: In this case
@W^v
@
=
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp > 0 (3.21)
@W^v
@y1
=  (V (bp)  bp) > 0: (3.22)
Both partial derivatives are positive for all and for all y1 and for all  > 0: As a result  equals
the maximal admissible value of the marginal tax rate and y1 = ymax that is the area with
zero marginal tax rate at the top is eliminated and all individuals are subject to the maximal
marginal tax rate. This result is irrespective of whether the weighting function is inequality or
polarization sensitive. As for the previous tax scheme the optimal redistributive policy is to
tax at 100% all incomes and redistribute them equally eventually keeping the share of income
necessary to cover the revenue requirement G:
The general solution. If " > 0 we obtain mitigating e¤ects on the sign of the partial
derivatives deriving from the distributive and distortionary welfare e¤ects of taxation on labour
supply.
We rst consider the rst term appearing on both partial derivatives that we denote by
v (bp) " + f("; ) with f("; ) := 1 (1+")(1 )"
1 (1 )1+" : For " > 0; the term f("; ) is positive and
increasing in  for  2 (0; 1); with lim!0 f("; ) = 0 and f("; 1) = 1; moreover it is also
increasing in " with f(0; ) = 0 and lim"!0 f("; ) = 1: Considering that @bp@by  0; that
@by
@ = by 1 (1+")(1 )" [1 (1 )1+"]

> 0; that @by@y1 = (1+")1 (1 )1+" = byy1 > 0 and that v (bp) " > 0 for bp 2 [0; 1)
irrespective of whether we are considering the polarization or the inequality sensitive represen-
tation, we have that the rst term in (3.15) and in (3.19) is non-positive. Moreover, the e¤ect
is increasing in " > 0 because all the terms are increasing in ":
If we consider rst the F:O:C: @W^v@y1 = 0; we have that for an internal optimal value for y1 it
is necessary that
@bp
@by @by@y1 y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

= V (bp)  bp: (3.23)
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As V (bp)   bp ! 0 for bp ! 1; then for su¢ ciently high values of " > 0 the F:O:C: should
be satised for y1 > 0: Moreover, considering that vP (bp) > vG (bp) for bp 2 (3=4; 1) and that
Vp (bp)   bp = (1   bp)2 < VG (bp)   bp = bp(1   bp) for bp 2 (1=2; 1) then for a given tax rate  the
optimal level of y1 in the upper part of the distribution should be lower in case of concerns for
polarization. It follows, in line with Mirrlees (1971) result that
Remark 11 When " > 0; the optimal taxation system requires that at least the top incomes
are taxed at a 0 marginal tax rate. For su¢ ciently low levels of elasticity the threshold y1; is
lower in the case of polarization sensitive evaluations than for inequality sensitive evaluations.
By combining with the F:O:C: related to @W^v@ one obtains
[V (bp)  bp] @by@
@by
@y1
 = [1  (1 + ") (1  )"]
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] y(p)dp (3.24)
 "(1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp (3.25)
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp; (3.26)
where
@by
@
@by
@y1
=
by 1 (1+")(1 )"
[1 (1 )1+"]by
y1
= y1
1 (1+")(1 )"
 [1 (1 )1+"] ; that is
@by
@
@by
@y1
= f("; )y1 : It follows that the
associated internal optimal level of  should satisfy
[V (bp)  bp] f("; )y1 = [1  (1 + ") (1  )"]Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] y(p)dp (3.27)
 "(1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp (3.28)
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp: (3.29)
This condition can be rearranged as follows
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[V (bp)  bp] f("; )y1 =  "(1  )" Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] y(p)dp (3.30)
 "(1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp (3.31)
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p) (1  )"] dp; (3.32)
where the term on the l.h.s is always positive, while the last term on the r.h.s. is also always
positive by construction. The derivation of the optimal level of  2 (0; 1) could be obtained
through simulations. We illustrate them in the next subsection by showing that polarization
SEFs exhibit lower level of  for any " > 0:
Illustrative simulation results. Tables 3 and 4 provide a quantitative illustration of the
optimal tax system with zero marginal tax rate at the top for Gini and Polarization SEF
respectively.
Table 3. Optimal tax system: Gini based SEF.
G "  y1 a G "  y1 a
0:1  0:01 97% 318
99:9%
40:02 0:2  0:01 97% 318
99:9%
35:40
0:1  0:1 76% 284
99:6%
26:91 0:2  0:1 76% 284
99:6%
22:11
0:1  0:2 56% 280
99:5%
18:09 0:2  0:2 56% 280
99:5%
13:29
0:1  0:5 10% 312
99:8%
 0:25 0:2  0:5 10% 312
99:8%
 5:05
0:1  0:6 0 0  4:80 0:2  0:6 0 0  9:61
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Table 4. Optimal tax system: Polarization based SEF.
G "  y1 a G "  y1 a
0:1  0:01 93% 128
94:4%
35:68 0:2  0:01 93% 128
94:4%
30:87
0:1  0:1 42% 68
83:7%
10:86 0:2  0:1 42% 68
83:7%
6:05
0:1  0:2 0 0  4:80 0:2  0:2 0 0  9:61
Analogously to the case of no taxation at the bottom of the income distribution, the choice of
the optimal tax system with zero marginal tax rate at the top turns out to be independent of
the revenue requirement G (compare the left and right panels of Tables 3 and 4). For the Gini
sensitive SEF the optimal system requires to tax almost the entire gross income distribution
with a marginal tax rate which is decreasing as elasticity increases. The marginal tax rate is
set equal to zero only for the extreme right tail of the distribution. This nding echoes the
celebrated Mirrlees (1971) result of no taxation at the top of the income distribution. For
levels of elasticity "  0:6 the optimal tax system consists of a lump-sum taxation.
When the focus shifts to polarization concerns the optimal tax system envisages lower values
for  and y1 for each elasticity level (compare the rst two rows of Tables 3 and 4). Then, the
optimal tax system is based on lump-sum taxation for elasticity level "  0:2:
Therefore, a higher social welfare is associated to a tax system with a no taxation area (for
Gini based SEFs) and with zero top marginal tax rate (for polarization based SEFs).
3.3.3 Optimal three brackets redistributive taxation
In this section we move to a piecewise linear tax system with three income brackets identied
by two income thresholds y1 < y2 and three marginal tax rates t1; t2; t3 2 [0; 1). In line with
Chapter 2, we focus only on tax schedule where t1  t2, and then we assume two possible tax
rates regimes, i.e. convex and non-convex, depending on the ranking of t2 and t3. In particular,
the convex regime is such t1  t2  t3, while non-convex case deals with congurations where
106
t1  t3  t2.
We formalize the optimal tax problem faced by the non-welfarist government, then we
provide numerical simulations to illustrate the optimal tax system for both regimes under the
case of SEFs sensitive to inequality or to polarization reduction.
Three brackets convex tax system
Under the convex regime marginal tax rates are increasing and the tax function T (y) is
T (y) :=
8>>><>>>:
t1y if y 2 [0; y1)
t1y1 + t2(y   y1) if y 2 [y1; y2)
t1y1 + t2(y2   y1) + t3(y   y2) if y  y2
:
Then, from the agents optimization problem described in Section 3.2.1 we obtain that the
associated post tax gross income quantile function yt(p) is
yt (p) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
y (p) (1  t1)" if y (p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y (p) 
y1
(1 t2)"
y (p) (1  t2)" if y1(1 t2)" < y (p) 
y2
(1 t2)"
y2 if
y2
(1 t2)"  y (p) 
y2
(1 t3)"
y (p) (1  t3)" if y (p) > y2(1 t3)"
:
With this tax regime some agents experience a gross income equal to one of the thresholds y1
or y2: In particular, dene pL1 := inffp : y(p)(1  t1)" = y1g; pH1 := supfp : y(p)(1  t2)" = y1g;
pL2 := inffp : y(p)(1   t2)" = y2g; and pH2 := supfp : y(p)(1   t3)" = y2g; we have that all
individuals covering the positions included in the interval

pL1 ; p
H
1

have a gross income equal
to y1, while for all individuals in the positions p 2

pL2 ; p
H
2

the gross income is y2.
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The SEF based on net incomes is
Wv =
Z pL1
0
v (p) y(p)(1  t1)"+1dp+ y1(1  t1)
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp
+
Z pL2
pH1
v (p)

y(p)(1  t2)"+1 + y1(t2   t1)

dp
+ [y2(1  t2) + y1 (t2   t1)]
Z pH2
pL2
v (p) dp
+
Z 1
pH2
v (p)
h
y (p) (1  t3)"+1 + y2 (t3   t2) + y1 (t2   t1)
i
dp  a;
with the revenue constraint
G = a+ t1
Z pL1
0
y(p)(1  t1)"dp+ t1
Z 1
pL1
y1dp
+t2
Z pL2
pH1
[y(p)(1  t2)"   y1] dp+ t2
Z 1
pL2
(y2   y1) dp
+t3
Z 1
pH2
[y(p)(1  t3)"   y2] dp:
We solve the social optimization problem numerically and report in Table 5 the results with
xed labour supply for Gini and Polarization based SEFs respectively. Note that we assume
that the marginal tax rates can not exceed an upper limit which we set equal to 50%.
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Table 5. Optimal convex tax system with xed labour supply.
Gini based SEF Polarization based SEF
G t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a t1 t2 t3 y1 y1 a
0:10  0 0 50% 20
0
20
0
9:22 0 0 50%
20
0
20
0
9:22
0:15  0 0 50% 20
0
20
0
6:82 0 0 50%
20
0
20
0
6:82
0:20  0 0 50% 20
0
20
0
4:41 0 0 50%
20
0
20
0
4:41
0:25  0 0 50% 20
0
20
0
2:01 0 0 50%
20
0
20
0
2:01
As shown in Table 5 with xed labour supply and redistribution the results are completely
di¤erent from those obtained in Chapter 2 when redistribution was not allowed. In particular,
here the optimal tax system turns out to be independent of the redistributive objectives and
requires to tax all incomes at the highest admissible tax rate. Then tax revenues net of the
income share covering the revenue requirement, are equally redistributed.
Recall that with no redistribution and xed labour supply the optimal tax system exhibits
two clear and di¤erent patterns of the marginal tax rates. For Gini based SEF there is an
income threshold above which taxation is the maximal admissible and zero below. In the case
of polarization SEF, the optimal tax system requires to tax, at the maximum admissible tax
rate, all incomes within the central interval. Marginal tax rates outside such interval are set
equal to zero.
Tables 6 and 7 reports some selected results of the simulations for positive values of labour
supply elasticity. Simulations results for other level of revenue requirements and di¤erent values
of labour supply elasticity are reported in Tables 15A and B for Gini SEFs and in Table 18 for
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polarization SEFs.
Table 6. Optimal convex tax system: Gini based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a
0:1  0:1 0 45% 50% 24
29%
25
34%
6:02
0:2  0:1 0 45% 50% 24
29%
25
34%
1:22
0:1  0:2 0 38% 50% 28
46%
29
52%
3:62
0:2  0:2 0 38% 50% 28
46%
29
52%
 1:18
0:1  0:4 0 35% 48% 35
65%
41
76%
0:34
0:2  0:4 0 35% 48% 35
65%
41
76%
 4:46
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Table 7. Optimal convex tax system: Polarization based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a
0:1  0:1 0 14% 31% 28
40%
29
44%
1:41
0:2  0:1 0 14% 31% 28
40%
29
44%
 3:39
0:1  0:15 0 0 6% 20
0
31
47%
 3:62
0:2  0:15 0 0 6% 20
0
31
47%
 8:43
0:1  0:2 0 0 0 20
0
20
0
 4:80
0:2  0:2 0 0 0 20
0
20
0
 9:61
Similarly to the case with two income brackets analyzed in the previous section, with redis-
tribution the optimal tax system is independent of the revenue requirement for a given value
of labour supply elasticity " > 0. When the revenue generated by the optimal tax system
is greater (lower) than the revenue requirement the proportional tax system is supplemented
with a lump-sum subsidy (tax). For the Gini based SEF the optimal tax system envisages a
no tax area for all incomes within the rst bracket (t1 = 0). The threshold y1 identifying this
exemption area is increasing in the level of labour supply elasticity. Marginal tax rates within
the other two intervals (t2 and t3) are positive and decreasing with the level of labour supply
elasticity.
When the focus shift to polarization concerns the optimal tax system exhibits lower tax
rates and tends to be based on lump-sum taxation for elasticity level "  0:2. Recall that
the simulations in Chapter 2 show that, under the assumption of no redistribution and with
"  0:2, the optimal convex tax system reducing polarization requires a proportional taxation
with a marginal tax rate increasing in the amount of required revenue.
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Three brackets non-convex tax system
When we assume a non-convex regime of the tax rates we have the following post tax gross
income quantile function yt(p)
yt (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
y (p) (1  t1)" if y (p) < y1(1 t1)"
y1 if
y1
(1 t1)"  y (p) <
y1
(1 t2)"
y (p) (1  t2)" if y1(1 t2)"  y (p)  by
y (p) (1  t3)" if y (p) > by
;
where gross incomes are the same for all incomes that are in the rst bracket and at the
rst threshold, while the result changes for incomes within the second and the third bracket.
In particular, di¤erently from the convex regime, there are no agents experiencing a gross
income equal to the second income threshold y2, where the gross income distribution exhibits
a discontinuity. Hence, there exists a threshold level by such that all incomes lower than by fall
in the second bracket, while all incomes above by belong to third bracket. This threshold is
by := (1 + ") (t2   t3) y2
(1  t3)(1+")   (1  t2)(1+")
;
and it is derived in Appendix B of Chapter 2. Dene pL1 := inffp : y(p)(1   t1)" = y1g;
pH1 := supfp : y(p)(1   t2)" = y1g and bp := supfp : y(p) = byg; we have that the SEF based on
net incomes is
Wv =
Z pL1
0
v (p) y(p)(1  t1)"+1dp+ y1(1  t1)
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp
+
Z bp
pH1
v (p)

y(p)(1  t2)"+1 + y1(t2   t1)

dp
+
Z 1
bp v (p)
h
y (p) (1  t3)"+1 + y2 (t3   t2) + y1 (t2   t1)
i
dp  a;
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with the revenue constraint
G = a+ t1
Z pL1
0
y(p)(1  t1)"dp+ t1
Z 1
pL1
y1dp
+t2
Z bp
pH1
[y(p)(1  t2)"   y1] dp+ t2
Z 1
bp (y2   y1) dp
+t3
Z 1
bp [y(p)(1  t3)"   y2] dp:
The social optimization problem is solved numerically for values of elasticity "  0. Table 8
reports the simulations results related to case of xed labour supply, while Tables 9 and 10
illustrate the optimal non-convex tax system for inequality and polarization sensitive SEFs
respectively.
Table 8. Optimal non-convex tax system with xed labour supply.
Gini based SEF Polarization based SEF
G t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a t1 t2 t3 y1 y1 a
0:10  0 50% 50% 20
0
20
0
9:22 0 50% 50%
20
0
20
0
9:22
0:15  0 50% 50% 20
0
20
0
6:82 0 50% 50%
20
0
20
0
6:82
0:20  0 50% 50% 20
0
20
0
4:41 0 50% 50%
20
0
20
0
4:41
0:25  0 50% 50% 20
0
20
0
2:01 0 50% 50%
20
0
20
0
2:01
With xed labour supply the optimal tax non-convex tax system coincides with the convex
one and it is independent of the distributive objective. All incomes are taxed with the highest
admissible tax rate and then the amount of revenue exceeding the revenue requirement is equally
redistributed.
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Table 9. Optimal non-convex tax system: Gini based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a
0:1  0:1 0 50% 50% 24
30%
24
30%
6:05
0:2  0:1 0 50% 50% 24
30%
24
30%
1:25
0:1  0:2 0 50% 35% 28
49%
240
99%
3:69
0:2  0:2 0 50% 35% 28
49%
240
99%
 1:11
0:1  0:4 0 49% 19% 36
71%
210
99%
0:47
0:2  0:4 0 49% 19% 36
71%
210
99%
 4:33
Table 9 shows that the optimal non-convex tax system reducing inequality always require a no
tax area which is increasing as elasticity increases (see column y1). Then, unless when elasticity
is low ("  0:1) ; the optimal value of t3 is lower than t2 and this di¤erence becomes sizeable as
the labour supply elasticity increases. This result is in line with the case of two income brackets
(see Table 3) and with the simulations in Chapter 2. However, di¤erently from these last ones,
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when redistribution is allowed, it is always optimal to set t1 = 0:
Table 10. Optimal non-convex tax system: Polarization based SEF.
G " t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 a
0:1  0:1 0 50% 0% 29
47%
66
83%
0:42
0:2  0:1 0 50% 0% 29
47%
66
83%
 4:38
0:1  0:15 0 50% 0% 30
52%
54
77%
 1:07
0:2  0:15 0 50% 0% 30
52%
54
77%
 4:38
0:1  0:2 0 46% 0 30
53%
48
72%
 2:03
0:2  0:2 0 46% 0 30
53%
48
72%
 6:84
As to polarization SEFs, the optimal tax system is such that taxation is the maximal admissible
within the central interval, whose size is reducing in the level of labour supply elasticity. More-
over, di¤erently from the case with no redistribution (Chapter 2), the optimal marginal tax
rates outside the central interval are always equal to zero and lump-sum taxation supplements
proportional tax in order to cover the revenue requirement.
To summarize the optimal three brackets tax system reducing income inequality is convex
unless when the level of labour supply elasticity is high, while the optimal tax schedule to
reduce polarization is non-convex. Last, we derive the optimal three brackets tax system by
considering gross wage distributions with di¤erent levels of pre-tax inequality and polarization.
The simulations results are reported in Tables 16 and 17 for Gini SEFs and in Tables 19 and
20 for polarization SEFs. The results we obtain show that when the level of initial inequality
is not high the optimal three brackets tax system for Gini based SEF is non-convex (compare
Tables 16 and 17 in Appendix B). While for the polarization SEFs the optimal three brackets
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tax system is always non-convex (see Tables 19 and 20 in Appendix B).
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we derive the optimal income taxation redistributive scheme under two non-
welfarist objectives, i.e. inequality or polarization reduction. We consider a set of alternative
piecewise linear tax schemes integrated with lump-sum taxation and subsidies. More specically,
we analyze tax systems with two and three income brackets, as well as di¤erent tax rates regimes
depending on their ranking. These di¤erent congurations are evaluated according to a rank-
dependent social evaluation function dened over net incomes, which formalizes the specic
governments non-welfarist objective.
The interesting aspect of this work is related to the introduction of a redistributive mech-
anism that leads to results contrasting those obtained in Chapter 2. In that case, indeed,
redistribution was not allowed and the focus was on the socially desirable mechanism collecting
a given revenue requirement.
There are four main interesting results. First, intuitively with xed labour supply the
optimal tax system is based on a proportional taxation with the highest admissible tax rate.
The collected amount, net of the income share covering the revenue requirement, is equally
redistributed. This result is independent of the non-welfarist distributive objective.
Second, with positive values of labour supply elasticity the non-welfarist objective becomes
a crucial determinant of the shape of the optimal tax system. In particular, simulations results
show that the optimal two brackets system reducing inequality requires a no taxation area
below a given threshold and proportional taxation above. As elasticity increases, the threshold
and the tax rate increases and decreases respectively. In case of polarization reduction, the
optimal two brackets tax system requires a proportional taxation for all incomes below a given
threshold a zero marginal tax rate for all incomes above. Both the threshold and the tax rate
are decreasing in the level of labour supply elasticity, and for value of "  0:2 the optimal tax
system is based only on lump-sum taxation.
With three income brackets we obtain that the optimal tax system for Gini based SEF is
convex unless when labour supply elasticity is high. Moreover, the optimal tax system reducing
116
inequality is convex when the initial level of gross income dispersion is high. As to polarization
reduction the optimal tax system is always non-convex. In both cases the marginal tax rates
are decreasing in the level of labour supply elasticity.
Third, the design of the optimal tax system is independent of the revenue requirement, and
the sign of the lump-sum transfer depends on the di¤erence between the collected amount and
the required revenue. Moreover the sign of the lump-sum transfer is a¤ected by the combination
of the level of labour supply elasticity and the index of gross income dispersion.
Last, it is more likely that the optimal tax system is based only on lump-sum tax with
polarization sensitive SEFs.
Appendix
Appendix A
In Appendix A we illustrate the main calculations related to the optimization problems behind
the derivations of the optimal two brackets redistributive taxation schemes.
A.1 The calculations for two brackets with no-tax area.
The partial derivatives w.r.t. the choice variables for the optimization problem in (3.13) are
respectively @
~Wv
@t and
@ ~Wv
@y1
: We derive them here in details. We rst consider
@ ~Wv
@t
= y1v
 
pH1
 @pH1
@t
  v  pH1  hy  pH1  (1  t)"+1 + ty1i @pH1@t
 
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) ("+ 1) (1  t)" dp+
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y1dp  t

y
 
pH1

(1  t)"   y1
 @pH1
@t
+
Z 1
pH1
[y (p) (1  t)"   y1] dp  t
Z 1
pH1
y (p) " (1  t)" 1 dp
= y1v
 
pH1
 @pH1
@t
  v  pH1  y  pH1  (1  t)" (1  t) + ty1 @pH1@t
  ("+ 1)
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) (1  t)" dp+
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y1dp  t

y
 
pH1

(1  t)"   y1
 @pH1
@t
+
Z 1
pH1
y (p) (1  t)" dp 
Z 1
pH1
y1dp  t
Z 1
pH1
y (p) " (1  t)" 1 dp:
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Recall that y
 
pH1

(1  t)" = y1 we then obtain
@ ~Wv
@t
= y1v
 
pH1
 @pH1
@t
  v  pH1  y1@pH1@t   ("+ 1) (1  t)"
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) dp
+
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y1dp+ (1  t)"
Z 1
pH1
y (p) dp 
Z 1
pH1
y1dp  t" (1  t)" 1
Z 1
pH1
y (p) dp:
That is we obtain that
@ ~Wv
@t
=   ("+ 1) (1  t)"
Z 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) dp+
Z 1
pH1
[v (p)  1] y1dp
+(1  t)"

1  t
1  t"
 Z 1
pH1
y (p) dp:
Let
R 1
pH1
y (p) dp = 1 and
R 1
pH1
v (p) y (p) dp = 1(1   Dv1); that is we compute the average
income and the abbreviated SEF for the distribution where for all p < pH1 all incomes are set
equal to 0 and coincide with y (p) for p  pH1 : We then obtain
@ ~Wv
@t
=   (1  t)" ("+ 1)1(1 Dv1) 

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1 + (1  t)"

1  t
1  t"

1
= (1  t)" ("+ 1)1Dv1  

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1 + (1  t)"

1  t
1  t"  ("+ 1)

1
= (1  t)" ("+ 1)1Dv1  

V (pH1 )  pH1

y1   1 (1  t)" 1 ":
In order to derive the F:O:C: w.r.t. the income threshold level y1 we compute
@ ~Wv
@y1
=
@pL1
@y1
v
 
pL1

y(pL1 ) +
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp  y1@p
L
1
@y1
v
 
pL1

+ y1
@pH1
@y1
v
 
pH1

 @p
H
1
@y1
v
 
pH1
 h
y
 
pH1

(1  t)"+1 + ty1
i
+
Z 1
pH1
v (p) tdp
 @p
H
1
@y1
t

y
 
pH1

(1  t)"   y1
  t Z 1
pH1
dp:
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Recall that y
 
pH1

(1  t)" = y1 and y(pL1 ) = y1; it follows that
@ ~Wv
@y1
=
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp+ y1
@pH1
@y1
v
 
pH1
  @pH1
@y1
v
 
pH1

[y1 (1  t) + ty1]
+t
Z 1
pH1
v (p) dp  t
Z 1
pH1
dp
=
Z pH1
pL1
v (p) dp+ t
Z 1
pH1
v (p) dp  t
Z 1
pH1
dp
= V
 
pH1
  V  pL1 + t(1  V  pH1 )  t(1  pH1 )
= V
 
pH1
  V  pL1   t V  pH1   pH1  :
A.2 The calculations for two brackets with no marginal taxation at the top.
The partial derivatives w.r.t. the choice variables for the optimization problem in (3.14) are
respectively
@W^v
@
=

v (bp) by(1  )"+1 @bp
@
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp (3.33)
 v (bp) [by   y1] @bp
@
  y1
Z 1
bp v (p) dp+ by (1  )" @bp@
+(1  )"
Z bp
0
y (p) dp  " (1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (1  bp)  y1 @bp
@
for the tax rate  ; and
@W^v
@y1
=
h
v (bp) y (bp) (1  )"+1i @bp
@y1
  v (bp) [y (bp)  y1] @bp
@y1
  
Z 1
bp v (bp) dp (3.34)
+y (bp) (1  )" @bp
@y1
+  (1  bp)  y1 @bp
@y1
:
for the income threshold level y1
We now simplify and readjust these equations, starting from @W^v@ :
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Recalling that y(bp) = by and readjusting (3.33) we obtain
@W^v
@
=
h
(1  )"   " (1  )" 1
i Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (V (bp)  bp)
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp
+
@bp
@

v (bp) by(1  )"+1   v (bp) [by   y1] + by (1  )"   y1 : (3.35)
Recalling that by := (1 + ")  y1
1  (1  )1+"

; (3.36)
and substituting we get
@W^v
@
= (1  )"

1  
(1  )"
 Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (V (bp)  bp)
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp
+
@bp
@
[ v (bp) (1 + ") y1 + v (bp) y1 + by (1  )"   y1] :
@W^v
@
=
@bp
@

 v (bp) "y1 +  (1  )" (1 + ")  y1
1  (1  )1+"

  y1

+(1  )"

1  
(1  )"
 Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (V (bp)  bp)
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp; (3.37)
where the term in the rst square bracket could be simplied as v (bp) "+ (1 )"(1+") 1+(1 )1+"
1 (1 )1+" =
 v (bp) "  1 (1+")(1 )"
1 (1 )1+" : It follows that
@W^v
@
=  @bp
@
y1

1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+" + v (bp) "

+(1  )"

1  
(1  )"
 Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (V (bp)  bp) (3.38)
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp:
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The terms in (3.38) can be further readjusted by adding and subtracting
R bp
0 [y (p)  y1] dp  R bp
0 v (p) [y (p)  y1] dp; while in the rst term one can consider that @bp@ := @bp@by @by@ where @by@ could
be computed by considering the denition of by in (3.36) so that after simplications one obtains
@W^v
@
=  @bp
@by @by@ y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

+(1  )"

1  
(1  )"
 Z bp
0
y (p) dp+ y1 (V (bp)  bp)
  (1 + ") (1  )"
Z bp
0
v (p) y(p)dp
 
Z bp
0
[y (p)  y1] dp+
Z bp
0
v (p) [y (p)  y1] dp
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp (3.39)
that leads to the following partition of the components
@W^v
@
=  @bp
@by @by@ y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

+ [1  (1 + ") (1  )"]
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] y(p)dp
 "(1  )" 1
Z bp
0
y (p) dp
+
Z bp
0
[v (p)  1] [y1   y (p)] dp: (3.40)
We now consider @W^v@y1 ; recalling that y(bp) = by and readjusting (3.34) we obtain
@W^v
@y1
=
h
v (bp) by (1  )"+1i @bp
@y1
  v (bp) [by   y1] @bp
@y1
+by (1  )" @bp
@y1
+  (V (bp)  bp)  y1 @bp
@y1
:
After rearranging the terms we get
@W^v
@y1
= [by (1  )"  [1  v (bp)] + by [1  v (bp)]  by [1  (1  )" v (bp)]  y1 [1  v (bp)]] @bp
@y1
+ (V (bp)  bp) :
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Note that the rst term that multiplies @bp@y1 has already been simplied in the above calcula-
tions for @W^v@ ; moreover we can consider that
@bp
@y1
:= @bp@by @by@y1 where @by@y1 could be computed by
considering the denition of by in (3.36) so that after substitutions we obtain
@W^v
@y1
=  @bp
@by @by@y1 y1

v (bp) "+ 1  (1 + ") (1  )"
1  (1  )1+"

+ (V (bp)  bp) :
Appendix B
In this appendix we recall the main aspects of the simulation procedure which is described in
Chapter 2 and then we provide additional tables whose results supplement those presented in
this chapter.
All simulations are based on a Pareto distribution of 1000 individuals gross wages. This
distribution is truncated both above and below and it is generated following Apps et al. (2014).
In particular, as in Apps et al. (2014) we assume that the lower bound is equal to 20, while
the upper bound corresponds to the 98th percentile5. This distribution is equivalent to the case
(1:a) in Apps et al. (2014) and the associated levels of inequality and polarization are 0.37 and
0.11 respectively.
In order to investigate the impact of the dispersion level on the optimal tax system, we
consider two alternative distributions characterized by di¤erent levels of inequality and po-
larization. These distributions are obtained by changing the bounds of the rst distribution,
keeping the mean constant. In particular, the second distribution is bounded between 17 and
1009, with pre-tax inequality and polarization equal to 0.45 and 0.10. The third distribution is
bounded between 25 and 142, while the level of inequality and polarization are 0.26 and 0.18.
The graph below illustrates these three distributions.
5Recall that the cdf of a Pareto distributed variable x is F (x) = 1    L
x

, where L is the scale parameter,
representing the lower bound of the distribution, while the parameter  is the Pareto index. Given L = 20 and
 = 1:4, it follows that the value associated to the upper bound is equal to 327:
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Fig. 3. Simulated gross wage distributions.
Recall that the agentsutility function adopted in the paper leads to a labour supply elasticity
which is constant throughout the entire distribution. Moreover, for a given wage distribution,
changes in the level of labour supply elasticity have two e¤ects: rst, they impact on the gross
income distribution in absence of taxation; second, they determine the individuals reaction
to taxation. In this work, we want to focus only on the second e¤ect, hence when the labour
supply elasticity changes, we keep constant the gross income distribution in absence of taxation.
To this end, we need an appropriate rescaling of the wage distribution, where each element is
raised to the power of (1 + ") (see equation (3.4) and set t = 0; k = 1= and  = "+1" ).
The simulations are performed by using a grid search method. More specically, we dene
the grids for the three tax rates and for the two thresholds. Then, for each combination of
these tax parameters we compute the value of the demo-grant which keeps the government
budget balanced and then we compute the value of social evaluation function. Last, we select
the combination of policy parameters associated with the highest social welfare.
The following tables report the simulations results for di¤erent tax systems, with two and
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three income brackets, under di¤erent regimes of the tax rates.
Simulations results for two brackets tax system
Table 11. Optimal tax system: Gini based SEF. Distribution 2.
I = 0:45: No-tax area Zero top marginal tax rate Opt.
G " y1 t a SW y1  a SW Syst.
0:10  0:01
18
12:6%
4:8%
98% 21:43 39:51
900
99:9%
98% 40:46 40:97 ZeroTop
0:10  0:1
22
46:2%
15:7%
84% 11:39 32:40
850
99:9%
80% 27:95 32:43 ZeroTop
0:10  0:15
23
52%
17:3%
77% 8:90 30:46
800
99:9%
72% 23:79 29:87 No-tax
0:10  0:20
25
59:8%
17:8%
73% 6:83 29:02
800
99:9%
64% 20:28 27:99 No-tax
0:10  0:40
32
74:9%
15:9%
58% 2:19 25:93
800
99:9%
37% 9:98 23:74 No-tax
0:10  0:60
37
80:9%
14:2%
48% 0:13 24:44
850
99:9%
18% 2:88 22:01 No-tax
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Table 12. Optimal tax system: Gini based SEF. Distribution 3:
I = 0:26: No-tax area Zero top marginal tax rate Opt.
G " y1 t a SW y1  a SW Syst.
0:10  0:01
26
10:4%
4:4%
96% 14:97 41:25
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99:5%
96% 39:85 41:22 No-tax
0:10  0:1
31
41:8%
13:2%
72% 4:86 35:25
127
98:4%
66% 23:72 34:49 No-tax
0:10  0:15
33
48:9%
13:5%
62% 2:51 33:90
128
98:5%
51% 17:26 32:82 No-tax
0:10  0:20
35
54:5%
13:2%
54% 0:89 33:02
129
98:6%
64% 20:28 27:99 No-tax
0:10  0:40
44
69:6%
9:6%
32%  2:49 31:47 25
0
0  4:80 30:62 No-tax
0:10  0:60
52
77:5%
7:1%
21%  3:68 30:98 25
0
0  4:80 30:62 No-tax
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Table 13. Optimal tax system: Polarization based SEF. Distribution 2
P = 0:10 No-tax area Zero top marginal tax rate Opt.
G " y1 t a SW y1  a SW Syst.
0:10  0:01
20
23:2%
2:7%
92% 18:81 41:81
158
95:9%
93% 33:09 41:84 ZeroTop
0:10  0:1
24
41:7%
3:2%
32% 2:40 38:63
63
84:4%
44% 9:65 38:80 ZeroTop
0:10  0:15
27
48:9%
1%
10%  2:64 38:31 59
82:9
20% 1:76 38:37 ZeroTop
0:10  0:20 17
0
0  4:80 38:28 17
0
0  4:80 38:28 Lump-sum
Table 14. Optimal tax system: Gini based SEF. Distribution 3
P = 0:18 No-tax area Zero top marginal tax rate Opt.
G " y1 t a SW y1  a SW Syst.
0:10  0:01
29
23:5%
2:8%
91% 11:99 41:75
93
92:2%
92% 37:02 41:79 ZeroTop
0:10  0:1
35
44:5%
3:2%
30%  0:56 38:68 66
81:6%
31% 8:21 38:67 ZeroTop
0:10  0:15
38
49:5%
0:8%
7%  3:87 38:44 25
0
0  4:80 38:43 No-tax
0:10  0:20 25
0
0  4:80 38:43 25
0
0  4:80 38:43 Lump-sum
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Simulations results for three brackets tax system
Table 15A.
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Table 15B.
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Table 16.
129
Table 17.
130
Table 18.
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Table 19.
132
Table 20.
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Chapter 4
Optimal Non-Welfarist Taxation
with Non-Constant Labour Supply
Elasticity
In this work we derive the socially desirable non-welfarist tax scheme under the assumption of
non-constant labour supply elasticity. We consider a class of social evaluation functions that
allows to formalize redistributive objectives related to income inequality and polarization.
The focus is on the optimal tax system collecting a given amount of per-capita revenue
when redistribution is not allowed. We consider a three brackets piecewise tax system with
two possible di¤erent tax rates regimes, i.e. convex where t1  t2  t3 and non-convex where
t1  t3  t2:
In the case of inequality concerns, the optimal tax system is convex with a no-tax area
which vanishes when the revenue requirement is high. For polarization concerns the optimal
tax schedule is non-convex.
Last, for social evaluation functions taking into account both inequality and polarization
considerations, the convex tax system is more likely to dominate the non-convex conguration
for high levels of inequality and polarization.
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4.1 Introduction
A typical optimal taxation model which aims at deriving the shape of the optimal tax schedule,
is formalized as a constrained maximization exercise. That is, a policy maker maximizes a
social welfare function subject to a budget constraint and taking into account agentsreactions
to taxation. Therefore, this exercise represents the formalization of the trade-o¤ between equity
and e¢ ciency which is at the core of the optimal taxation theory. In other words, the need
to satisfy the revenue requirement and the distributive objectives has to be balanced with the
e¢ ciency losses associated with the taxation.
Tuomala (1985) provides a simplied formula for the optimal linear tax which makes explicit
the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. In particular, the more responsive are the agents to income
taxation, the higher are the e¢ ciency costs and the lower the tax rate. At the same time, the
optimal tax rate is increasing in the level of inequality within the wage distribution. Another
formulation of the optimal linear tax, where this trade-o¤ is easily identiable, is the covariance
rule provided by Dixit and Sadmo (1977) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
Therefore, as demonstrated by Ebert and Moyes (2003 and 2007), the design of the redis-
tributive policy can not ignore agentsbehavioral responses to taxation. However, given the
complexity of the tax systems, agents can react along di¤erent potential dimensions. For in-
stance, agents may decide to change their labour supply or to stop working. The rst decision
is known as intensive margin, while the second is called extensive margin.1
Then, assessing labour supply responses to taxation is a crucial element in the design of
the optimal tax policy. Typically, these reactions are estimated within structural models and
measured by the wage labour supply elasticity. The picture arising from the empirical literature
is that these reactions di¤er according to the gender, the marital status and the socio-economic
background of agents, moreover there is no a broad consensus about the size of these reactions.2
In this work we take into account that agentsreactions to taxation can di¤er. In particular,
we consider the case where wage labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the level of agents
1Behavioral responses to taxation can involve the possibility to evade tax or the decision to shift income into
sources taxed with lower tax rate. However, in this work we do not consider these dimensions and we focus only
on reactions in terms of labour supply changes.
2See Bargain and Peichl (2016), Bargain et al. (2014), Meghir and Phillips (2008), Saez et. al (2009) for a
review of the literature on labour supply responses to taxation.
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wage. This scenario is consistent with the ndings of many studies (see Aaberge et al. 1995,
2002 and Aaberge and Colombino 2013). Then, we aim at deriving the optimal non-welfarist
tax system reducing income inequality and income polarization. More specically we want to
see how the assumption of non-constant labour supply elasticity changes the results obtained
in Chapter 2, where the focus was on the identication of the socially desirable mechanism
collecting a given level of per-capita revenue, under the assumption of constant labour supply
elasticity.
The introduction of non-constant elasticity represents the rst extension with respect to
Chapter 2. A second novelty is the consideration of a third weighting function taking into ac-
count at the same time both inequality and polarization concerns. In particular, this weighting
function is obtained as a combination of the two weighting functions adopted for inequality and
polarization considerations.
As in Chapter 2, here we consider a piecewise linear tax system with three income brackets
and no redistribution of the collected revenue.
The results we obtain are qualitatively in line with those derived in Chapter 2. More speci-
cally, the optimal tax system reducing income inequality is convex with increasing marginal tax
rates. As to polarization reduction the optimal tax system is non-convex, while for the third
weighting function combining inequality and polarization considerations, the optimal tax sys-
tem depends on the levels of pre-tax inequality and polarization. In particular, when inequality
and polarization before tax are high the optimal tax system is convex.
The di¤erences with respect to the results obtained in Chapter 2 are related to the features
of the labour supply elasticity prole. In particular, since we consider a labour supply elasticity
decreasing in the level of wage, we obtain that the tax rates in the rst bracket are always
lower than those derived in Chapter 2, where elasticity is constant and lower. Moreover, here
the median income is always within the rst interval and taxed with lower tax rates than in
Chapter 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey introduce the social
evaluation model used to evaluate the tax systems. The optimization problems faced by the non-
welfarist policy-maker and by each agent are described in Section 3. The numerical solutions
of the optimal tax systems are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 The social evaluation model
In this section we recall the social evaluation model adopted to evaluate alternative taxation
policies. In line with the exposition of Chapter 2 we consider a class of social evaluation
functions dened over net incomes, that allows to formalize redistributive objectives related
to inequality and polarization concerns. In particular, when taking into account inequality
considerations the redistributive objective could be quantied in terms of changes in the Gini
index of incomes. Then, an appropriate modication of the positional weighting function allows
to move, within the same social evaluation model, from inequality considerations to those
focusing on the polarization of incomes.
Let F (y) denote the cumulative income distribution function with quantile function y (p) =
inf fy : F (y)  pg and mean  (F ) = R 10 y (p) dp: Let v (p)  0 be a set of positional weights
depending on the individualsposition p 2 [0; 1] in the income ranking, such that R 10 v (p) dp = 1
and V (p) =
R p
0 v (t) dt:
The rank-dependent social evaluation function [SEF] (see Yaari, 1987, 1988 and Weymark,
1982) aggregates incomes weighted according to the individualsposition in the income ranking
and it is formalized as
Wv(F ) =
Z 1
0
v (p) y (p) dp: (4.1)
The specic non-welfarist distributive objective is formalized by the particular form of the
weighting function v (p). As argued in Chapter 2, we consider two families of weights taking
into account inequality or polarization considerations. More specically, when the focus is on
inequality concerns the weights are linearly decreasing in the individuals positions, moving
from poorer to richer individuals. Then, the weighting function v (p) can be formalized as
v (p) := vG (p) =

1  [ 2  12   p] if p  12
1  2  p  12 if p  12 : (4.2)
In the case of polarization considerations the weighting function is expressed as
v (p) := vP (p) =

2p+ 1 if p  12
2p  1 if p  12
; (4.3)
where weights are linearly increasing both below and above the median. Moreover, the weighting
137
function vP (p) exhibits a jump at the median position p = 1=2, and weights below the median
are higher than those below.
Under both approaches the social evaluation can be summarized by the mean income of
the distribution  (F ) and a linear index of dispersion Dv (F ) dependent on the choice of the
weighting function v. The SEF could then be decomposed as
Wv(F ) =  (F ) [1 Dv (F )] : (4.4)
However, in this work we also consider a third weighting function which is obtained as a linear
combination of (4.2) and (4.3) and it is formalized as
v (p) := vGP (p) =
1
2
vG (p) +
1
2
vP (p) =

1:5 if p  12
0:5 if p  12
: (4.5)
In other terms, according to (4.5) the weight attached to each net income is equal to the average
between the weights attached by the weighting functions (4.2) and (4.3). Then, all incomes
below (above) the median are weighted with the same weight equal to 1.5 (0.5). The graph
below illustrates the three weighting functions considered in this work.
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Fig.1. Weighting functions.
4.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, rst we formalize the optimal tax problem faced by a non-welfarist government
aimed at identifying the socially optimal three brackets piecewise tax system collecting a given
per-capita amount of revenue. Then, we present the agents optimization problem. To this
regard, di¤erently from Chapter 2 we adopt a specication of the agentsutility function leading
to a wage labour supply elasticity which is decreasing in the level of individualswage.
4.3.1 The governments optimization problem
A non-welfarist government maximizes a linear rank-dependent SEF dened over individuals
net incomes with generic non-negative positional weights v (p)
Wv =
Z 1
0
v (p) [y (p)  T (y (p))] dp; (4.6)
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where y (p) denotes the quantile function or the inverse of the income distribution. Let p1 :=
supfp : y(p) = y1g and p2 := supfp : y(p) = y2g with y (p1) = y1 and y (p2) = y2 denoting the
two income thresholds of the considered tax system, where F (y1) = p1 and F (y2) = p2. The
tax function is denoted by T (y), where taxation is non-negative. The per capita government
budget constraint is Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp = G; (4.7)
where G represents the per capita revenue requirement. We consider a three brackets linear
tax function, with T (y) dened as follows
T (y) :=
8>>><>>>:
t1y   Z
t1y1 + t2 (y   y1)  Z
t1y1 + t2 (y2   y1) + t3 (y   y2)  Z
if y  y1
if y1 < y  y2
if y > y2
; (4.8)
where Z is a demo-grant which can be negative (positive) in case of lump-sum taxation (sub-
sidy). In line with Chapter 2 we assume that Z is equal to zero. Moreover, we focus only on
tax schedules where t1  t2, and assume two possible regimes (convex and non-convex) of tax
rates depending on the ranking of t2 and t3. Convex system is such that t1  t2  t3, while
non-convex case considers congurations where t1  t3  t2:
The social optimization problem requires to maximize Wv with respect to the three tax
rates ti with i = 1; 2; 3, and the two income thresholds y1 and y2 where y1 < y2. The associated
Lagrangian function of the governments optimization problem is
max
t1;t2;t3;y1;y2
L =Wv + 

G 
Z 1
0
T (y (p)) dp

;
where  denotes the Lagrangian multiplier, measuring the welfare cost of an increase in the
revenue requirement.
The optimal tax system is such that groups of individuals could exhibit the same net income.
However, the interesting aspect of our formulation is that the optimal tax system substantially
di¤ers depending on whether the social objective is concerned about reducing inequality or with
reducing polarization.
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4.3.2 The agentsoptimization problem
In this work we consider agents endowed with preferences between consumption and leisure
formalized by the following utility function described in Onrubia et al. (2005)
U(x; l) = x +  (L  l) ; (4.9)
with  > 0 and 0 <  < 1, where x 2 R denotes the net disposable income/consumption
and l 2 [0; L] denotes the labour supply, which can not exceed a maximum level equal to L.
The utility function could also be expressed in terms of disposable income and leisure `; where
` = L   l: In this case given the above assumptions the function is strictly quasi-concave in x
and `.
Each agent is characterized by a productivity level formalized by the exogenous wage w > 0:
We assume that agents in the economy earn only a gross labour income income y = wl  0:
With no-taxation y = x; hence the derivative of the utility function (4.9) w.r.t. the labour
supply l is
@U(x; l)
@l
= wl 1    (L  l) 1 :
Then, setting this derivative equal to zero, one obtains that the optimal level of pre-tax labour
supply is
l =
L
 
w


w +
 
w

 = L
w 1 + 1
; (4.10)
where  = 1(1 ) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
The next graph illustrates the pre-tax individuals labour supply for three di¤erent values of
, i.e. 3, 2 and 1.5, which are associated with the highest, the central and the bottom curve
respectively.
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Fig. 2. Pre-tax optimal labour supply.
As Figure 2 shows, labour supply is increasing in the level of wage, that is individuals with
higher wage work longer hours, moreover as the level of  increases the labour supply curve
becomes higher and each individual increases his labour supply. Given (4.10) it follows that
the income in absence of taxation is
y = wl =
Lw
 + w 1
: (4.11)
From (4.10) one obtains that the wage labour supply elasticity is
"l;w =
@l
@w
w
l
=
(   1)
 + w 1
; (4.12)
which is positive for  > 1: Moreover, the labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the level of
individualswage, to this regard one can verify that the derivative of (4.12) w.r.t. the wage is
negative, that is
@"
@w
=   (   1)w
 2
( + w 1)2
< 0:
Figure 3 illustrates the pattern of the wage labour supply elasticity for values of  and  equal
to 2 and 4.5 respectively.
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Fig. 3. Labour supply wage elasticity.
Agents are subject to a taxation formalized by (4.8) that leads to the net disposable income,
considered in their utility function, obtained as x = y   T (y): Hence, one can equivalently
re-express the problem in the space (x; y) for each agent. In this case the utility function (4.9)
can be rewritten as
u(x; y) = U(x; y=w) = x +  (L  y=w) (4.13)
and the relation between x and y is
x := y   T (y) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  t1)y if y 2 Y1  [0; y1)
(t2   t1)y1 + (1  t2)y if y 2 Y2  [y1; y2)
(t2   t1)y1 + (t3   t2)y2 + (1  t3)y if y 2 Y3  [y2;1)
: (4.14)
Where Yi denotes the income set associated with the ith income bracket, while the set Y nyi 1
will denote the set Yi net of its lower element yi 1; where y0 = 0: Recall that we rule out the
possibility to redistribute the collected revenue, so that the demo-grant Z is set equal to zero.
Therefore, net incomes can be written in the general form as
x = y (1  ti) +
X
i
(ti   ti 1) yi 1: (4.15)
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The marginal rate of substitution between gross income y and net income x is
MRSyx =

w
 
L  yw
 1
x 1
; (4.16)
which is decreasing in the level of wage w; therefore in the space (x; y) the indi¤erence curves
are atter the higher is the individuals wage.
From the agentsoptimization problem it follows that for gross income levels that do not
coincide with the thresholds y1 < y2 it should hold that MRSyx = (1  ti) when y 2 Yi: Given
the denition of y = wl one obtains that the above optimality condition requires yi 1 < y < yi;
that is
yi 1 <
Lw  


1 ti

(
P
i yi 1 (ti   ti 1))

(1 ti) 1 + w
 1 < yi; (4.17)
with the associated post-tax labour supply
lt =
L

w(1 ti)

  Pi yi 1 (ti   ti 1)
w (1  ti) +

w(1 ti)

 (4.18)
for i 2 f1; 2; 3g where y3 = +1; y0 = 0: Then, the three sets of values can be expressed in
terms of intervals of wages such that
0 <
Lw

(1 t1) 1 + w
 1 < y1
y1 <
Lw  


1 t2

(y1 (t2   t1))

(1 t2) 1 + w
 1 < y2
y2 <
Lw  


1 t3

[y2 (t3   t2) + y1 (t2   t1)]

(1 t3) 1 + w
 1 < y3:
Depending on what tax regime is considered with respect to the value of t3 compared to t1  t2;
we could have that under the convex regime some agents have a gross income equal to one of
the thresholds y1 and y2, or that if the tax system is non-convex, some agents could have a
gross income coinciding with y1; while around y2 the map of y w.r.t. w exhibits a jump.
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In particular if t1  t2  t3 the gross income distribution is as follows
y =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Lw

(1 t1) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y1w

< Q1
y1 if Q1  w
 
L  y1w
  Q2
Lw 


1 t2

[y1(t2 t1)]

(1 t2) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y1w

> Q2 and w
 
L  y2w

< Q3
y2 if Q3  w
 
L  y2w
  Q4
Lw 


1 t3

[y2(t3 t2)+y1(t2 t1)]

(1 t3) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y2w

> Q4
;
(4.19)
where the thresholds Qj , for j = 1; 2; 3; 4 are dened as follows
Q1 =


1  t1

[y1 (1  t1)] ;
Q2 =


1  t2

[y1 (1  t1)] ;
Q3 =


1  t2

[y2 (1  t2) + y1 (t2   t1)] ;
Q4 =


1  t3

[y2 (1  t2) + y1 (t2   t1)] :
The labour supply levels associated with the gross income distribution (4.19) are
l =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
L

w(1 t1)


w(1 t1)+

w(1 t1)

 if w  L  y1w  < Q1
y1=w if Q1  w
 
L  y1w
  Q2
L

w(1 t2)

 y1(t2 t1)
w(1 t2)+

w(1 t2)

 if w  L  y1w  > Q2 and w  L  y2w  < Q3
y2=w if Q3  w
 
L  y2w
  Q4
L

w(1 t3)

 y2(t3 t2) y1(t2 t1)
w(1 t3)+

w(1 t3)

 if w  L  y2w  > Q4
: (4.20)
The next gure illustrates the optimal combination of (y; x) for ve agents with di¤erent wage
levels under the convex regime of tax rates. Given that the MRSyx is decreasing in w, we have
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that as the wage increases the indi¤erence curves become atter.
Fig. 4. Gross & Net incomes under the CONVEX regime.
Under the non-convex regime (t1  t3  t2) the gross income distribution is
y =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Lw

(1 t1) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y1w

< Q1
y1 if Q1  w
 
L  y1w
  Q2
Lw 


1 t2

[y1(t2 t1)]

(1 t2) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y1w

> Q2 and w
 
L  y2w
  bQ
Lw 


1 t3

[y2(t3 t2)+y1(t2 t1)]

(1 t3) 1
+w 1
if w
 
L  y2w

> bQ
;
(4.21)
where the gross incomes in the rst income bracket and at the rst threshold are the same as
in the convex regime. The result changes for incomes within the second and the third bracket.
More specically, there are no agents having a gross income equal to y2, where the gross income
distribution exhibits a discontinuity. Hence, there exists a threshold level bQ distinguishing
between incomes within the second and the third bracket. We do not derive explicitly this
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threshold and in the numerical simulations, for all individuals located above y1 we identify
their optimal gross income as the one associated with the larger utility.
The optimal levels of labour supply under the non-convex regime are
l =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
L

w(1 t1)


w(1 t1)+

w(1 t1)

 if w  L  y1w  < Q1
y1=w if Q1  w
 
L  y1w
  Q2
L

w(1 t2)

 y1(t2 t1)
w(1 t2)+

w(1 t2)

 if w  L  y1w  > Q2 and w  L  y2w   bQ
L

w(1 t3)

 y2(t3 t2) y1(t2 t1)
w(1 t3)+

w(1 t3)

 if w  L  y2w  > bQ
: (4.22)
Figure 5 shows the optimal levels of gross income y and the associated net income x for four
agents with di¤erent wages under a non-convex regime of tax rates. Recall that higher wages
are associated with atter indi¤erence curves.
Fig. 5. Gross & Net income under the NON-convex regime.
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4.4 Simulations results
In this section we present numerical results showing the optimal tax system for each weighting
function under the two tax rates regimes (convex and non-convex). In line with Chapter 2,
simulations are based on a truncated Pareto distribution of 1000 gross wages. This distribution
is truncated both below and above, with the two bounds equal to 20 and 327 respectively. The
average gross wage is equal to 48.04. Then, in order to solve the optimal tax problem described
in the previous section, we need to assign a value to the parameters L,  and  of the utility
function (4.9). We set the maximal level of labour supply L equal to one, while the choice of
the other two parameters is crucial to determine the prole of the wage labour supply elasticity
(4.12). In particular, we set  and  in such a way that the pattern of the wage labour supply
elasticity is broadly consistent with the main ndings provided by the empirical literature. To
this end, recall that empirical estimates (see Bargain and Peichl 2016 and Meghir and Phillips
2008) of labour supply elasticity are higher for the extensive margin (choice between working
and not working) than for the intensive margin (choice on how much to work). The estimates
suggest also that some demographics groups (married women) are more responsive than others
(men). Moreover, labour supply elasticity tends to decline as the individualsincome increases.
The parameters  and  we choose lead to a wage labour supply elasticity prole broadly
consistent with the estimates obtained in Aaberge and Colombino (2013), although we do not
consider di¤erent demographics groups.
More specically we consider two di¤erent proles of the wage labour supply elasticity,
which are illustrated in Figure 6. Specically the solid (dashed) line is obtained setting  and
 equal to 0.67 (0.5) and 8.712 (4.5) respectively. In both case the average labour supply is
equal to 0.64.
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Fig. 6. Wage labour supply elasticity Distr. 1A and 1B.
As anticipated the elasticity sharply declines as the wage increases. Recall that we consider a
truncated wage distribution with lower bound equal to 20, then the elasticity at the bottom
percentile is around 0.5 and 1.3 for the dashed and the solid line respectively. However, from
(4.11) one can note that the combination of (, ) has an impact on the gross income distribution
in absence of taxation as well. Figure 7 illustrates the gross income distributions associated
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with the two pairs of (, ) considered above.
Fig. 7. Gross Income Distributions 1A and 1B.
In particular, Distribution 1A (1B) is associated with the elasticity prole illustrated by the
dashed (solid) line in Figure 6. The average gross income  and the median incomeM in absence
of taxation are respectively equal to 35.03 and 19.90 for Distribution 1A and 37.01 and 19.84
for Distribution 1B. Moreover, Distribution 1A exhibits lower levels of pre-tax inequality and
polarization than Distribution 1B, that is I1A = 0:47; P1A = 0:13 and I1B = 0:51; P1B = 0:15.
As in Chapter 2 the simulations are performed by using a grid search method.3 Recall also
that the revenue requirement G is dened as a fraction of the average gross income in absence
of taxation. More specically, we consider four di¤erent levels of G, i.e. 10%, 15%, 20% and
25% of the average gross income. We also assume that the value of the marginal tax rates can
not exceed an upper limit which we set equal to 50%:
3We dene the grids for t1; t2; y1 and y2; with t1  t2 and y1  y2: Then, for each combination of these policy
parameters we compute the value of t3 which satises the budget constraint and then we compute the value of
the SEF. Last, we identify the combination associated with the highest value of the SEF.
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Tables 1 and 2 report the simulations results for Distribution 1A and 1B respectively.
Table 1. Optimal tax system for Distribution 1A ( = 35; I = 0:47 and P = 0:13):
l= 0:64 Convex tax-system Non-convex tax-system Opt.
G t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 Syst.
Gini based SEF
0:10   0 30% 46% 40
0:83
54
0:90
0 44% 32%
42
0:87
260
0:99
Con.
0:15   0 36% 50% 24
0:72
36
0:85
0 50% 34%
26
0:80
260
0:99
Con.
0:20   8% 36% 50% 22
0:69
34
0:83
8% 50% 38%
24
0:78
230
0:99
Con.
0:25   18% 40% 50% 24
0:72
36
0:84
18% 50% 40%
26
0:78
230
0:99
Con.
Polarization based SEF
0:10   10% 10% 10% 350
1
350
1
7% 28% 8%
18
0:57
32
0:73
Non-C.
0:15   16% 16% 16% 300
1
300
1
13% 30% 14%
18
0:57
32
0:73
Non-C.
0:20   21% 21% 21% 300
1
300
1
20% 34% 20%
18
0:58
30
0:72
Non-C.
0:25   27% 27% 27% 300
1
300
1
26% 38% 26%
16
0:54
28
0:71
Non-C.
(1/2Gini + 1/2 Polarization) based SEF
0:10   0 19% 24% 20
0:58
46
0:83
0 22% 1%
20
0:60
260
0:99
Non-C.
0:15   3% 27% 31% 18
0:58
34
0:78
3% 30% 4%
18
0:59
260
0:99
Non-C.
0:20   12% 29% 33% 18
0:57
40
0:81
12% 32% 14%
18
0:58
230
0:99
Non-C.
0:25   22% 31% 34% 18
0:55
34
0:77
22% 34% 22%
18
0:57
230
0:99
Non-C.
Note. The two values reported in the columns y1 and y2 express the thresholds in
terms of the income level and the associated percentile in the income distribution.
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Table 2. Optimal tax system for Distribution 1B ( = 37; I = 0:51 and P = 0:15):
l= 0:64 Convex tax-system Non-convex tax-system Opt.
G t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 t1 t2 t3 y1 y2 Syst.
Gini based SEF
0:10   0 34% 50% 53
0:86
83
0:93
0 48% 46%
55
0:89
89
0:93
Con.
0:15   0 32% 50% 29
0:75
51
0:88
0 48% 40%
31
0:83
300
0:99
Con.
0:20   5% 36% 50% 21
0:70
41
0:86
6% 50% 40%
25
0:80
300
0:99
Con.
0:25   16% 38% 50% 21
0:69
41
0:85
16% 50% 40%
25
0:79
300
0:99
Con.
Polarization based SEF
0:10   0 18% 24% 19
0:58
120
0:94
0% 24% 18%
19
0:61
31
0:72
Non-C.
0:15   5% 24% 28% 17
0:57
110
0:94
5% 30% 24%
17
0:61
25
0:68
Non-C.
0:20   13% 28% 32% 17
0:58
105
0:93
14% 32% 28%
17
0:61
25
0:69
Non-C.
0:25   23% 32% 36% 15
0:55
110
0:94
24% 36% 32%
15
0:58
23
0:67
Non-C.
(1/2Gini + 1/2 Polarization) based SEF
0:10   0 18% 34% 29
0:70
83
0:91
0 28% 24%
35
0:77
300
0:99
Con.
0:15   0 26% 40% 19
0:62
73
0:90
0 32% 14%
19
0:66
260
0:99
Con.
0:20   6% 32% 44% 17
0:62
65
0:89
6% 38% 28%
17
0:66
300
0:99
Con.
0:25   17% 34% 46% 17
0:61
63
0:89
17% 40% 30%
17
0:54
300
0:77
Con.
For both distributions the optimal tax system reducing inequality is convex with increasing
marginal tax rates. The tax rate in the rst income bracket is set equal to zero unless when
the revenue requirement is high (0.20% and 0.25%). However, note that Distribution 1A is
characterized by a narrow rst bracket and higher tax rates in the rst two brackets than
Distribution 1B (compare top left panel of Tables 1 and 2). This result is related to the fact that
Distribution 1A exhibits lower wage labour supply elasticity at the bottom than Distribution
1B (see Figure 6). When the required revenue increases the marginal tax rates in the rst two
brackets increase, while the two income thresholds decrease.
This result is qualitatively in line with the results we obtain in Chapter 2, where the wage
labour supply elasticity is assumed to be constant throughout the entire distribution. However,
di¤erently from there, here the rst income threshold is always greater than the median income.
In Chapter 2, indeed, we obtain that for low values of elasticity and high revenue requirements
the median income is taxed with a marginal tax rate which is almost equal to the maximal
admissible. To this regard, the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are more consistent with
those in Chapter 2 related to the case of high elasticity.
When the governments non-welfarist objective shifts to polarization concerns the optimal
tax system, as obtained in Chapter 2, becomes non-convex. This result holds for both distrib-
utions (see central panel of Tables 1 and 2). More specically, the optimal tax system reducing
polarization requires a central bracket with a high marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rates
increase with the revenue requirement (see central right panel of Tables 1 and 2). Comparing
the optimal non-convex tax systems reducing polarization for Distributions 1A and 1B two in-
teresting ndings should be noted. First, the central bracket is larger in the case of Distribution
1A (compare columns y1 and y2 of central right panel of Tables 1 and 2). Second, marginal
tax rates are higher for Distribution 1A, but the interesting aspect is the prole of the two
marginal tax rates t1 and t3. In particular, in the case of Distribution 1A we have that t1 = t3,
while for Distribution 1B it happens that t1 < t3: The reasons for choosing t1 < t3 is related
to the fact that the wage labour supply elasticity of the incomes in the bottom percentiles is
higher in Distribution 1B than in Distribution 1A (see Figure 6). The di¤erence in terms of the
wage elasticity prole has another consequence. In particular, when we consider the optimal
tax system reducing polarization under the convex regime we obtain that for Distribution 1A
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this tax system is based on a proportional taxation, while for Distribution 1B the marginal tax
rates are increasing with the optimal t1 always lower than the one obtained for Distribution
1A (compare central left panel of Tables 1A and B). The median income falls within the rst
income brackets, this result is consistent with the conclusions of Chapter 2, where the median
income belongs to the central interval only for low levels of labour supply elasticity.
Last, for SEFs taking into account both inequality and polarization concerns we have that
the optimal tax system is non-convex in the case of Distribution 1A and convex for Distribution
1B (compare bottom panel of Tables 1 and 2). Specically, for Distribution 1A, where the top
wage elasticity is greater than Distribution 1B, it is socially desirable to reduce the marginal
tax rate on the extreme right tail. The marginal tax rates with this SEF are lower than those
obtained with the Gini and Polarization SEFs, except for the levels of t1 which are comprised
between the two values obtained under the Gini and Polarization SEFs. As to the two income
thresholds, we have that y1 is in line with the values obtained in the case of Polarization SEFs,
while y2 coincides with the levels associated to the Gini SEFs.
When we consider Distribution 1B, characterized by a high levels of inequality and polar-
ization and showing higher (lower) level of labour supply elasticity at the bottom (top), the
optimal tax system considering inequality and polarization concerns, requires increasing mar-
ginal tax rates. Both the optimal marginal tax rates and the income thresholds are comprised
in between the levels obtained with the Gini and Polarization SEFs.
4.5 Concluding remarks
In this work we extend the analysis of Chapter 2, where we investigate how the specic govern-
ments redistributive objective impacts on the shape of the optimal tax system. As in Chapter
2 we consider a piecewise three brackets linear tax schedule and we focus on the optimal tax
scheme collecting a given amount of per-capita revenue under the assumption of no redistrib-
ution of the collected income. We analyze two di¤erent regimes of the tax rates depending on
the ranking of t2 and t3, i.e. convex t2  t3 and non-convex t2  t3:
With respect to Chapter 2, the novelty of this work is that, here we replace the assumption
of constant labour supply elasticity throughout the entire distribution, with a more realistic
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assumption that elasticity changes according to individualscharacteristics. In particular, in
line with the empirical estimates of other works (Aaberge and Colombino 2013), we assume
that labour supply elasticity is decreasing in the level of individualswage. Moreover, we intro-
duce also a third weighting function, which is obtained as a combination of the two weighting
functions expressing concerns for inequality or polarization reduction.
The results we obtain qualitatively conrm those obtained in Chapter 2, that is the optimal
tax system changes according to the non-welfarist redistributive objective. In particular the
optimal tax system for inequality reduction is convex exhibiting increasing marginal tax rates.
With respect to Chapter 2 we nd that the rst bracket is wider (including always the median
income) and taxed with lower marginal tax rate. This result is related to the introduction of
non-constant elasticity with high values in the bottom percentiles.
As to polarization SEFs the optimal tax system is non-convex, however the marginal tax
rates are lower than those obtained in Chapter 2. Hence, the main implication of the assumption
of non-constant elasticity is the reduction of the tax burden for income percentiles exhibiting
higher elasticity.
Last, when the weighting function takes into account both inequality and polarization con-
cerns, the shape of the optimal tax system depends on the level of initial dispersion. More
specically, for high level of pre-tax inequality and polarization the optimal tax scheme is
convex, while when the levels of inequality and polarization are low the optimal system is non-
convex. In both cases the tax rates and the income thresholds are comprised in between the
values associated with the tax system obtained for Gini and polarization SEFs respectively.
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